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resumo 
 
 
A crise económica e financeira global, que atingiu a maior parte dos sistemas 
económicos regionais e nacionais por todo o mundo no final de 2007, tem 
alertado para uma maior reflexão sobre o papel desempenhado pelas 
empresas multinacionais (EMNs) estrangeiras nas economias receptoras. Os 
governos geralmente encaram o investimento directo estrangeiro (IDE) e a 
presença das empresas estrangeiras como algo altamente desejável. Contudo, 
até que ponto é que as actividades das multinacionais estrangeiras contribuem 
para a gravidade dos efeitos da crise ou, em alternativa, permitem atenuar 
alguns dos seus piores efeitos, ao reduzirem o volume de despedimentos e as 
contracções de produção nas economias acolhedoras?  
Com base em dados ao nível da empresa da base de dados Quadros de 
Pessoal e num período temporal integrando períodos de estabilidade e de 
abrandamento económico, a presente dissertação avalia em que medida as 
subsidiárias estrangeiras apresentaram um comportamento diferenciado face 
às empresas locais durante os períodos de abrandamento ultrapassados pela 
economia Portuguesa, com o objectivo de aferir a capacidade potencial das 
empresas estrangeiras em agirem como elementos estabilizadores ou 
destabilizadores durante períodos de crise. Em particular, centramos a nossa 
análise em duas medidas de performance ao nível da empresa (crescimento 
do emprego e crescimento do volume de negócios), bem como nas 
perspectivas de sobrevivência e taxas de falência. 
Depois de controlarmos por diversas características das empresas e das 
indústrias, não encontramos diferenças significativas entre as empresas 
estrangeiras e domésticas no que respeita ao crescimento do emprego, 
embora os resultados sugiram que a propriedade estrangeira pode ter afectado 
positivamente a taxa de crescimento do volume de vendas durante as 
recessões. Relativamente às tendências de sobrevivência, as empresas 
estrangeiras e domésticas não exibiram diferenças significativas nos padrões 
de sobrevivência e falência ao longo dos períodos de abrandamento 
económico.  
De um ponto de vista de política, apesar de os nossos resultados não 
contestarem a opção por políticas centradas na atracção de IDE, a evidência 
empírica encontrada para Portugal não justifica a escolha de uma política 
discriminatória a favor das empresas estrangeiras. Os resultados mostram que 
as EMNs estrangeiras não exercem um efeito destabilizador nas economias 
acolhedoras. Porém, não existem razões sólidas para esperar ganhos 
positivos do IDE, nomeadamente no que respeita ao seu papel potenciador na 
recuperação económica. 
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abstract 
 
The global financial and economic crisis, which struck most of the world’s 
national and regional economic systems in the late 2007, has led to calls for 
further reflection on the role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host 
economies. Governments commonly seem to view inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign firms’ presence as highly desirable. However, in 
what extent do foreign multinationals’ activities contribute to the severity of 
crisis’ effects or otherwise allow to mitigating some of the worst effects, by 
reducing lay-offs and output contractions in the host countries?  
Using firm-level data from Quadros de Pessoal database and a time span 
integrating periods of economic stability and economic downturns, this 
dissertation evaluates in what extent foreign subsidiaries have behaved 
differently than local firms during the slowdown periods experienced by 
Portuguese economy, in order to assess the potential ability of foreign firms to 
act as stabilizer or disturbing elements during crises. In particular, we focus on 
two performance measures at the firm-level (employment growth and sales 
turnover growth) and also on firm survival prospects and failure rates.  
After controlling for several firm-level and industry-level characteristics, we find 
no significant differences between foreign and domestic firms in what concerns 
employment growth, though the results suggest that foreign ownership may 
have positively affected firms’ sales turnover growth during recessions. 
Regarding survival trends, foreign and domestic firms did not exhibit different 
chances of survival and exit throughout economic slowdowns.  
For policy, despite our results do not contest the option for active FDI attraction 
policies, the empirical evidence found for Portugal is not supportive of a 
discriminatory policy in favour of foreign firms. The results indicate that foreign 
MNEs do not exert a disturbing effect on host economy. However, there are no 
strong reasons to expect positive gains from FDI in what concerns its potential 
recovery-enhancer role.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
“ O capital estrangeiro é como o vento: só entra onde tem saída.” 
 
Albert Hirschman 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
The global financial and economic crisis, which struck most of the world‟s 
national and regional economic systems in the late 2007, has led to calls for further 
reflection on the role played by foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host 
economies. Governments commonly seem to view inward foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and foreign firms‟ presence as highly desirable (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004; Markusen 
and Nesse, 2007). However, in what extent do foreign MNEs‟ activities contribute to the 
severity of global economic crisis or otherwise allow to mitigating some of the worst 
effects, by reducing lay-offs and output contraction in the host countries? 
There is a current debate on the role of foreign firms in face of a crisis and their 
respective impact in host country‟s economy. Foreign MNEs either can help to alleviate 
the crisis‟ effects owing to their well documented ownership advantages and their 
consequent superior performance, or can add to macroeconomic instability due to the ease 
with which they can transfer production facilities from one country to another. The 
empirical evidence on these matters is still scarce, besides their strong focus on the context 
of the Asian financial crisis and the ambiguous conclusions hitherto achieved.  
Throughout this dissertation, based on firm-level data from Quadros de Pessoal
1
 
database, we will attend on how foreign and domestic firms operating in Portuguese 
manufacturing industries have behaved over a time span of about 20 years, integrating 
periods of economic stability and also stages of economic downturn. In particular, we will 
focus on two performance measures at the firm-level (namely, employment growth and 
sales turnover growth) and also on firm survival prospects and failure rates. Overall, our 
main aim is to assess in what extent foreign subsidiaries have behaved differently than 
local firms during the slowdown periods experienced by Portuguese economy during the 
                                                          
1
 We acknowledge GEP for allowing the use of the original data. The data analysis, results and conclusions 
are of the author‟s own responsibility. GEP stands for Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento from MTSS 
(Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social - Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity). 
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early 1990s and 2000s, in order to evaluate the potential ability of foreign firms to act as 
stabilizer or disturbing elements during crises. Accordingly, we attend on the effect arising 
from foreign ownership upon firm performance and firm survival during periods of 
economic slowdown, also attending on other factors which are likely to discriminate 
among firms, namely firms‟ characteristics (in particular, firm size) and the industries‟ 
specificities.  
Figure 1 depicts the content of the remainder chapters of this dissertation. After 
this first introduction, we will start with a deep survey of the main literature on these 
matters throughout Chapter 2. We initiate the discussion by reviewing the comparative 
studies between foreign and domestic firms searching for significant differences at 
performance and survival. Accordingly, section 2.2 surveys the empirical results for the 
foreign ownership- firm performance link, while section 2.3 focuses on the empirical 
findings for the relationship between foreign ownership and firm survival. These first 
sections help to support the expectation of a different behaviour among foreign and 
domestic firms under a crisis environment, so that section 2.4 deals with the available 
empirical studies searching for a potential singular role played by foreign MNEs operating 
in host countries, either during or after a crisis event. Finally, section 2.5 discusses some 
likely moderating factors of foreign ownership effect under crises. Besides foreign MNEs‟ 
motivations and crisis‟ specificities, we focus on firm-level and industry-level 
characteristics where foreign and domestic firms are commonly found to differ, specially 
attending on the moderating impact arising from firm size. After this in-depth literature 
review, we derive our research questions, which will be empirically addressed in the 
subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 3 provides a first look into the data. We start by presenting the empirical 
setting used to assess our main research questions, followed by an assessment of foreign 
and domestic firms‟ evolution in Portuguese manufacturing industry, particularly looking 
at differences at entry patterns, size and scale, operational performance, human capital 
levels and geographical location. In addition, the evolution patterns of foreign and 
domestic firms of different size classes is also discussed, in order to assess whether, 
unconditionally, substantial differences arise from the comparisons between the diverse 
groups of firms.   
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In Chapters 4 and 5 we empirically assess the differences between foreign and 
domestic firms during economic slowdowns, in what concerns their performance/growth 
patterns and exit risks. Precisely, in Chapter 4, we use panel data models to appraise in 
what extent foreign and domestic firms have behaved differently at employment growth 
and sales turnover growth
2
. In Chapter 5, we draw on duration models and time-to-event 
data to perform a survival analysis, aiming to evaluate the significance of foreignness for 
firm exit during recessions. Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes by summing up the results of this 
study, discussing as well their implications from a policy point of view.      
 
 
Figure 1. Outline integrating the content of the dissertation  
 
 
 
On the whole, we find no significant differences between foreign and domestic 
firms in what concerns employment growth, though the results suggest that foreign 
ownership may have positively affected firms‟ sales turnover growth during recessions. 
Regarding survival trends, after controlling for several characteristics of firms and 
industries, we find that foreign firms exhibit higher failure rates over the time, although 
during recessions foreign and domestic firms do not exhibit different chances of survival 
and exit.  
                                                          
2
 Employment growth and sales turnover growth are frequently used as measures of firm growth and firm 
performance. Turnover and sales are frequently used interchangeably in the literature (Coad, 2009; Bamiatzi, 
Bozos and Nikolopoulos, 2010).  
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth empirical study of this issue 
using a long time span of micro data for Portugal, a country with great challenges for 
convergence and with an active policy towards inward FDI. Accordingly, this study 
contributes to the existing literature on foreign firms‟ role during crises by providing as 
well novel empirical evidence on the Portuguese experience. Furthermore, this study 
connects the main contributes of the literature on International Business (IB), Industrial 
Organization (IO) and Organizational Ecology (OE) over the recent years, with a current 
and timely debated setting of global economic crisis, which contributes to the originality of 
this research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINITION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
  
 
2.1. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
To what extent do foreign firms‟ activities contribute to the severity of global 
economic crisis or otherwise allow to mitigating some of the worst effects, by reducing 
lay-offs and output contraction in the host countries? Foreign MNEs are said to possess 
firm-specific advantages which make them able to surpass their liability of foreignness 
(Zaheer, 1995) and to outperform their domestic counterparts in the host economy (Hymer, 
1976; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Caves, 1996). Their well documented ownership-
specific advantages (Dunning, 1988), which include financial advantages, knowledge 
advantages and other advantages acquired from multinationality, often shift the changes of 
firm-level performance, growth, survival and exit. Foreign firms seem thus to be in a better 
position to compete and to face the obstacles in the market, which lead us to the 
expectation of a potential different behaviour among foreign and domestic firms during a 
crisis. Accordingly, the next two sections of this chapter will, respectively, survey the 
literature on the differences between foreign and domestic firms concerning several 
performance measures and survival patterns, thus highlighting the mixed results hitherto 
obtained for the relationship between foreign ownership, firm performance and firm 
survival.  
However, under a crisis context, we still know little about these relationships, as 
the results provided by the literature lead us to doubt whether under a crisis environment 
foreign MNEs are affected or react differently than domestic firms. Foreign MNEs can 
help to alleviate the crisis‟ effects owing to their specific advantages, which provide them 
the ability to easily access the needed resources, to use internal capital markets when faced 
with financial constraints or to obtain overseas credit through their parent companies, 
which allows them to expand their economic activity even in turbulent periods (Desai et 
al., 2004; Blalock et al., 2005; Chung and Beamish, 2005a, 2005b), and thus stabilize the 
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economy. On the other hand, foreign firms may react more adversely to crises as it is easier 
for them to transfer production facilities internationally (Görg and Strobl, 2003; Lee and 
Makhija, 2009), to cut operational costs (Gao and Eshaghoff, 2004), to replace their sales 
in host countries by higher levels of exports (Lipsey, 2001), or in the limit, to exit the local 
economy if the host market and/or production conditions are less attractive (Álvarez and 
Görg, 2009). 
For this reason, section 2.4 reviews the empirical studies searching for a potential 
(un)stabilizer role played by foreign firms under a crisis environment, where firm 
performance measures and firm survival are over again emphasized. An important detail 
refers to the fact that available firm-level studies have dealt with firms‟ responses and 
evolution either during crises or after crises. However, it is important to distinguish firms‟ 
behaviour during and after a crisis event, since very different results may be obtained 
conditional on a short-term or medium/longer-term analysis, as the survey of literature 
shows.  
Finally, some moderating factors likely to interfere with the foreign ownership effect 
under crises have also been suggested by some authors in the literature. In fact, the way 
foreign firms behave under a crisis context may depend on several specificities as foreign 
MNEs‟ motivations and a number of firm-level characteristics. Accordingly, section 2.5 
will discuss some of the main factors likely to moderate the impact of being foreign-owned 
during a crisis, particularly attending on the main characteristics where foreign and 
domestic firms more often differ and thus may contribute to a distinct behaviour during 
slowdowns. Additionally, we also pay a special attention to firm size as a moderating 
factor able to explain what happens to firms over periods of deep economic crises. At last, 
in section 2.6 we conclude, by defining our research questions.  
Overall, this dissertation integrates the most important contributes given by different 
strands of the literature, namely the Organizational Ecology and Industrial Organization 
with those of International Business and the theory of multinational enterprise (MNE). 
Moreover, we establish a connection between those contributes and a current setting of 
global economic crisis and thus try to provide a novel contribute to the several branches of 
the literature on these matters.  
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2.2. FIRM PERFORMANCE: DOES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MATTER? 
 
The FDI literature has early established that a reason why firms invest abroad is 
because they possess firm-specific advantages, not available to domestic firms in the host 
country (Vernon, 1966; Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1981; Caves, 1974). These ownership 
advantages and firm-specific assets, as better access to financial markets and superior 
managerial practices, very often assist foreign MNEs to achieve a differentiated behaviour 
and to be better performers than purely domestic firms. 
There are two main theoretical approaches that are important to explain 
performance differences between firms – Industrial Organization, a neoclassical 
perspective based on industry‟s characteristics and firm‟s specificities, and International 
Business, a more evolutionary theory based on arguments as ownership-advantages, 
location factors and incentives for internalization of some activities by foreign firms. Both 
viewpoints are crucial for understanding firm performance and why foreign firms may 
differ from domestic ones at performance and growth. Accordingly, there are strong 
reasons to expect that foreign ownership matters for firm dynamics. 
Along with the literature review conducted by Bellak (2004a) on the importance 
of performance gaps for economic policy, a part of the impact of inward FDI on the host 
economy depends on the existence of performance gaps between foreign firms and their 
domestic counterparts. Actually, the more similar the firms, the smaller will be the 
potential spillovers arising from foreign presence. On the other hand, if gaps are very large, 
such externalities arise to a small extent, especially if local firms lack the required 
absorptive capacity to learn the best practices of foreign firms (Bloömstrom and Kokko, 
1998; Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2002; Görg and Greenaway, 2003). For that reason, the role 
of foreign ownership and “multinationality” in explaining the differences between foreign 
and domestic firms at performance levels has been occupying a significant body of IB and 
FDI literature over the recent years. However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive – 
several studies demonstrate that foreign affiliates perform better than domestic enterprises 
(e.g., Kimura and Kiyota, 2007), while many others prove that such gap is a statistical 
artefact and that the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is 
spurious (e.g., Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2002) or even negative (e.g., Luo and Tan, 1998). 
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Table 1 summarizes the results of about 30 empirical studies on the link between foreign 
ownership and firm performance, reflecting the mixed evidence found in the literature. 
        
 
2.2.1. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Willmore (1992) has early concerned with the significance of performance gaps 
between foreign and domestic firms in Brazil. By focusing on firm performance at exports, 
his study applied to more than 17.000 manufacturing firms concluded that foreign-owned 
exporters registered on average 65% more exports than otherwise comparable 
domestically-owned firms. Moreover, foreign firms in Brazil were found to be typically 
larger, skill intensive and paying 40% higher wages per employee. Similar conclusions 
were attained by Cabral (1996) for the Portuguese setting, where foreign firms are known 
to be highly export-oriented, relatively larger and good performers, and by Farinha and 
Mata (1996), who found that the effect of foreign ownership upon firm performance was 
clearly positive, not only concerning the value creation, but also for the job creation 
process in the long run. More recently, Cardoso (2008) focused on the top largest firms and 
corroborated the previous evidence for Portugal, showing that foreign and domestic firms 
differ at comparative performance, even according to different performance measures.  
For many other European countries there is strong evidence of a positive link 
between foreign ownership and firm performance. For Austria, Gugler (1998) used a 
sample of 600 largest non-financial corporations to show that foreign firms presented a rate 
of return of 10.4%, which was significantly higher than the overall median of 8.4%. 
Empirical evidence for UK was enriched by the studies of Oulton (1998a, 1998b) and 
Griffith and Simpson (2001), who analyzed different performance proxies and both the 
manufacturing (Oulton, 1998a; Griffith and Simpson, 2001) and the services sectors 
(Oulton, 1998b). The performance gaps remained even after controlling for structural 
differences between firms, which confirmed the role of multinationality in explaining the 
firms‟ dynamics.   
For Ireland, Görg and Strobl (2003a) tested the significance of foreign control 
upon employment persistence and showed, in line with Farinha and Mata (1996), that jobs 
generated in surviving foreign firms are more persistent than jobs created in indigenous 
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firms. Employment growth was also found to be greater and more secure within foreign 
firms by Özler and Taymaz (2004) and Girma and Gong (2008), in Turkey and China 
respectively, where foreign ownership seems to be understood as an important tool to 
generate jobs.  
In Asia, domestic firms also seem to be in disadvantage against foreign MNEs‟ 
affiliates. Ramstetter‟s (1999) study shows that the average productivity of labour and 
export propensities are often higher in foreign MNEs than in local firms operating in Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. Blomstroöm and Sjöholm (1999) and 
Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) used in turn the empirical settings of Indonesia and India 
respectively to test whether firm performance measures depended on different levels of 
foreign ownership. Both agreed with foreign firms‟ superiority at all levels, but while the 
formers showed that foreign affiliates had better performance whatever their degree of 
foreign control, the last found that only firms with foreign participation above 50% 
benefited from a “performance bonus”.  
The superiority of foreign-owned firms in China, either at sales levels, 
productivity or profitability was particularly discussed by Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) 
and Girma and Gong (2008). Over again, foreign ownership was found to have strong 
positive effects on firm performance, being more than a summary of superior 
characteristics and ownership advantages. This general scenario observed around the world 
was also translated by the study of Criscuolo (2005) applied to OECD countries. By 
comparing the labour productivity among foreign and domestic firms over the late 1990s, 
the study concludes that foreign affiliates tend to outperform their domestic counterparts, 
particularly in manufacturing industries, where they tend to concentrate in high technology 
and high value added industries. This and the previous empirical contributes have thus 
shown that, after controlling for differences in industrial distribution of foreign and 
domestic firms, as well as firm-level specificities, the performance differences persist 
between the two groups of firms, with foreign-owned firm outperforming domestic ones. 
Hence, a significant branch of the literature supports the idea that foreign ownership 
significantly matters for firm growth and performance.  
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Reference* Country [Period] Performance Measure Methodology 
FO impact  
on firm 
performance 
Kumar (1984) UK [1968-1976] 
Profitability (average 1972-1976) OLS - 
Firm Growth (average 1972-1976) OLS n.s. 
Kim & Lyn (1990) USA [1980-1984] Profitability 
Univariate Analysis and 
MAXR procedure 
- 
Willmore (1992) Brazil [1980] Export Performance Cross-section regression + 
Cabral (1996) 
Portugal 
[1986-1992] 
Export Performance Tobit + 
Farinha & Mata (1996) 
Portugal 
[1982-1992] 
Value added per employee and 
employment persistence 
Random-effects panel data 
estimations 
+ 
Price-Cost Margin 
Random-effects panel data 
estimations 
- 
Doms & Jensen (1998) USA [1987] 
Value added, TFP, wages, Capital 
intensity 
Cross-section regression + 
Gugler (1998) Austria [1996] Rate of Return and Profitability 
OLS, Descriptive Statistics 
and Data Analysis 
+ 
Luo & Tan (1998) China [1994] 
Return on Sales and Return on 
Assets 
Mutiple Regression and 
Canonical Analysis 
- 
Oulton (1998a) UK [1973-1993] Gross and Net Output, Value Added 
Cross-section regressions 
and Panel data models 
+ 
Oulton (1998b) UK [1995] Productivity Cross-section regression + 
Blomström & Sjöholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia [1991] Labor Productivity Cross-section regression + 
Chhibber & Majumdar 
(1999) 
India [before and 
after 1991] 
Return on Sales and Return on 
Assets 
Cross-section regression + 
Ramstetter (1999) Asia [1970-1996] Value added per plant T-test statistics + 
Matalony (2000) USA [1992] Return on Assets 
Univariate Regression; 
Descriptive Statistics 
- 
Griffith & Simpson 
(2001) 
UK [1980-1996] Value added per worker Panel data models + 
Pfaffermayr & Bellak 
(2002) 
Austria [1997/2000] 
Labor productivity, Investment 
propensity and cash-flows 
Probit and Ordered Probit n.s. 
Görg & Strobl (2003a) Ireland [1973-1996] Employment Persistence 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model 
+ 
Özler & Taymaz (2004) Turkey [1983-1996] Employment Growth Tobit + 
Barbosa & Louri (2005) 
Portugal [1992] and 
Greece [1997] 
Return on Assets (both net and 
gross) 
Quantile Regression n.s. 
Criscuolo (2005) OECD [1995-2001] Labor Productivity 
Descriptive Statistics and 
Data analysis 
+ 
Benfratello & Sembenelli 
(2006) 
Italy [1992-1999] TFP GMM n.s. 
Hallward-Driemeier, 
Wallsten & Xu (2006) 
China [2000] 
Sales growth, investment rate, TFP 
and employment growth 
Cross-section regression + 
Xu, Pan, Wu & Yim 
(2006) 
China [1998/2002] Profit, Sales, Assets, ROA, ROS Multiple-way ANOVA n.s. 
Aydin, Sayim & Yalama 
(2007) 
Turkey [2003/2004] 
Return on Assets T-test statistics + 
Operating Profit Margin T-test statistics n.s. 
Return on Equity T-test statistics n.s. 
Kimura & Kiyota (2007) Japan [1994-1998] 
Return on Assets, Return on Equity, 
Value added and TFP 
Probit + 
Móden, Norbäck & 
Persson (2007) 
Poland [1995-2000] Labor Productivity Panel data models + 
Cardoso (2008) Portugal [2006] 
Profit Rate, Return on Sales and 
Value Added per employee 
Cross-section regression; 
Quantile Regression 
+ 
Girma & Gong (2008) China [1999-2005] 
Employment Growth, TFP and 
Profitability 
Fixed effects GMM 
estimation 
+ 
Karlsson, Lundin, 
Sjöholm & He (2009) 
China [1998-2004] Employment Growth 
Panel data models; 
Heckman 2-step estimations 
n.s. 
(+) means that foreign firms perform better than domestic firms; (-) means that foreign firms perform worse than domestic firms; (n.s. = 
not significant) means that being foreign-owned does not matter for firm performance, thus no significant performance gaps exist 
between foreign and domestic firms.  
Source: Own elaboration, *Studies are presented in a chronological order.  
 
Table 1. Empirical evidence on the foreign ownership impact upon firm performance 
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2.2.2. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEGATIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE  
 
Despite a large branch of literature sustains that foreign-owned firms are 
significantly better performers than domestic firms at several levels, conflicting results 
were early presented and discussed in IB research. As an example, Kumar (1984) used the 
British experience to evaluate whether firms with overseas production significantly 
differed from those with only domestic operations. By selecting a sample of 700 UK firms, 
the conclusions contested the superiority of foreign subsidiaries commonly found in many 
comparable studies. Indeed, the degree of overseas operations seemed not to have any 
relevant influence upon firms‟ growth, still exerting a negative impact on profit rates and 
investment levels. Likewise, for USA, Kim and Lyn‟s (1990) results indicated that foreign 
firms operating in US markets were less profitable than randomly selected domestic firms, 
presenting also higher debt levels over the early 1980s. Confirming these results, Matalony 
(2000) advanced as well that profitability is one firm-level characteristic where foreign 
firms usually perform worse than domestic firms, after an assessment of the return on 
assets of over than 2.000 firms. 
Very similar outcomes were obtained for other economies, like China and 
Portugal. Luo and Tan (1998) surveyed about 50 firms operating in Chinese electronics 
industry and showed that the environmental complexity and hostility, beside the risk-taking 
attitude of foreign affiliates, tend to justify their lower profitability and smaller returns, 
which validates the perspective of liability of foreignness  in MNE  theory  (e.g. Hennart,  
1982;  Zaheer,  1995). For the Portuguese case, Farinha and Mata (1996) also highlight the 
foreign disadvantage at price-cost margins, balancing the foreign advantage already stated 
in the previous section, namely at value added and employment persistence.  
 
 
2.2.3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEUTRAL FACTOR FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE  
 
Despite the conflicting results previously discussed, a third alternative conclusion 
may also be achieved, since the foreign ownership effect may arise from foreign firms‟ 
superiority at several firm-level and industry-level characteristics. Xu et al. (2006) 
revisited the Chinese case and showed that foreign-invested enterprises are not necessarily 
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better performers than domestic firms, not only in what concerns their profitability and 
returns, but also at sales levels and assets‟ value. Karlsson et al. (2009) go far within the 
Chinese context and prove that no significant differences arise between foreign and 
domestic firms at employment growth rates. Sustained by a large firm-level dataset for the 
period 1998-2004, the authors reveal that no pure ownership effect exists associated with 
foreign capital but, rather, other firm-level characteristics explain firm performance, as 
firm size, export shares, labour productivity, average wages and capital intensity.  
Benfratello and Sembenelli‟s (2006) outcomes on the Italian case confirmed as 
well that foreign ownership per se does not matter for firm‟s productivity, but that the 
country of origin possibly matters, given that only firms under US ownership were found 
to be more productive than other comparable enterprises of different nationalities
3
. For 
Turkey, Aydin et al. (2007) establish that foreign performance only differ from domestic 
one at return-on-assets (ROA), being thus equivalent in what concerns the operating profit 
margin and returns on equity.  
For Portugal and Greece, joining the opposite outcomes provided by Farinha and 
Mata (1996) and Cardoso (2008) on the Portuguese case, Barbosa and Louri (2005) 
evaluated the importance of foreign ownership for corporate performance. The results 
reject the hypothesis of foreign superiority, given that ownership ties did not make a 
significant difference on firm performance, especially in Portugal. For Greece, only foreign 
MNEs in the upper quantiles of gross profits were found to perform better than domestic 
firms.  
In summary, the evidence about performance gaps between foreign and domestic 
firms is far from conclusive. However, governments around the world still focus their 
policies aiming to attract foreign presence expecting that such a gap lead to numerous 
benefits for host economies and for local firms (e.g., Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004; Lim, 
2005; Markusen and Nesse, 2007), without being sure if foreign ownership accounts in 
some extent for potential performance gaps observed between firms. This question gains 
increased importance under a crisis context, especially if there is a potential stabilizer role 
to be exerted by the best performers. As a result, deeper understanding on the role of 
foreign ownership upon firms‟ evolution is needed, in order to discern if foreign control 
                                                          
3
 Curiously, Doms and Jensen (1998) had already stated that nationality might be a potential explanatory 
factor of firm performance, provided that within foreign-owned firms, they found that US firms tend to differ 
from the other foreign affiliates, often presenting even better evolutions.   
21 
 
may somewhat explain the way firms evolve and develop over the time and under different 
macroeconomic environments. If foreign ownership really matters for corporate 
performance and thus foreign firms present a consistent superior behavior compared to 
local firms, we might expect that during problematic periods, when host economies suffer 
economic breakdowns, foreign MNEs‟ superiority helps to leverage the local upturn.    
 
2.3. FIRM SURVIVAL: DOES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MATTER? 
 
Post-entry growth and life duration of firms has been occupying a large body of 
the IO and OE literature, mainly over the last two decades (van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp, 
1994; Mata and Portugal, 2004; Lin and Huang, 2008). Several firm-specific, industry-
specific and macroeconomic variables have been largely debated by researchers as 
important determinants for the life span of firms in general
4
. The link between foreign 
ownership and the survival of firms is an important topic that has emerged in more recent 
studies on firm survival. However, while there have been several studies of the survival of 
foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Li, 1995; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 
2004), only a few have compared the survival of foreign and domestic firms (Bernard and 
Sjöholm, 2003
5
; Kronborg and Thomsen, 2009).  Moreover, there is not a consensus about 
which type of firms survive longer – foreign-owned or domestic-owned firms – so that the 
knowledge of the determinants of foreign firms‟ lifetimes, as well as the dissimilarities on 
life expectations between foreign and domestic firms, are issues likely to be of great value 
to host governments, which have been strongly attracting foreign investments without 
paying attention to such details. Governments of host countries should know what type of 
firm is more prone to death, with the aim of establish the most adequate measures in order 
to avoid job losses and market shakeouts. This question, likewise to performance gaps 
between foreign and domestic firms, gains even more relevance under a context of crisis. 
There are several arguments that make us expect that foreign ownership matters 
for firm survival, though no clear suppositions can be made regarding the direction of the 
foreignness effect. On the one hand, it is suggested that foreign firms are “footloose”, 
                                                          
4
 In chapter 5 we will discuss the main firm-level and industry-level variables likely to affect the survival of 
firms, according to the literature. For a comprehensive survey of empirical evidence on firm survival, see, for 
instance, Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008).   
5
 Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) also highlight that this gap in the literature is found not only for the case of 
developing countries, but also for developed countries.  
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because they can be less rooted in local economy and thus easily re-allocate their resources 
to other countries as a reaction to adverse changes in the host country (Bernard and 
Sjöholm, 2003; Görg and Strobl 2003a, 2003b; Taymaz and Özler, 2007; Van Beveren, 
2007). In other words, foreign firms may have lower exit costs that make exit probability 
higher. Besides this, investing abroad is usually a risky deal, as foreign MNEs may have 
knowledge disadvantages about local market, which increases their well known liability of 
foreignness, which impacts negatively on their survival prospects (Zaheer and Mosakowsi, 
1997).   
On the other hand, foreign affiliates may be less likely to exit because investing 
abroad involves substantial sunk costs which are likely to be higher than for setting up a 
purely domestic firm in the host country (Álvarez and Görg, 2009). Additionally, foreign 
firms have, on average, superior technological and managerial skills, as well as valuable 
connections with other firms, which enable them to develop successful entry strategies and 
a stable post-entry growth (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994; Mata and Portugal, 2004). 
However, the survival differences between foreign and domestic firms may actually arise 
from their different characteristics, and if that is the case, it may happens that anything is 
left to the foreignness per se (Mata and Portugal, 2002; Holmes et al., 2010), so that the 
relationship between firm survival and foreign ownership is actually neutral.   
In view of that, this section reviews the results of the main empirical studies of the 
last two decades about the differences on survival patterns among firms under foreign and 
domestic control. According to their mixed outcomes, these studies can be grouped in three 
broad groups: 1) those that found a survival bonus belonging to foreign firms; 2) those that 
found a survival bonus belonging to domestic firms; and 3) those showing that no 
difference exists between foreign and domestic firms‟ survival patterns.  Table 2 presents a 
synopsis of this literature. 
 
 
2.3.1. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 
The US case was early explored in the seminal studies of Li and Guisinger (1991) 
and Audretsch and Mahmood (1994). Li and Guisinger‟s (1991) results have shown that 
the business failure rate of foreign-controlled firms is significantly lower than the failure 
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rate of domestic firms, both in aggregate and also by major industry groups, which 
somewhat confirms the Dunning‟s (1988) hypothesis on MNEs‟ ownership advantages. 
Subsequently, Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) showed, with data on over than 12.000 US 
manufacturing establishments, that the structure of ownership affects the survival 
prospects, since being a subsidiary of a multi-establishment firm impacts positively on 
firm‟s life expectancy.  
For developing countries like Indonesia, Behrman and Deolalikar‟s (1989) study 
was one of the first contributes confirming that establishments with higher survival 
durations are those with larger foreign shares. Actually, their results precise that a 10% 
larger share held by foreigners would be equal to about five additional years in firm age. 
More recently, Narjoko and Hill (2007) revisited the Indonesian context and established 
that foreign ownership is a positive factor for a better evolution of firms, especially under a 
crisis environment, when foreign control seems to be vital for firms‟ resilience, adjustment 
and recovery.   
The superiority of foreign firms in terms of survival was also stated by Bridges 
and Guariglia (2008), who studied the survival patterns of globally engaged firms and 
purely domestic companies operating in UK. They justify the higher failure probabilities 
found for domestically-owned firms with their lower collateral and higher leverage, 
leading them to the financial constraints that, conversely, foreign firms rarely face. Using 
similar arguments, Helmers and Rogers (2008) also state that foreign-owned firms 
operating in British manufacturing during the early 2000s were less likely to exit, 
compared with the financially struggled domestic firms. On the other hand, Holmes et al. 
(2010) conclude that only local SMEs are less likely to survive than firms that are initially 
foreign-owned, whereas the nature of ownership is found to be insignificant among micro-
enterprises.  
Many other empirical settings have been used to test the importance of foreign 
ownership for firm survival. For instance, Bonn (2000) chooses the Australian framework 
to explore the characteristics of long-term survival and to demonstrate that survivors 
during the period 1982-1993 were predominantly foreign-owned firms, which indicates 
that managers of domestic companies must be aware of their greater vulnerability 
compared with MNEs‟ affiliates. For Taiwan, Aw (2002) expresses that firms with foreign 
investments were found to be about 23% more likely to survive than purely domestic 
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firms. For Portugal, Mata and Portugal (2004) provide a simple comparison of survival 
patterns of domestic and foreign entrants and conclude that domestic firms face higher 
rates of exit than foreign ones and that, among these, greenfield entrants confront higher 
rates of exit than those entering by acquisition. The Chinese case was explored by Girma 
and Gong (2008), who confirmed the previous evidence on foreign advantage, over again 
justified by the ability of foreign affiliates to access to financial sources.  
A broader analysis on this matter is provided by Geishecker et al. (2008) for the 
Euro Area. Unconditionally, Euro Area MNEs exhibit higher survival rates than 
indigenous firms, in addition to a “performance premium” and a larger scale of operations 
which increase their relative importance at value added, employment and sales turnover. 
Instead, Kronborg and Thomsen (2009) focused on Denmark to explore the link between 
foreign ownership and long-term survival. By using 528 pairs of companies (foreign- and 
domestic-owned) over a 110-year period, they reveal that there is a statistically and 
economically significant “survival premium” attributed to foreign firms, though such 
premium declines over time and tend to disappear by the end of the period analyzed.  
In conclusion, ownership-specific advantages (Dunning, 1988), which include 
financial advantages, knowledge advantages and advantages acquired from 
multinationality, shift the changes of exit and survival. Foreign firms seem thus to be in 
better position to compete and to face the obstacles in the market. However, the longer 
survival durations associated with foreign ownership may also be a function of foreign 
firms‟ larger size at establishment-level, rather than ownership alone.  
 
 
2.3.2. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEGATIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 
Conflicting results about the potential life-enhancing effect arising from foreign 
ownership were mainly found during the last decade, as Table 2 confirms. The studies of 
Görg and Strobl (2000, 2003a, 2003b) for Ireland, Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) for 
Indonesia and Bernard and Jensen (2007) for USA, are strong supporters of the MNEs‟ 
footloose behavior hypothesis. In fact, after controlling for firms‟ and industries‟ 
characteristics, foreign firms were found to have higher failure rates than domestic firms. 
A possible explanation for such dynamic relies on the ease with which foreign firms 
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transfer production facilities from one country to another (Görg and Strobl, 2000, 2003a, 
2003b) or the extensive use by MNEs of the margin available to close their plants more 
often than their domestic equivalents (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003). 
Other authors highlight the liability of foreignness as an explanatory factor of 
foreign firms‟ higher hazards. Zaheer and Mosakowsi (1997) provide a deep analysis of 
foreign and domestic counterparts in the banking industry and reveal that foreign firms 
have a lower chance of survival, although the effect of foreignness on the survival rate is 
non-linear, more precisely, inverted-U shaped. According to their results, it takes over 15 
years to “level the playing field” between foreign and domestic firms, which means that 
foreign affiliates must, at least initially, possess some superior source of competitive 
advantage over local firms, in order to compensate their liability of foreignness. 
More generalist studies searching for the determinants of survival of 
manufacturing firms have also found that foreign ownership matters. Baldwin and Gu 
(2004) for Canada and Pérez et al. (2004, 2010) and Ortega-Argilés and Moreno (2005) 
both for Spain and Kimura and Kiyota (2006) for Japan have showed that firms with 
foreign capital participation bear a notorious higher risk of exit. These results are justified 
with the high financial and managerial burdens implied by foreign investments, for 
example due to the higher tariffs and other taxes that foreign firms must pay.  
The most recent contributes have been studying very different countries around 
the world and keep on promoting the debate and the discussion about the potential impact 
of foreign ownership upon firm survival. Van Beveran (2007) tested the MNEs‟ footloose 
behavior hypothesis for Belgium and has confirmed that after controlling for the fact that 
foreign MNEs are on average larger, more productive and pay higher wages, foreign-
owned firms are found to be more likely to exit than domestic firms, both in manufacturing 
and services. The author highlights the importance of such result for policy makers, who 
must rethink the desirability of the large impact of foreign firms on host economy. For the 
Dutch case, Fertala (2008) provides evidence on foreign firms‟ higher risk of failure, 
mainly arising from the well documented liability of foreignness. Finally, Álvarez and 
Görg (2009) and Bandick and Görg (2009) have corroborated the previous results for Chile 
and Sweden, respectively. However, Álvarez and Görg (2009) underline that only 
domestic-market oriented MNEs are more footloose, a result that is not obtained for 
multinational exporters, which are more likely to survive than domestic companies.  
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Reference* Country [Period] Methodology 
FO impact 
on firm 
survival 
Behrman & Deolalikar (1989) Indonesia [1975-1985] Tobit model + 
Li & Guisinger (1991) USA [1978-1988] Bivariate Analysis + 
Audretsch & Mahmood (1994) USA [1976-1986] 
Semi-Paramentric Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model 
+ 
Zaheer & Mosakowski (1997) 47 countries [1974-1993] Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Mata & Portugal (1999, 2002) Portugal [1983-1989] 
Competing-Risks Model, Semi-
Parametric Discrete Hazards Model, 
Descriptive Statistics 
n.s. 
Bonn (2000) Australia [1982-1993] Logit model + 
Görg & Strobl (2000, 2003a, 2003b)  Ireland [1973-1996] Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Aw (2002) Taiwan [1986-1991] Probit model + 
Bernard & Sjöholm (2003) Indonesia [1975-1989] 
Semi-Paramentric Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model 
- 
Kimura & Fujii (2003) Japan [1994-1999] Cox Proportional Hazard Model n.s. 
Baldwin & Gu (2004) Canada [1989-1991] 
Probit; Ordered Probit; Heckman 2-
step estimations 
- 
Mata & Portugal (2004) Portugal [1983-1989] Logit model + 
Özler & Taymaz (2004) Turkey [1983-1996] Cox Proportional Hazard Model n.s. 
Pérez, Llopis & Llopis (2004, 2010) 
Spain [1990-1999, 1990-
2000] 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Ortega-Argilés & Moreno (2005)  Spain [1990-2001] Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Kimura & Kiyota (2006)   Japan [1994-2000] Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Bernard & Jensen (2007) USA [1987-1997] Probit model - 
Kimura & Kiyota (2007) Japan [1994-1998] Probit model with random effects n.s. 
Narjoko & Hill (2007) Indonesia [1993-2000] Probit model + 
Taymaz & Özler (2007) Turkey [1983-2001] Cox Proportional Hazard Model n.s. 
Van Beveren (2007) Belgium [1996-2001] Cox Proportional Hazard Model - 
Bridges & Guariglia (2008) UK [1997-2002] Logit and Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model 
+ 
Fertala (2008) Germany [1997-2004] Gompertz-Makeham Hazard Model - 
Geishecker, Görg and Taglioni (2008) Euro Area [2000-2004] Descriptive Statistics + 
Girma & Gong (2008) China [1999-2005] Cox Proportional Hazard Model + 
Helmers & Rogers (2008) UK [2001-2005] Cox Proportional Hazard Model + 
Álvarez & Görg (2009) Chile [1990-2000] Probit model - 
Bandick & Görg (2009) Sweden [1993-2002] Complementary log-logistic model - 
Kronborg & Thomsen (2009) Denmark [1895-2005] Cox Proportional Hazard Model + 
Holmes, Hunt & Stone (2010) UK [1973-1994] Log-Logistic Hazard Model +/n.s. 
(+)  means that foreign firms survive longer that domestic firms; (-) means that domestic firms survive longer than foreign firms; (n.s. = 
not significant)  means that no differences exist between foreign and domestic firms in terms of survival. 
 
Source: Own elaboration, * Studies are presented in a chronological order;  
 
Table 2. Empirical evidence on the foreign ownership impact upon firm survival  
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2.3.3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEUTRAL FACTOR FOR FIRM SURVIVAL 
 
A third branch of the literature on the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm survival found that no significant difference exists between foreign-owned and 
domestic-owned companies in what concerns their survival trends and/or exit risks. By 
that, foreign ownership neither acts as a life-enhancing factor, nor as a catalyst to a 
premature death, but rather works as a neutral factor upon firms‟ dynamics.     
For Portugal, the most important contributes to the understanding of foreign and 
domestic firms‟ dynamics have been provided by Mata and Portugal (1999, 2002, 2004) 
for the period 1983-1989. However, while Mata and Portugal‟s (2004) study has suggested 
that a “survival bonus” might exist in favour to foreign affiliates, more robust econometric 
techniques, in particular the duration models and time-to-event econometric procedures 
used by Mata and Portugal (1999, 2002), have show that foreign and domestic firms do not 
exhibit different chances of survival, that they respond similarly to the determinants of 
survival and display identical time patterns of exit. In summary, their general conclusions 
attest that being foreign-owned does not matter for survival, despite the differences found 
in size, human capital, legal structures and industries entered. As a result, they underline 
that managers should not assume that their firms will stay longer in the market just because 
it happens to be foreign.  
For Japan and Turkey, analogous results were already identified. Kimura and Fujii 
(2003) studied the evolution patterns of Japanese firms during the late 1990s and found no 
evidence of a footloose behaviour among foreign firms. More recently, Kimura and Kiyota 
(2007) proved that, notwithstanding the superior performance exhibited by foreign firms in 
Japan, foreign ownership is not related to the likelihood of firm exit after controlling for 
the various characteristics of firms. In fact, their results state that firms with good 
performance are more likely to survive than firms with bad performance, but foreign 
ownership per se does not matter at all in the decision to exit. For Turkey, Özler and 
Taymaz (2004) corroborate this outcome as foreign-owned firms are found to be best 
performers than domestic ones (cf. Table 1), thought foreign ownership in itself does not 
matter for survival. Later, Taymaz and Özler (2007) have deepened this analysis and 
asserted that, actually, foreign firms are less likely to exit but neither foreign ownership 
alone, nor foreign presence in the market matter for survival. On the other hand, what 
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matters is other industry and other firm characteristics, such as firm size or the quality of 
the labour force. Accordingly, this branch of the literature supports that the country‟s 
industrial policy should be ownership-neutral rather than discriminatory in favour to 
foreign affiliates‟ entry.  
 
 
2.4. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS UNDER CRISES: ARE FOREIGN MNES 
(UN)STABILIZERS? 
 
From the previous literature, we realize that there is no consensus on the effect of 
foreign ownership in itself either on firm performance or on firm survival. Moreover, what 
still remains somewhat neglected, claiming for further research, is whether under a crisis 
environment foreign firms are affected or react differently than domestic firms, and, if that 
is the case, if the ownership advantages of the former make them weather the crisis in a 
better way helping to stabilize the host economy. 
In the literature we find arguments for a stabilizer or otherwise role of foreign 
MNEs during crisis (McAleese and Counahan, 1979; Álvarez and Görg, 2007, 2009). On 
the one hand, foreign MNEs may introduce instability into host economies during 
economic crises because, compared to domestic firms, it is easier for them to transfer 
production facilities internationally (Flamm, 1984
6
; Lee and Makhija, 2009), to switch 
their sales from host countries to export markets (Lipsey, 2001), to cut operational costs 
(Gao and Eshaghoff, 2004) and, in the limit, to exit the local economy. These reactions 
may contribute to accelerate job losses and the decline in business activities, making more 
difficult the subsequent recovery process.  
Conversely, rather than contributing to increase instability, foreign MNEs may 
impact positively in the host economy during crises. Foreign firms have the ability to use 
internal capital markets when faced with financial constraints, being able to access 
overseas credit through their parents, which allows them to expand their economic activity 
even in turbulent periods (Desai et al., 2004; Blalock et al., 2005). Moreover, being less 
reliant on domestic markets, foreign MNEs may be better able to lessen the adverse impact 
of a negative shock. In addition, foreign MNEs are unlikely to react aggressively to short 
                                                          
6
 Flamm‟s argument is based on optimal portfolio theory, saying that when there are negative changes in the 
economy, foreign investors react and readjust their optimal portfolio and may thus leave the economy.   
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term changes in host country conditions since investing abroad involves substantial sunk 
costs and such an adverse reaction would impact negatively on MNEs‟ image (McAleese 
and Counahan, 1979).  
The empirical literature on this question is not unanimous and can be divided into 
three broad categories: a first branch that shows that foreign ownership is a positive factor 
for firm behaviour under crisis, which means that foreign MNEs can be a stabilizer agent, 
by attenuating the negative effects of crises; a second one that supports the opposite, i.e. 
that foreign ownership is a negative factor and thus foreign MNEs react to crises periods 
more abruptly than domestic firms, worsening the crisis‟ impact on host economies; and a 
third set of studies showing that foreign MNEs and domestic firms do not behave 
differently during economic crises and thus there is no clear impact of MNEs‟ presence on 
the host country development and subsequent recovery. In this last case, foreign ownership 
is said to be a neutral factor for firm behaviour under crises. Table 3 summarizes the main 
empirical studies on these matters. 
Available firm-level studies have typically been based on Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998 and have dealt with firms‟ responses either during crisis or after crisis. 
However, it is important to distinguish foreign firms‟ behavior during and after a crisis, 
since very different results may be obtained conditional on a short-term or medium/longer-
term analysis. As a result, the time horizon of the empirical studies will be taken into 
account throughout the following literature review.  
 
 
2.4.1. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM BEHAVIOUR 
 
a) During crisis periods 
Drawing on Asian financial crisis started in the second half of 1997, Fukao (2001) 
studied how over 1100 Japanese subsidiaries operating in the ASEAN-4 countries and 
Korea immediately responded to the crisis. Despite the perseverance and embeddedness 
that seems to characterize Japanese MNEs, the author found some differences according to 
the subsidiaries‟ market-orientation. More precisely, the results revealed that local-market 
oriented subsidiaries were seriously hit by the reduction in local demand and price 
increases of imported inputs, while export-oriented subsidiaries (those with exports/sales 
ratios greater than 50 percent) benefited with the reduction of production costs, increasing 
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their sales by 17 percent and almost doubling their profits. At employment level, export-
oriented subsidiaries presented an average growth lower than 1 percent and market-
oriented ones barely reduced their employment levels, mainly due to parent firms‟ support. 
Moreover, the author also shows that Japanese subsidiaries were reluctant to cut their 
workforces even when their sales were declining, which supports the foreign MNEs‟ 
stabilizer role hypothesis. One possible explanation advanced by Fukao (2001) is that 
foreign subsidiaries remained patient due to the high sunk costs involved in Japanese FDI, 
often characterized by long-term relationships and the accumulation of firm-specific skills.  
Following a similar research question, Wang et al. (2005), based on a sample of 
1128 Japanese subsidiaries, studied the change in foreign subsidiaries‟ performance 
resulting from the onset of Asian crisis for the countries belonging to ASEAN-4. By 
looking for the factors determining the success and failure during such a turbulent period, 
the results disclosed that Japanese MNEs‟ affiliates are likely to be winners during a crisis, 
raising their performance levels, especially those with higher experiential knowledge in the 
country. Consequently, since the great part of foreign firms seem to have reacted positively 
to the crisis‟ beginning, the maintenance of that position in the subsequent periods may 
have helped to stabilize the turbulence in Asian economies.   
Chung and Beamish (2005a) and Chung et al. (2008) have focused on ASEAN-5 
countries under the same crisis environment and have also found evidence of a potential 
stabilizer function among foreign MNEs‟ affiliates. Chung and Beamish‟s (2005a) study 
highlights the importance of dynamic capabilities of foreign affiliates during a crisis, 
which make them able to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address the requirements of the environment and become increasingly 
flexible, which impacts positively upon their survival rates, even under a turmoil. Chung et 
al. (2008), by focusing on the relevance of multinational networks during times of crisis, 
showed that foreign subsidiaries in MNE networks survive longer in a crisis owing to their 
better access to resources and the advantages arising from such linkages, which provide 
them greater agility to adapt themselves to the new context. However, the value of MNE 
networks is not so evident during stable periods. Very recently, Lee and Makhija (2009) 
revisited the Asian crisis context and their main impacts in Korea. Their findings suggest 
that foreign firms‟ flexibility helped them to adapt to the crisis, to retain their success and 
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good performance and even to increase their value added and firm value. All these 
outcomes made them powerful elements for the recovery of Korean economy. 
Evidence on other crisis‟ contexts also support the potential benefit arising from 
MNEs‟ presence during a crisis. Gao and Eshaghoff (2004) gave the example of the 
Argentine financial crisis in early 2000s, based on a sample of 82 MNEs respondents to a 
survey. By proposing a classification of foreign MNEs‟ responses to crises, the authors 
state that foreign firms were generally found to be patient and cautiously optimistic in their 
reactions, preferring to adapt themselves to the new environment by restructuring current 
operations, relieving excess capacity and reducing the operational costs, being interested in 
increasing investments even during the crisis, maintaining as well their resources within 
the country. Given the potential benefits arising from such an attitude by foreign 
multinational companies, the authors highlight the need to, and the crucial role of host 
governments in, restore foreign investors‟ confidence as a basis of the subsequent 
economic recovery of the country, in order to make them view that the crisis may also be 
an opportunity to reorganize themselves and become more efficient, rather than just a 
threat. 
Finally, Görg and Strobl (2003a) use a different context to assess the footloose 
behaviour of foreign firms in Ireland and, instead, control for sector-specific cyclical 
effects which may impact on firm survival. By studying the dynamics of a sample with 
over 15.000 establishments during a large time span, the authors test the significance of 
foreign ownership for firm survival and job persistence during adverse conditions at 
sectoral level. Although they conclude that foreign-owned firms are, in fact, more 
footloose than domestic-owned ones, they show also that jobs generated in surviving 
MNEs are more persistent than jobs created in indigenous firms (cf. section 2.2.1). 
Actually, foreign MNEs in Ireland seem to be more likely to create new jobs only if they 
expect those jobs to last in the long run while domestic firms base job creation decisions 
more on a short term basis. As a result, if host governments apply the right measures to 
retain foreign investments and encourage foreign MNEs to face a decrease in the industry 
where they operate, clear benefits regarding the persistence of positive employment 
changes may result and thus stabilize the economic disorder.  
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b) After crisis periods 
The responses of foreign firms immediately after the onset of the crisis – in the 
short-run – may differ from their behavior in post-crisis periods – in the medium/long-
term. So, we must accurately review the empirical findings on the stabilizer role of foreign 
firms after the crisis, i.e., during the period of economic recovery. 
Drawing from a survey of Japanese, European and North American transnational 
corporations (TNCs), Poon and Thompson (2001) showed that foreign-owned firms were 
responding positively to the expected changes, suggesting that the Asian crisis could lead 
them to raise their embeddedness in the region in the long-run. Motivated by market 
opportunities, low cost production and proximity to competitors‟ activities, foreign firms in 
Hong-Kong and Singapore demonstrated optimistic reactions in the onset of the Asian 
crisis and intended to be resilient in the subsequent periods, since they expected that the 
financial crisis would speed up reforms, leading to a better business environment. 
Thompson and Poon (2000) had already obtained similar conclusions only for TNCs 
operating in Singapore, while Thompson (2001) replicated the study for the sample of 
European TNCs operating in both countries. All the three studies, based on a deep 
descriptive analysis of foreign TNCs‟ responses to the survey, underlined that Asian 
countries should safeguard FDI and TNCs‟ presence to ensure the sustainability of a longer 
term economic recovery and to assist valuable technological transfers.  
Athukorala (2003) exploits the same empirical setting to test the role of foreign 
MNEs‟ investments in the economic recovery of five ASEAN countries. After analyzing 
the evolutional trends of FDI in the region and the comparative performance of foreign 
affiliates in economic adjustment, the findings suggest that foreign firms were instrumental 
to lessen the severity of economic collapse and to facilitate the recovery process. More 
precisely, the study confirms that FDI has weathered the Asian crisis far better than 
domestic private investment. Moreover, by analyzing the Malaysian case in detail, the 
statistics show that industries with higher MNEs‟ presence were at the lower end of the 
ranking of industries in terms of the degree of employment and output contractions and 
real wage compression. In summary, MNEs acted as cushion during the post-crisis period, 
playing a useful stabilizing role by limiting the fall in aggregate flows and facilitating the 
adjustment route. 
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Later in time, Blalock et al. (2005) compared the Asian post-crisis outcomes of 
Indonesian-owned exporters with those of foreign-owned exporters. The results established 
that both foreign and domestic exporters‟ value added and employment raised after the 
crisis, suggesting that they profited from the devaluation and had sufficient cash-flow to 
finance more workers. However, only foreign-owned exporters increased investment levels 
significantly, which means that foreign affiliates take advantage from their greater access 
to overseas financing, in opposition to domestic exporters who had to face the credit 
crunch. As a result, foreign affiliates adopted expansive behaviours that could be crucial 
for the quick recovery of Indonesian economy, helping to mitigate the financial handicap 
of local firms.  
Similarly to Blalock et al. (2005), Narjoko and Hill (2007) examined in what 
extent foreign ownership and prior export orientation could be significant determinants for 
survival and recovery in Indonesia after the Asian crisis. Drawing on a sample of over 
11.000 firms, the authors examined the determinants of performance adjustments between 
1998 and 2000 and concluded that being an exporter foreign-owned firm was crucial to 
succeed in the post-crisis. However, it seems that only those firms with a high foreign 
ownership share (about 40 percent) exhibited superior performance, which confirms that 
the greater the parent share, the deeper the foreign firms‟ pockets, the lower their financial 
constraints and the higher the potential benefits arising from their presence in the recovery 
period.  
Chung and Beamish (2005b) verified the above outcomes, based on a sample of 
Japanese subsidiaries operating in five emerging economies in Asia. Concerned with which 
type of subsidiary survive longer in the post-crisis, the authors show that foreign 
subsidiaries tend to take the form of wholly-owned subsidiaries and majority joint-ventures 
in the post-crisis environment and, consistently, subsidiaries with those characteristics are 
more likely to endure the periods subsequent to a crisis and thus stabilize the host economy 
and contribute to the adjustment trajectory.  Finally, the experience lived in several Asian 
countries invested by Thai multinationals was expressed by Pananond (2007), who used 
case-study methods to prove that MNEs have adopted some post-crisis adjustments that 
would probably help to stabilize (or, at least, to decrease the instability in) the host 
economies. In detail, Thai MNEs have placed more emphasis and commitment on 
strengthening their industry-specific technological capabilities, becoming more and more 
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embedded in the host economy and thus denying the so-called “footloose behaviour” of 
foreign MNEs under a crisis.     
 
c) During and after crisis periods 
Within this first branch of the literature supporting the foreign MNEs‟ stabilizer 
role hypothesis, some studies analyze both the periods during and after the crisis context. 
Edgington and Hayter (2001), as the majority of empirical evidence, used the empirical 
setting of Asian crisis to analyze the initial reactions of two Japanese MNEs (Toyota and 
Matsushita) and their subsequent behaviour as well. Their analysis advocates that existing 
firms had a remarkable resilience to the crisis, maintaining their operations and also 
expanding their exports so as to earn income from their Asian production in overseas 
currencies. Moreover, Japanese MNEs in general expected the long-term benefits of 
expanding in the region to outweigh the short-term risks, so they chose to become 
embedded in the region and not be so “footloose” as did portfolio investments. 
Consequently, potential gains with foreign presence were available for host economies 
both during and after crisis. 
Desai et al. (2004) studied foreign firms‟ responses in a different crisis 
environment, paying attention to currency depreciation events in a sample of 25 emerging 
economies. By analyzing foreign MNEs‟ sales, assets and investment responses both 
during and after depreciation events, they conclude that foreign affiliates were able to 
expand their activity and performance indicators over such periods, while local firms 
showed little change. The enhanced relative performance of foreign MNEs is explained by 
their ability to use internal capital markets, which make them overcome the financial 
constraints suffered by local firms. In summary, as foreign firms are able to expand their 
activity precisely when host economies are fragile and prone to severe economic 
contractions, foreign affiliates can mitigate some of the aggregate effects of currency 
crises. Consequently, the results suggest that the increased economic activity due to foreign 
MNEs could support local firms through spillover effects such as increased demand for 
local inputs and higher levels of employment.       
Finally, Takii and Ramstetter (2005) complement the studies on the Asian crisis 
by demonstrating that foreign firms‟ performance in Indonesia increased steadily through 
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the early 1990s and that such expansion continued through and after the crisis, playing an 
important role in the recovery process of many Indonesian manufacturing industries. 
 
 
2.4.2. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEGATIVE FACTOR FOR FIRM BEHAVIOUR 
 
a) During crisis periods 
Chen and So (2002), based on a sample of US MNEs with sales in the Asia-
Pacific region, showed that the exchange rate fluctuations around the Asian financial crisis 
have negatively affected the sensitivity of those firms to stock market risk, leading them to 
adopt a more volatile behaviour than domestic firms. After seeing their market risk 
increase and their stock returns decrease, the main reaction of foreign MNEs was to reduce 
their exposure to the crisis and adopt a „stop-and-go‟ attitude to protect themselves, which 
may have impacted negatively on subsequent adjustments of invested countries.   
For Ireland, Görg and Strobl‟s (2003a) study, despite having found that 
employment may be more stable in foreign MNEs during periods of sectoral turbulence, 
showed opposite outcomes regarding firm survival. In fact, foreign firms seem to be more 
footloose than their domestic counterparts, being more likely to leave if sectoral conditions 
change adversely. The explanation advanced by authors related to the fact that it is easier 
for foreign firms to move their production facilities abroad, which may produce strongly 
negative effects mainly on host economies with significant foreign shares at employment 
and output.  
Very recently, Álvarez and Görg (2009) used the Chilean recession as empirical 
setting and presented robust evidence that foreign MNEs‟ affiliates are more likely to exit 
when the economy is hit by a negative shock. However, this is only true for the case of 
domestic market-oriented MNEs, since exported-oriented MNEs were found to have 
replaced domestic sales by exports, which made them able to fend off the crisis‟ negative 
effects and thus sustain their operations in the host economy.  
Ihrig and Prior (2005) used a sample of 548 MNEs and 353 US domestic firms to 
study the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on foreign firms‟ returns. The results were 
somewhat mixed, since only 15% of foreign MNEs were found to be highly exposed to the 
volatility and market risk, which have led them to contract their investments and become 
more risk-averse. However, only one in five US manufacturing firms suffered such an 
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exchange rate exposure, hence no clear conclusions about the potential (un)stabilizer role 
of foreign firms during crisis were achieved. 
At last, Belderbos and Zou (2007) analyzed a sample of 940 surviving Japanese 
affiliates operating in nine Asian countries during the years leading up and into the Asian 
financial crisis and obtained conflicting results. Their study allowed observing different 
dynamic responses to changes in economic environment according to the affiliates‟ 
position in the MNEs‟ network. The negative impacts of crisis seem to have been more 
strongly felt by wholly-owned subsidiaries than by joint-ventures, with the former reacting 
more flexibly and thus searching for better opportunities outside the host country. 
Consequently, these divergent responses may either lead to lower or higher gains for host 
economies, conditional on the relative importance that each type of foreign subsidiaries 
reports in the host economy.  
 
b) After crisis periods 
Min et al. (2007) was the only study identified as supporter of the hypothesis that 
foreign MNEs destabilize the host economy after a crisis event. Based on a sample of 
MNEs from USA, Japan, UK and France, the authors examine whether and how the Asian 
crisis affected the distribution of FDI decisions in Korea during the 5-year period after the 
onset of the crisis. The results prove that foreign firms‟ decisions differed substantially 
according to their origin. More precisely, US and European MNEs had a “stop and go” 
reaction, particularly in terms of the real value of FDI projects, whereas Japanese MNEs‟ 
decisions were more conservative. A possible explanation for these results is associated to 
MNEs‟ motivations to invest in a country like Korea, as we will discuss in the next section. 
While Japanese MNEs‟ investments are largely motivated by labour strike and import 
considerations, which make domestic and foreign production to be complementary, 
Western MNEs were guided primarily by exchange rate and institutional factors, 
recognizing foreign and domestic production as substitutes. As a result, beside the 
country‟s culture, history, stage of economic development and crisis‟ experience already 
discussed, MNEs‟ motivations may also lead to very different conclusions when we try to 
assess their potential stabilizer role in a crisis environment.      
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McAleese & 
Counahan (1979) 
Ireland / 1952-1977 
Irish recession 
1973-1977 
Chi-square tests; Pearson 
correlations; Contingency 
tables 
Employment growth n.s. 
Fukao (2001) 
5 Asian countries / 
1996/1997 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
OLS and Tobit 
Growth of employment, 
sales and profits 
+ 
Chen & So (2002) 
Asia-Pacific region / 
1996-1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Single-factor market 
model (CAPM) 
MNEs' stock return and 
market risk 
- 
Görg & Strobl 
(2003a) 
Ireland / 1973-1996 
Sector-specific 
cycle 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model 
Firm survival - 
Employment 
persistence 
+ 
Gao & Eshaghoff 
(2004) 
Argentina / 2002 
Financial Crisis 
(2001/2002) 
Exploratory factor 
analysis 
Business strategies + 
Chung  &  Beamish 
(2005a) 
5 ASEAN Countries 
/ 1993-1999 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model 
Firm Survival + 
Ihrig & Prior (2005) 
Not Specified / 
1995-1999 
Exchange rate 
fluctuations  
Exposure estimates using 
Jorion (1990) model 
MNEs' returns ? 
Wang, Huang & 
Bansal (2005) 
4 ASEAN countries / 
1996/1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Logit and descriptive 
statistics 
1996-1998 performance 
change 
+ 
Álvarez & Görg 
(2007) 
Chile / 1990-2000 
Chilean 
Economic Crisis 
1995-2000 
Difference-in-differences; 
Heckman 2-step 
estimation 
Employment growth n.s. 
Belderbos & Zou 
(2007) 
9 Asian Countries / 
1995-1999 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Probit; Heckman 2-step 
estimation 
Employment growth ? 
Chung , Lu & 
Beamish (2008) 
5 ASEAN countries / 
1994-1999 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Cox Proportional Hazard 
Model; Random-effects 
estimations 
Subsidiary exit and 
Subsidiary profitability 
+ 
Álvarez & Görg 
(2009) 
Chile / 1990-2001 
Economic Crisis 
1995-2001 
Probit Firm survival - 
Lee & Makhija 
(2009) 
Korea / 1996 / 1998  
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Cross-Section Linear 
Regression 
Tobin's q + 
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Poon & Thompson 
(2001) 
Hong-Kong and 
Singapore / 1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive statistics; 
ANOVA 
MNCs‟ embeddedness 
and expectations 
+ 
Athukorala (2003) 
5 ASEAN countries / 
1990-2001 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics Employment and output + 
Blalock, Gertler & 
Levine (2005) 
Indonesia / 1990-
2000 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Difference-in-differences; 
Probit 
Value added, 
employment, 
investment  and 
survival 
+ 
Chung & Beamish 
(2005b) 
5 ASEAN countries / 
1986-2001 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Logit; Multivariate 
analysis; Cox PHM 
Firm strategy and firm 
survival 
+ 
Min, Rhim, Friesner 
& Cashel-Cordo 
(2007) 
Korea / 1997-2001 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
GLS and forecasting 
techniques 
Number and value of 
FDI projects 
? 
Narjoko & Hill 
(2007) 
Indonesia / 1993-
2000 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
OLS; Probit; Heckman 2-
step estimation 
Real Value Added and 
firm survival 
+ 
 
Pananond (2007) 
Several Asian 
countries / 1990s 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Case-Study 
Networking 
Capabilities 
+ 
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Legewie (1999) 
Southeast Asia 
countries / 1990s 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive statistics and 
case studies 
Market orientation and 
internal structure 
? 
Edgington & Hayter 
(2001) 
5 ASEAN countries / 
1990s 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive statistics and 
case studies 
Investments and 
Exports 
+ 
Lipsey (2001) 
LatinAmerica, 
Mexico and East 
Asia / 1980s 
and1990s 
Financial Crisis 
in Latin America 
(1982), Mexico 
(1994) and East 
Asia (1997) 
Descriptive statistics 
Employments, sales and 
exports 
- 
Desai, Foley & 
Forbes (2004) 
25 emerging 
economies / 1991-
1999 
Currency 
depreciations  
Panel regression; IV; 
Bivariate analysis 
Sales and assets (in 
level and growth rates) 
+ 
Takii & Ramstetter 
(2005) 
Indonesia / 1975-
2001 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Pooled regression; 
Descriptive statistics 
Value added, 
employment and 
productivity 
+ 
(+) - MNEs acted as a stabilizer element; (-) - MNEs acted as a unstabilizer element; (?) - Mixed results regarding MNEs' stabilizer role; 
(n.s. = not significant) - No evidence of a (un)stabilizer role for MNEs 
Source: Own elaboration, * Studies are presented in a chronological order 
Table 3. Empirical evidence on the potential MNEs‟ stabilizer role under crisis environments 
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c) During and after crisis periods 
Lipsey (2001) studied the behaviour of US manufacturing affiliates under three 
crisis environments – Latin America, Mexico and East Asia – and concluded that foreign 
affiliates weathered the crises better than domestic firms. Foreign MNEs‟ main reaction 
during and after the crises was to switch their sales from host countries to export markets 
and to sharply curtail local sales, which severely affected the output contractions in host 
economies. At the employment levels, the decline by US affiliates was not so noticeable 
than it was for sales, recovering more quickly to the pre-crisis levels. In addition, R&D 
expenditures by US MNEs also fell sharply in every country. Facing a scenario like this, 
we could not expect at all that foreign firms can act as a stabilizer element in the recovery 
from a crisis. 
Legewie (1999) obtained very similar conclusions to those of Min et al. (2007), 
with the exception that his study distinguished between short-term and long-term reactions 
of European, US and Japanese MNEs to the Asian crisis. Accordingly, in the short-run, all 
MNEs adopted a similar restrictive and defensive approach. In the long-run, Japanese 
affiliates were found to prefer to strengthen their existing affiliates, due to their strong 
domestic-market orientation, in opposition to Western MNEs which transferred their 
production activities faster. One more time, the FDI motivations of each group of MNEs 
can explain such approaches in face of a crisis – while Japanese FDI is based on a long-
term commitment with host economies, the most Western MNEs look for a competitive 
market and a large production area when they invest abroad. 
 
 
2.4.3. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS A NEUTRAL FACTOR FOR FIRM BEHAVIOUR 
 
A small number of studies show that MNEs neither act as stabilizers nor 
disturbing agents during crises (e.g., McAleese and Counahan, 1979 for Ireland and 
Álvarez and Görg, 2007 for Chile). These authors found both groups of firms to display 
identical patterns of reaction when accounting for differences in the various firm-level and 
industry-level specificities, so thus they refute that MNEs may pull out more quickly than 
domestic firms when the economy is hit by a negative shock, leaving unclear the potential 
benefits or the eventual damages from foreign firms presence during crisis. However, 
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McAleese and Counahan (1979) found large-sized foreign firms more stable than smaller 
ones in face of a recession. By contrast, Narjoko and Hill (2007) found an ambiguous 
effect of firm size, while Wang et al. (2005) argued that firm size is not an important 
determinant for firm success during a crisis. 
To conclude, based on the great majority of the studies, we may expect foreign 
ownership to matter for firms‟ behaviour during a crisis period. However, there is no 
consensus regarding the direction of the effect. Nonetheless, those results may be 
conditional on a variety of factors, which we will refer as the potential moderating factors 
of foreign ownership effect under crises in the next section.   
 
 
2.5. MODERATING FACTORS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP EFFECT UNDER CRISES 
 
2.5.1. CRISIS’ SPECIFICITIES AND INVESTMENT MOTIVATIONS OF FOREIGN MNES 
 
From the above, there seems to be no agreement on the foreign ownership effect 
under crises. The several empirical results must be carefully compared, as part of the 
differences may be related to the choice of the dependent variables (e.g., firm performance 
or growth measures and firm survival). The previous studies were also conducted under 
different crisis‟ contexts. For example, for the Asian crisis, foreign firms seem to have 
outperformed domestic ones, thus helping to soften the economic contraction and hasten 
the economic recovery. However, this result must be not generalized to other different 
crisis‟ environments, as the conclusions may vary according to the crisis‟ specificities. 
Nevertheless, the literature does not discuss in what extent the type of crisis matter for 
foreign firms‟ behaviour, though we expect that the crisis‟ nature may interfere with the 
foreign ownership effect. For instance, a domestic crisis (that is, a crisis specific to the 
local economy) may be more likely to induce an adverse reaction among foreign firms, 
which may easily re-allocate their resources and search for a better environment anywhere 
outside the host country. Conversely, an international crisis limits the choices of re-
allocation of foreign MNEs, so that they may be more resilient and patient in face of a 
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global turmoil. Despite that, foreign MNEs‟ motivations7 may play an even greater role in 
their reactions to a domestic or global adverse shock.   
In what regards market-seeking MNEs, their sales and employment will be 
severely hit from a domestic shock (mainly from an adverse shock in demand), but not in a 
particularly different way from domestic firms. They may however resist better, due to 
their superior financial conditions and to better expectations about the future. Nonetheless, 
if their long-term expectations in that market are not better than those of local firms, they 
may strongly cut the operations in the local economy.  
Foreign MNEs established in a country mainly to have better access to resources 
or efficiency (resource-seeking or efficiency-seeking MNEs, respectively), are probably 
more export-oriented than purely domestic firms. Hence, their sales and employment levels 
may be less affected than indigenous firms‟ levels in a crisis‟ setting. Foreign MNEs may 
even benefit from a domestic decline in the prices of inputs to expand sales abroad. If the 
crisis is associated to a (domestic or global) rise in input prices, MNEs may react better 
than domestic firms if they are able to access to inputs in better conditions than their 
indigenous counterparts. Otherwise, they may react more adversely than local firms by 
reconfiguring their local and/or global competitive strategies and hence redeploy their 
activities, motivated by better conditions elsewhere (Gao and Eshaghoff, 2004; Álvarez 
and Görg, 2007, 2009).   
Finally, strategic asset-seeking MNEs are expected to be more resilient during 
crises, due to potential sunk costs of their specific investments. Moreover, their 
expectations of long-term benefits may lead them to expand in the region to outweigh the 
short-term risks. So, they may choose to become embedded in the region and not be so 
“footloose” as commonly portfolio investments are during a crisis (Edgington and Hayter, 
2001).  
All these theoretical expectations can be raised from the literature, but they should 
be empirically tested. Besides, there are firm‟s and industry‟s characteristics likely to affect 
firm performance and survival under a crisis‟ context and where foreign and domestic 
                                                          
7
 Dunning (1988, 1993) and Dunning and Lundan (2008) classify the MNEs‟ motivations in four broad types: 
resource-seeking (leading MNEs to vertically integrate, motivated by the availability of resources and/or their 
lower costs), market-seeking (for cases when MNEs invest abroad to guarantee a larger market for their 
products and services), efficiency-seeking (when MNEs are motivated to invested in host countries to obtain 
economies of scale and scope and/or risk reduction through product diversification) and strategic-asset 
seeking (in order to gain new product lines and new markets, to obtain economies of synergy, economies of 
common governance and to improve their competitive and strategic advantages).  
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firms very often differ. Next, we review the main comparative studies on the differences 
between foreign-owned and domestic-owned firms, in order to identify other firm-level 
and industry-level variables that may moderate the foreign ownership effect under a crisis. 
 
 
2.5.2. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS: WHERE DO THEY DIFFER? 
 
The IB literature has early established that a reason why a firm decides to invest 
abroad is the ownership of firm-specific advantages, not available to domestic firms in the 
host country (Hymer, 1957; Vernon, 1966; Caves, 1974; Dunning, 1981). Accordingly, we 
expect that these advantages assist foreign MNEs to achieve a differentiated behaviour and 
a favourable position compared to their domestic competitors. Moreover, as we previously 
stated, such different characteristics may also act as moderating factors of foreign MNEs‟ 
behaviour during a crisis event, so that a different reaction by foreign-owned firms may be 
the result of their superior characteristics, rather than a pure ownership effect.   
 The empirical literature concerned with the differences between foreign-owned 
firms and local firms highlights that the main areas where foreign firms widely differ from 
domestic ones are size and scale, wages, human capital, productivity, technology intensity, 
innovation activities, export orientation and entry patterns (Blomström and Kokko, 1998; 
Ramstetter, 1999; Hanson, 2001; Sleuwaegen and DeBacker, 2003a; Bellak, 2004b, among 
others). Table 4 presents a summary of the main comparative studies between foreign-
owned firms and their local counterparts. 
Size and scale are one of the firm-level differences where the comparative studies 
reviewed commonly agree in favour of foreign superiority. In fact, not only for Portugal 
(Farinha and Mata, 1996; Barbosa and Louri, 2005), but also for many countries around 
the world (e.g., Doms and Jensen (1998) for USA, Baldwin and Gu (2004) for Canada, 
Kimura and Kiyota (2007) for Japan), there is strong evidence that foreign-firms are larger 
than domestic ones. This may result from, on the one hand, a better access to financial 
support by foreign firms, either through their parent company or their worldwide networks 
(Bonn, 2000; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Ushijima, 2005; Xu and Lu, 2007), or 
alternatively, a way through which MNEs try to overcome the well known liability of 
foreignness (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997; Fertala, 2008). 
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Notwithstanding, the differences at firm size may be related as well to the dimension of the 
market that firms have to serve. Thus, given the common foreign firms‟ export-orientation 
(e.g. Anastassopoulos, 2003; Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Magalhães and Africano, 2007), in 
contrast to the typical local market-orientation of domestic firms, the larger scale presented 
by MNEs‟ affiliates may be a natural outcome. 
Firm-level differences related to human capital, workforce qualifications and 
wage gaps have also attracted the attention of researchers over the time, who mostly 
confirm the superiority of foreign firms. Human capital is increasingly understood as the 
most important competitive factor at firm-level, exerting significant impacts on firms‟ 
evolution and growth (Teixeira, 2002; Almeida, 2003; Bellak, 2004a, 2004b; Teixeira and 
Tavares-Lehmann, 2007), and the available empirical evidence suggests that foreign MNEs 
and their subsidiaries often present important pools of skilled labor, which tends to be 
highly relevant to increase their productivity levels, to “decode” new technical information 
and to incorporate it into the manufacturing process and thus create value (Teixeira, 2002). 
Moreover, the differences in the workforce qualifications may also justify the disparity 
found at wages level, since better qualified workers usually earn higher wages (e.g., Doms 
and Jensen, 1998; Ernst, 2005). However, the differences in wages are not absolutely 
explained by the literature. Beside the qualifications of workers, other factors may explain 
this wage gap, as firms‟ performance (better performed firms may pay higher wages), 
firms‟ management policies (higher wages may work as an incentive to raise the workers‟ 
effort and, hence, the productivity or even to attract the “best” workers in the market), 
firms‟ technology and capital intensity or even firms‟ size (Globerman, Ries and 
Vertinsky, 1994; Jimeno et al., 2000; Bellak, 2004a, 2004b; Martins, 2008). As a result, 
many firm-level characteristics, rather than foreign ownership per se, may be the source of 
such wage gap. Actually, Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) have shown that after controlling for 
firms‟ and industries‟ characteristics, the wage gap totally vanishes.  
Technology intensity and innovation activities also seem to work as 
discriminating factors between foreign and domestic firms. According to Markusen (1995), 
foreign MNEs have assumed greater importance in industries with higher intensity on 
R&D activities, higher proportion of qualified professionals, in sectors where new and 
technologically advanced products are produced, as well as in industries with higher levels 
of advertisement (see also Kuemmerle, 1999; Andersson, Forsgren and Pederson, 2001). 
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This evidence also supports the different specialization patterns of foreign-owned firms, a 
situation frequently found for the Portuguese case (Cabral, 1996; Gonçalves and 
Guimarães, 1997; Freitas and Paes Mamede, 2008), where foreign enterprises tend to 
concentrate themselves in more technologically complex sectors. Accordingly, this 
magnitude of foreign firms in R&D intensive industries may lead to positive effects on 
industrial diversification, contributing as well to the regeneration of the productive 
structure of host economies. 
All the above empirical findings tend to support an additional difference between 
foreign subsidiaries and local firms, now related to the patterns of entry. More precisely, 
foreign-owned firms tend to choose industries where the entry barriers are higher – 
namely, more dynamic, concentrated and technologically complex industries and where a 
greater minimum efficient scale is required to operate efficiently (Howenstine and Zeile, 
1992; Bloömstrom and Kokko, 1998; Doms and Jensen, 1998; Görg and Strobl, 2000). For 
Portugal, this evidence was already been well documented by the studies of Mata and 
Portugal (1999, 2002, 2004), Barbosa et al. (2004) and Barbosa and Louri (2005), which 
have shown that foreign firms often enter the industries where growth rates, concentration, 
R&D intensity and foreign presence are higher, thus exhibiting greater ability to overcome 
entry barriers. On the other hand, industries where entry is more difficult also tend to be 
more profitable and attractive in terms of potential gains, which may explain the foreign 
superiority at profitability levels shown by studies as Kumar (1990) and Cardoso (2008), 
among others. 
All these firms‟ and industries‟ characteristics where foreign and domestic firms 
are found to be different are likely to affect firm performance and dynamics under a crisis‟ 
context. Moreover, they may act as moderating factors of the effect arising from foreign 
ownership upon firm performance and/or survival. Consequently, we must properly 
account for them in order to investigate if there remain any significant differences on firm 
behaviour that can be attributed to foreignness per se. Next, we specially attend on firm 
size as a potential moderating factor of foreign ownership effect under a crisis event.    
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Where do DF and 
FF differ? 
Empirical Evidence  
Reference*, year [country]  
SIZE AND SCALE Howenstine & Zeile, 1992 [USA]; Willmore, 1992 [Brazil]; Farinha & Mata, 1996 
[Portugal]; Bloömstrom & Kokko, 1998 [n.a.]; Doms & Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Görg 
& Strobl, 2000 [Ireland]; Mata & Portugal, 2001, 2002, 2004 [Portugal]; 
Anastassopoulos, 2003 [Greece]; Bernard & Sjöholm, 2003 [Indonesia]; Baldwin & 
Gu, 2004 [Canada]; Özler & Taymaz, 2004 [Turkey]; Barbosa & Louri, 2005 
[Portugal, Greece]; Kimura & Kiyota, 2007 [Japan]; Álvarez & Görg, 2009 [Chile] 
WORKFORCE 
QUALITY / HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
Doms & Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Oulton, 1998a, 1998b [UK]; Griffith & Simpson, 2001 
[UK]; Almeida, 2003 [Portugal]; Bellak, 2004a, 2004b [n.a.]; Mata & Portugal, 
2004 [Portugal]; Taymaz & Özler, 2007 [Turkey]; Teixeira & Tavares-Lehmann, 
2007 [Portugal] 
EXPORTING 
BEHAVIOR 
Willmore, 1992 [Brazil]; Cabral, 1996 [Portugal]; Barbosa & Louri, 2002 [Portugal, 
Greece]; Anastassopoulos, 2003 [Greece]; Baldwin & Gu, 2004 [Canada]; Barbosa, 
Guimarães & Woodward, 2004 [Portugal]; Tavares & Young, 2006 [Portugal]; 
Magalhães & Africano, 2007 [Portugal] 
TECHNOLOGY 
INTENSITY AND 
INNOVATION 
Howenstine & Zeile, 1992 [USA]; Doms & Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Gugler, 1998 
[Austria]; Forsgren, Pedersen & Foss, 1999 [Denmark]; Anastassopoulos, 2003 
[Greece]; Baldwin & Gu, 2004 [Canada]; Özler & Taymaz, 2004 [Turkey]; Barbosa 
& Louri, 2005 [Portugal]; Criscuolo, 2005 [OECD]; Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006 
[Italy];  Kimura & Kiyota, 2007 [Japan]; Taymaz & Özler, 2007 [Turkey]; Freitas & 
Paes Mamede [Portugal] 
AVERAGE WAGES Howenstine & Zeile, 1992 [USA]; Willmore, 1992 [Brazil]; Globerman, Ries & 
Vertinsky, 1994 [Canada]; Doms & Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Feliciano & Lipsey, 1999 
[USA]; Griffith & Simpson, 2001 [UK]; Almeida, 2003 [Portugal]; Bellak, 2004a, 
2004b [n.a.]; Mata & Portugal, 2004 [Portugal]; Özler & Taymaz, 2004 [Turkey]; 
Taylor & Driffield, 2004 [UK]; Kimura & Kiyota, 2007 [Japan]; Taymaz & Özler, 
2007 [Turkey]; Martins, 2008 [Portugal] 
SPECIALIZATION 
PATTERNS 
Cabral, 1996 [Portugal]; Gonçalves & Guimarães, 1997 [Portugal]; Freitas & Paes 
Mamede, 2008 [Portugal] 
CAPITAL 
INTENSITY 
Howenstine & Zeile, 1992 [USA]; Doms & Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Oulton, 1998a, 
1998b [UK]; Bellak, 2004a, 2004b [n.a.]; Barbosa & Louri, 2005 [Portugal, Greece]; 
Kimura & Kiyota, 2007 [Japan] 
ADVERTISEMENT 
INTENSITY 
Bloömstrom & Kokko, 1998 [n.a.]; Özler & Taymaz, 2004 [Turkey] 
ABILITY TO 
OVERCOME 
ENTRY BARRIERS 
Howenstine & Zeile, 1992 [USA]; Bloömstrom & Kokko, 1998 [n.a.]; Doms & 
Jensen, 1998 [USA]; Görg & Strobl, 2000 [Ireland]; Mata & Portugal, 2001, 2002, 
2004 [Portugal]; Barbosa, Guimarães & Woodward, 2004 [Portugal]; Barbosa & 
Louri, 2005 [Portugal]; Taymaz & Özler, 2007 [Turkey] 
n.a. = not applicable, which means that the study is a survey of empirical literature. *Studies are presented in a chronological order. 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Table 4. Empirical evidence on the differences between foreign and domestic firms 
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2.5.3. FIRM SIZE AS A MODERATING FACTOR OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP EFFECT 
  
The link between firm size and firm evolution during and after crises was a 
neglected question, at least before Asian financial crisis. Moreover, the literature has paid 
little attention to the relationship between crisis‟ environments and smaller firms‟ 
performance, focusing the interest on banks and large corporations (Régnier, 2005; Özar et 
al., 2008). Besides, studies recognizing firm size as a potential moderating factor of foreign 
MNEs‟ responses to crisis episodes are even scarcer. The limited empirical evidence about 
SMEs‟ (Small and Medium-Firms) and LEs‟ (Large Enterprises) responses to crisis 
periods has provided mixed outcomes, leaving unidentified which of those two groups are 
the common winners and losers during a crisis. As a result, we still doubt on the effect on 
firm size on firms‟ behaviour under crises.  
It is often argued that smaller enterprises are more flexible in adjusting to a 
downturn of the economy (Özar et al., 2008) and today, it is increasingly accepted that 
small businesses are not just “little big businesses”, but rather that SMEs have their own 
particular characteristics that affect the way they operate and react to the adversities (Hill 
et al., 2002). In addition, the increasing role of small firms in economic growth and 
development, acting as a key source of jobs, business dynamism and innovation (e.g. 
Gregory et al., 2002; Harvie, 2003; OECD, 2009) raises the concern about their potential 
role in the post-crisis recovery process as business cycle shock absorbers and potential 
stabilizer agents. However, a plethora of arguments make us expect that, facing a crisis 
environment, LEs can do better than SMEs. Table 5 presents a synopsis of the main 
conflicting arguments found in the literature about the relationship between firm size and 
firms‟ behaviour under crises, by distinguishing the reasons for a potential (un)stabilizer 
role of SMEs, compared to LEs, regardless their ownership. A summary of the main 
comparative studies between SMEs‟ and LEs‟ performance and the role of firm size under 
crises‟ contexts can be found in Table 6.  
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Table 5. Arguments for a different behavior between SMEs and LEs during crisis 
 
Arguments for SMEs being potential unstabilizer 
agents  Firm size as a positive factor under crises 
Argued by*… 
 
 SMEs’ resources 
 
SMEs often lack technology, know-how, management skills 
and innovative capacity. 
 
 
Nugent & Yhee (2002); Régnier (2005) 
 
SMEs are unlikely to have contingency plans to help to 
smooth potential shocks. 
 
Butler & Sullivan (2005); Marino et al. 
(2008) 
 
SMEs are more financially constrained due to inadequate 
access to finance. 
 
Gertler & Gilchrist (1994); Mulhern 
(1996); Forbes (2002); Nugent & Yhee 
(2002); Liu (2004); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Maksimovic (2005); Narjoko & Hill 
(2007); Das & Pradhan (2009); Hodorogel 
(2009); OECD (2009) 
 SMEs’ market orientation 
 
SMEs are less geographically diversified, being embedded in 
few regions and thus rarely export-oriented. 
 
 
Butler & Sullivan (2005); Narjoko & Hill 
(2007); OECD (2009) 
 SMEs’ linkages 
 
SMEs are often strongly dependent on few customers and 
suppliers. 
Nugent & Yhee (2002) 
Arguments for SMEs being potential stabilizer agents 
 Firm size as a negative factor under crises 
Argued by*… 
 
 SMEs are more flexible and resilient, being more able to 
exploit market niches. 
 
Berry, Rodriguez & Sandee (2001); 
Gregory, Harvie & Lee (2002); Hall & 
Harvie (2003); Narjoko & Hill (2007); 
Hodorogel (2009) 
 SMEs concentrate on activities characterized by economies 
of agglomeration, rather than economies of scale. 
Berry, Rodriguez & Sandee (2001); Hall 
& Harvie (2003) 
 SMEs are less reliant on formal credits, thus less burdened 
by debts.  
Sato (2000); Berry, Rodriguez & Sandee 
(2001); ter Wengel & Rodriguez (2006) 
 SMEs‟ smaller size may be an advantage, since SMEs are 
less submitted to inertia, rigidity and sunk costs, in 
opposition to LEs. 
Tan & See (2004) 
 SMEs can overcome their technological disadvantages 
through imitation, being a follower and acquiring second-
hand equipment from LEs. 
Nugent & Yhee (2002); Gregory. Harvie 
& Lee (2002) 
 Source: Own elaboration. *Studies are presented in a chronological order. 
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a) Firm size as a positive factor for firm behaviour under crises 
The seminal article of McAleese and Counahan (1979) was one of the first studies 
looking for a potential stabilizer role played by a specific group of firms during recessions. 
By comparing the employment growth/decline in foreign MNEs and domestic firms in 
Ireland, their analysis also paid attention to the moderating effects of firm size. 
Accordingly, despite no evidence was found on the effect of foreign ownership upon firms‟ 
evolution during the recessive periods analyzed (remember the section 2.4.3), different 
conclusions were obtained regarding the effect of firm size. In fact, some foreign MNEs – 
those characterized by a larger scale and thus higher market autonomy – were found to be 
more stable during economic shakeouts. In opposition, smaller firms (both foreign and 
domestic) suffered greater instability and larger employment declines, which made them a 
potential disturbing element for the subsequent economic recuperation. 
Mulhern (1996) focused on the Venezuelan small firms during the crisis of 1989-
1994. Based on simple statistics, the author observes several performance indicators, as 
output contraction, employment evolution and failure rates. The overall picture points that 
smaller firms were severely affected by that economic contraction, as within a one-year 
period after the crisis, it was estimated that 50% of SMEs were either closed or became 
inactive. This outcome was in part explained by SMEs‟ difficulty in obtaining finance and 
information, by their lack of skilled managers and an unsympathetic treatment by banks.  
Using a broader perspective, Higson et al. (2002) studied the impact of the 
business cycle in the growth rate of US quoted companies‟ sales and concluded that, in the 
expansion phases, smaller firms on average grow faster than larger ones, while during 
contractions, this tendency is tempered in favour of large firms. Then, despite in normal 
conditions smaller and medium firms perform an important function for the economy, this 
is not always true during turbulent periods. Beck et al.‟s (2005) study also rejected the 
hypothesis that SMEs can do better than LEs during adversities, since smaller firms tend to 
be the most adversely affected by financial, legal and/or corruption obstacles, mainly due 
to their higher financial constraints, which is more evident in less developed countries.  
For Turkey, Özar et al. (2008) concluded that, despite the important role of 
smaller firms in alleviating poverty, generating new jobs, being also a key source of firm 
dynamism and innovation, the 2001 financial crisis caused a dramatic disruption on SMEs' 
growth. Possible explanations are associated to the encouragement given to small firms to 
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use external credit to facilitate their growth, which becomes a harmful strategy in times of 
crisis due to the skyrocketing interest rates that smaller firms have to bear.  
For the after crisis time horizon, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) stated that the 
adverse periods had a substantially larger negative effect on SMEs, as small firms‟ sales 
tended to drop more than 4% per year faster than larger firms, thus accounting for a 
significant disproportionate amount of the ensuing decline in the manufacturing industry. 
Finally, Domaç and Ferri (1999) evaluated both the during and the after crisis periods for 
Korea and provided evidence on SMEs‟ weakness, compared to LEs. They demonstrate 
that Korean SMEs suffered disproportionately from the Asian financial crisis and from 
severe monetary restrictions, mainly due to their strong dependence on small banks' 
lending. Consequently, firm size was revealed to be an important positive factor for firms‟ 
ability to strive the crisis.  
 
b) Firm size as a negative factor for firm behaviour under crises 
Sato (2000) used the Indonesian metal-working and machinery component 
industry to examine how the Asian financial crisis has affected SMEs. The results 
demonstrated that, despite wide fluctuations in SMEs‟ performance, export-related small 
business remained profitable and assured their good markets even after the crisis‟ turmoil, 
which made them relatively better off than larger enterprises. Using the same empirical 
background, ter Wengel and Rodriguez (2006) analyzed the export performance of 
Indonesian SMEs after the Asian crisis. Their outcomes showed that while LEs contracted 
and reduced their exports, SMEs grew and expanded their sales overseas, maybe because 
they were not so reliant on formal credit like their larger counterparts, which had been 
largely exposed to an easy access to finance and imprudent banking practices, leaving them 
a large burden of loans and a consequent inert position in face of an external shock.  
For Singapore, Tan and See (2004) found a negative correlation between firm 
performance and firm size, with LEs suffering the highest declines after the crisis, due to 
their inertia problems. Régnier‟s (2005) standpoint confirmed that SMEs tend to be more 
resilient than LEs. Moreover, local SMEs linked to transnational corporations or other type 
of foreign affiliates have proven to be even more resilient than purely domestic market-
oriented SMEs, due to various forms of assistance from the foreign partner, which proves 
that the effects of firm size and foreign ownership may be related under a crisis. 
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Main 
Focus 
Reference* 
Country 
/ Period 
of Data 
Crisis' 
Context 
Methodology 
Firm Performance 
Measure 
Firm 
size 
effect 
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McAleese & 
Counahan (1979) 
Ireland / 
1952-1977 
Irish recession 
1973-1977 
Chi-square tests; 
Pearson correlations; 
Contingency tables 
Employment growth + 
Mulhern (1996)  
Venezuela 
/ 1989-
1994 
1994 
Venezuelan 
economic  
crisis 
Descriptive Statistics General Performance + 
Higson, Holly &  
Kattuman (2002)  
USA / 
1950-1999 
US Business 
Cycle 
Fluctuations 
Descriptive Statistics, 
Data Analysis, OLS 
and GMM 
Growth rate of sales + 
Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt &  
Maksimovic (2005)  
54 
Countries / 
1995-1999 
Financial, legal 
and corruption 
obstacles 
Panel Data Models Growth rate of sales + 
Larsen & 
Bjerkeland (2005) 
Norway / 
1988-2004 
Banking crisis in 
the  
early 1990s 
Norges Bank‟s bank- 
ruptcy prediction 
model Sebra 
Firms' loan losses  ? 
Özar, Özertan &  
Irfanoglu (2008)  
Turkey / 
2001 
2001 Turkish 
financial crisis  
Cross-sectional 
regression 
Employment growth + 
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b
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Gertler & Gilchrist  
(1994)  
USA / 
1960-1991 
1981-82 US 
recession  
and "Romer 
dates"  
Descriptive Statistics, 
bivariate VAR 
analysis and 
structural equations 
Sales, inventories and  
short-term debt   
+ 
Sato (2000) 
Indonesia / 
1997-1999 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics 
and Data Analysis 
Growth rate of assets 
and profits 
- 
Tan & See (2004) 
Singapore 
/ 1995-
1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
Strategic reorientation  - 
Régnier (2005) 
Thailand / 
1998-2000 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics General Resilience - 
ter Wengel & 
Rodriguez  
(2006)  
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Domaç & Ferri 
(1999) 
Korea / 
1992-1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics 
and VAR Analysis 
Firms' industrial 
production 
+ 
Claessens, Djankov 
&  
Xu (2000) 
6 Asian 
Countries / 
1988-1998 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Cross-sectional 
pooled regression 
ROA and debt burden  n.s. 
Berry, Rodriguez &  
Sandee (2001)  
Indonesia / 
1990s 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics Productivity Growth - 
Forbes (2002) 
42 
Countries / 
1997-2000 
Currency 
Depreciations 
Events 
Panel Data Models 
Sales, net income,  
asset value, market  
capitalization  
? 
Gregory, Harvie & 
Lee  
(2002)  
Korea / 
1990s and 
early 
2000s 
1997 East Asian 
financial crisis 
Descriptive Statistics General Performance - 
 
(+) - Firm Size has a positive effect upon firm performance under crises, thus SMEs are unstabilizer elements; (-) - Firm Size has a 
negative effect upon firm performance under crises, thus SMEs are potential stabilizer elements; (?) - Mixed results regarding SMEs' 
stabilizer role; (n.s. = not significant) - No evidence of a (un)stabilizer role for SMEs or LEs 
Source: Own elaboration, * Studies are presented in a chronological order 
Table 6. Empirical evidence on the firm size effect under crisis environments 
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Berry et al. (2001) and Gregory et al. (2002) studied the SMEs‟ dynamics both 
during and after the Asian financial crisis. The former discussed the firms‟ evolution in 
Indonesia and showed that smaller firms were found to have weathered the crisis better 
than larger companies, being able to respond more quickly and flexibly to the sudden 
shocks, mainly because they were less dependent on formal markets and formal credit. In 
addition, SMEs‟ resilience during and after the crisis was also explained by their ability to 
exploit market niches and take advantage of economies of agglomeration, in opposition to 
larger firms, which were more reliant on economies of scale and whose production 
structure took more time to be reorganized. Gregory et al. (2002) focused on Korean 
experience and concluded that, despite the negative effects of crisis on SMEs, smaller 
firms showed remarkable resilience during and after the Asian financial crisis. 
Accordingly, the negative relation found between firm size and firm behaviour imply that 
SMEs were potential shock absorbers and important stabilizer elements, playing an 
important role in the subsequent recovery process, by helping to create jobs or absorbing 
the employees dispensed by LEs, and thus improving their efficiency, growth and exports.  
 
c) Firm size as a neutral factor for firm behaviour under crises 
Only Claessens et al. (2000) has clearly found that firm size neither impacts 
positively nor negatively on firm behaviour during or after crisis events, but rather acts as a 
neutral factor. Their results show that LEs were not necessarily better able than SMEs to 
weather the Asian crisis. Actually, other factors were found to be more important than firm 
size to explain the way firm evolve during and after turbulent periods, like previous 
vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures.  
Larsen and Bjerkeland (2005) and Forbes (2002) were the two inconclusive 
studies within the sample of studies reviewed, obtaining mixed results about the potential 
firm size effect upon firm performance measures under a crisis. Larsen and Bjerkeland 
(2005) used the early 90s banking crisis in Norway as empirical setting to test the 
differences between SMEs and LEs in what concerns their loan losses. According to their 
outcomes, unexpected loan losses have been lower for SMEs‟ loans than for those of larger 
enterprises in about 2/3 of the period reviewed (1988-2004), while in the remaining period 
the opposite scenario was found. As a result, they do not have a basis for concluding 
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whether SMEs or LEs have better supported such a crisis episode. Moreover, the results 
depend on the model used and the method for calculating unexpected losses.  
Similar problems were faced by Forbes (2002), who studied the firms‟ evolution 
during and after currency crises in 42 different countries. Overall, the results suggested that 
larger firms tend to have worse performance than smaller firms. However, the significance 
of such upshot fluctuates across different performance measures and also according to the 
methodological procedure adopted, so that no definite conclusions were provided about the 
potential firm size effect upon firm performance measures during and after crises.  
 
 
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DEFINITION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
After the analysis of the literature discussed in the previous sections and paying 
attention to the currently environment of global financial and economic crisis, we claim for 
the important and well-timed debate on the role of foreign MNEs in face of a crisis and the 
respective impact in host countries‟ economy. Foreign firms either can help to alleviate the 
crisis‟ effects owing to their ownership advantages and their consequent superior 
performance or survival perspectives, or can add to macroeconomic instability due to the 
ease with which they can transfer production facilities from one country to another.  
From the literature review, there is no consensus about the effect of foreign 
ownership upon firm performance and firm survival, either during normal conditions or 
under a crisis event. Moreover, there are also several firm-level and industry-level 
characteristics where foreign and domestic firms very often differ and which are likely to 
affect the performance, growth and survival of firms, and hence moderate the effect arising 
from foreign ownership. Accordingly, in our analysis we must properly account for them, 
in order to investigate if there remain any significant differences in firm performance and 
firm survival/failure that can be attributed to foreignness per se during a crisis event. 
Accordingly, this dissertation aims at filling the gap in the literature by addressing 
three main research questions:  
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1) Does foreign ownership helps to differentiate the performance and survival of 
firms? 
 
2) Does the foreignness effect changes during crises? i. e. Can foreign firms act, 
in some extent, as stabilizers during economic slowdowns? 
 
3) How firm size interferes with the foreign ownership effect during economic 
slowdowns?   
 
In the next sections we provide a first look into the data and the empirical setting 
used to answer the above questions, followed by the presentation of our methodological 
procedures, and subsequently the discussion of our empirical results and their policy 
implications.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS IN PORTUGUESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (PMI): 
A FIRST LOOK INTO THE DATA 
 
 
3.1. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
From the previous literature review, we conclude that foreign ownership can be an 
important source of firm heterogeneity, affecting the dynamics of performance and 
survival. However, the international literature also points that foreign and domestic firms 
often differ in several characteristics, as size, productivity, human capital or industries 
entered. Actually, these differences at firm- and industry-level may soften the effect of 
foreign ownership, so that we must properly account for them, in order to investigate if 
there remain any significant differences in firms‟ behaviour that can be attributed to 
foreignness per se.   
In this chapter we provide a first look into the data, by conducting a dynamic and 
comparative analysis of evolutional differences between foreign and domestic firms in 
general and also disaggregated into different size classes. Based on descriptive statistics 
and data analysis, we search for a differentiated behaviour between foreign and Portuguese 
firms over a 20-year period (1988-2007). In particular, we pay special attention to issues of 
scale, operational performance, human capital and geographical location, after assessing 
the relative importance of foreign firms in Portuguese manufacturing and also their entry 
patterns in the different industries.  
 
 
3.2. EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
Since the EEC accession in 1986, Portugal experienced an outstanding growth of 
FDI inflows, even compared with the FDI growth in neighbouring Spain or other small 
OECD countries (OECD, 1994). Over the period, foreign firms assumed a significant role 
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in the modernization and dynamics of the Portuguese economy. According to Tavares 
(2002) and Barbosa et al. (2004), the relatively lower input costs and the export 
opportunities due to the country‟s location in Western Europe were the main motivations 
for foreign entry and permanence, which shows the importance of both efficiency-seeking 
and, to a less scale, market-seeking motivations of foreign MNEs operating in Portugal. In 
manufacturing, a bulk of foreign subsidiaries have located in Portuguese industries with 
the aim of benefiting from factor price differences between this small open economy and 
other countries in Europe, and, to a less extent, from a small but growing market. 
During the period under analysis (1988-2007), the Portuguese economy 
experienced periods of considerable growth but also years of recession: the early 1990s 
(1991-1993) and 2000s (2001-2003). These were characterized by declines in GDP, private 
consumption and investment and an increase in unemployment (Figures 2 and 3). These 
recessions were associated to a decline in economic activity which occurred mainly in 
developed countries, leading to considerable declines in Portuguese exports and in private 
consumption along with investment contraction. Nonetheless, internally, reductions in 
public investment and gross fixed capital formation, in addition to fragilities at total factor 
productivity also contributed to further declines in economic activity (Bank of Portugal, 
2009a, 2009b). These recessions are likely to have affected firms‟ performance, but the 
effect may differ between firms and industries. From this section onwards, we investigate 
in specific how (and if) foreign ownership had affected firms‟ employment growth, sales 
turnover growth and survival, overall and during recessions in particular. 
 
Figure 2. Annual growth rate of Portuguese real GDP Figure 3. Unemployment rate in Portugal 
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3.3. DATA  
 
Our data were obtained from an annual survey (Quadros de Pessoal, hereafter 
QP) from GEP of the Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS) since 1982
8
. This 
is a comprehensive survey covering all firms with wage earners in Portugal and its 
longitudinal dimension allows firms to be followed over time, as firms are identified with a 
single number.  By working with the original raw data files at the firm-level from 1985 to 
2007, it was possible to identify over 100.000 firms in each year. The data was provided by 
GEP
9
 - MTSS.    
What makes this data source really unique and particularly valuable from the point 
of view of the analysis of foreign entry and exit is that, among other data, the survey 
records the share of equity held by non-residents, allowing the computation of estimates on 
the importance of foreign-owned firms in the Portuguese economy. For the classification of 
firms, the share of equity owned by foreign investors is a common criterion used in the 
literature for firms‟ discrimination. Some studies consider as FDI a foreign participation of, 
at least, 10%. In our study, we classify a firm as foreign if its share of equity owned is, at 
least, 50%. This participation level is also commonly used on studies at microeconomic 
level (e.g., Teixeira and Tavares-Lehmann, 2007) and ensures a significant level of foreign 
influence in domestic firms‟ operations.  
However, despite these advantages, the database has also some limitations that 
should be made clear. First, we do not know the identity of the foreign owners. This is 
unfortunate because it prevents us from using the parents‟ characteristics, like the country 
of origin, to explain the behaviour of foreign firms. In addition, we could not control 
specifically for firms‟ exporting behaviour. Nonetheless, we have accounted for the export 
intensity of the industry in an attempt to overcome this data limitation. Thus, in addition to 
QP database, we have also used data on exports from National Institute of Statistics (INE), 
as well as on Gross Value Added from Bank of Portugal, both at 2-digit industry level, 
according to the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) rev 2, in order to 
                                                          
8
 We acknowledge GEP for allowing the use of the original data. The data analysis, results and conclusions 
are of the author‟s own responsibility. GEP stands for Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento from Ministry 
of Labour and Social Solidarity. The Ministry was created on 1916 as Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare. Now it is called Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social (MTSS) (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Solidarity). 
9
 GEP – Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (Strategy and Planning Office). 
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compute the export intensity of manufacturing industries. At the macroeconomic level, 
data on annual growth rate of Portuguese GDP was accessed through OECD (Country 
Statistical Profiles 2009). Although QP dataset is available for the period 1985 to 2007, we 
only have information on industries‟ exports since 1988, so the next descriptive analysis 
and the following empirical study used information for the period 1988 through 2007.   
In what concerns firm size, we later distinguish between SMEs and LEs based on 
the European definition, according to which a firm is considered a SME if it employs fewer 
than 250 persons and if its annual turnover does not exceed 50 million euro or its balance 
sheet does not exceed 43 million euro
10
. 
 
 
3.4. EVOLUTION TRENDS OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS IN PMI 
 
3.4.1. ENTRY PATTERNS 
 
Between 1988 and 2007, the number of foreign firms (FF) and domestic firms 
(DF) located in Portugal grew in a considerable way as Figures 4 and 5 report, although the 
growth had been greater in the foreign case. During this period, the average annual growth 
rate was about 8.2% in FF and 5.8% in DF. Overall, the trend in new firm creation is 
clearly positive for both groups of firms, despite a slight lessening in the growth of foreign 
entries during the downturn periods. The concentration of firms in manufacturing industry 
has been decreasing during the last decades, inversely to wholesale and retail sectors. In 
1988, almost 38% of FF and 24% of DF were operating in Portuguese manufacturing 
industry. In 1995, the respective shares had fallen to 28% and 20%, and more recently, in 
2007, just 20% of FF and 12% of DF were focused in Portuguese manufacturing.    
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
10
 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/sme_user_guide_pt.pdf 
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Figure 4. Total number of DF Figure 5. Total number of FF 
  
 
Next figures summarize the distribution of FF and DF over the different 
industries, according to distinct levels of technological complexity
11
. In opposition to FF, 
which have been reallocating themselves from low-tech industries towards more 
technology intensive ones, DF still remain strongly concentrated in sectors requiring labour 
intensive activities and low levels of technological complexity. This dissimilarity may 
suggest a higher ability to overcome entry barriers and to conduct innovative activities in 
favour to FF.  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of DF by Technological 
Complexity 
Figure 7. Distribution of FF by Technological 
Complexity 
  
 
                                                          
11
 The analysis of the level of technological complexity was based on OECD classification (LT: Low Tech 
Industries; MLT: Medium-Low Tech Industries; MH-HT: Medium-High/High Tech Industries). Due to the 
high level of aggregation in economic activities present in “Quadros de Pessoal” database, Medium-High and 
High Technology Industries were joined in the analysis. 
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Owing to the longitudinal dimension of QP database, we can follow individual 
firms over time and compute entry and exit measures by ourselves
12
. Such process enabled 
us to track 121.402 new firms over the period 1986-2005 (1.045 FF and 120.357 DF) and 
the identification of 98.959 exits during the same period, from which 846 corresponded to 
foreign closures. Figures 8 to 11 illustrate the evolution of open to closure ratio (O/C 
Ratio), first in aggregated Manufacturing Industry and then in different industries 
according to their technological complexity. 
The statistics reflect a more stable evolution of the ratio corresponding to DF, 
regardless the industry. In addition, the ratio for DF was almost always higher than one, 
reflecting a greater number of openings than closures. In contrast, FF were responsible for 
the highest, but also the lowest, ratios.  
 
Figure 8. O/C Ratio in Manufacturing Figure 9. O/C Ratio in Low Tech Industries 
  
Figure 10. O/C Ratio in Medium-Low Tech Industries Figure 11. O/C Ratio in Medium-High/High Tech 
Industries
13 
  
                                                          
12
 Detailed explanation on the computation of entry and exit occurrences in the database will be presented in 
Chapter 5.  
13
 The missing data in the figure means that there were no shutdowns in 1987 and 1989 among foreign 
subsidiaries operating in medium-high/high technology sectors.   
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Regarding the industries entered, some differences among foreign and domestic 
entrants were also noted. In order to compare the attributes of the industries entered by new 
firms according to their ownership, some t-tests on the statistical significance of 
differences were performed. The results corroborate those ones already obtained in 
previous studies conducted for Portugal with data for later 80s and early 90s (e.g., Mata 
and Portugal, 2002, 2004). Foreign entrants prefer industries where concentration
14
 is 
higher, where minimum efficient scale
15
 is larger and with stronger foreign presence
16
. The 
differences found in industries attributes between foreign and domestic entrants were 
frequently significant at 1% level. In addition, domestic firms seem to choose more often 
industries with higher entry rates
17
, a fact in line with their preference for industries with 
higher competition levels and lower concentration. The industry growth rate
18
 was also 
analyzed, but the differences were not so evident. Since the late 90s, foreign entrants have 
been choosing industries with higher growth rates, but the differences were rarely 
significant.  
 
 
3.4.2. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN FIRMS IN PMI 
 
The figures below illustrate the evolution of FF‟s share in the total number of 
firms operating in PMI over the period under observation. In aggregate terms, the average 
share was 1,4%, despite some weakens have  been detected namely during the economic 
slowdowns. Over the whole period, low-tech industries were those where FF were less 
important in relative shares (just 1%), in contrast to medium-low tech industries, where 
foreign subsidiaries have gained increasing expressivity (accounting for, on average, 2.8% 
of total number of firms).  
Foreign firms have also been presenting a growing share in total employment, as 
well as in total sales, namely in high technology intensive sectors, as next figures confirm. 
Over the period 1988-2007, the average share of foreign firms was 11,6% in 
                                                          
14
 Industry concentration was measured by computing the Herfindhal Index of concentration, in terms of 
employment.  
15
 Proxied by the median value of 2-digit industry‟s employment. 
16
 Foreign presence was measured by the share of FF in total employment in the 2-digit industry. 
17
 Entry rate refers to the ratio of the number of entrants in year t to the total number of existing firms in t. 
18
 Computed through the difference, in logs, of total employment in 2-digit industry between t and t-1. 
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manufacturing employment and 20% in the total manufacturing sales turnover. Moreover, 
the average shares registered by FF in the most technologically complex sectors were, 
respectively, 23% and 38,8%, validating their importance in more advanced industries. The 
reasons for that concentration may be associated to the results of Mata and Portugal (1999, 
2002, 2004), Barbosa et al. (2004) and Geroski et al. (2010), whose studies revealed that 
FF prefer sectors where entry barriers are important. Such a presence from foreign 
multinationals‟ affiliates may contribute to the regeneration and modernization of 
Portuguese industrial production, supporting a structural change towards technologically 
more complex exports (Freitas and Paes Mamede, 2008). Nonetheless, macroeconomic 
conditions seem to exert an impact on FF‟s contribution to such a modernization. 
Recessive periods were described by evident attenuations in foreign shares, namely during 
the early 1990s recession, both in total employment and total turnover.  
 
Figure 12. Share of FF in total number of firms Figure 13. Share of FF in total number of firms by 
technological complexity 
  
 
Figure 14. Share of FF in total employment Figure 15. Share of FF in total employment by 
technological complexity 
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Figure 16. Share of FF in total turnover Figure 17. Share of FF in total turnover by 
technological complexity 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3. SIZE, SCALE AND AGE 
 
The following data confirms the widespread belief highlighted in the literature 
related to foreign superiority in terms of size and scale
19
. All over the time, FF largely 
overcame the scale of operations of their domestic counterparts, both at employment and 
turnover levels. During the last decades, both groups of firms have been reducing their 
average level of employment, in contrast to their average turnover, which has been 
presenting a positive evolution, mainly for FF. These opposite trends let us foresee a 
positive evolution on labour productivity levels, probably associated to the mechanization 
of production processes, especially in more technology intensive industries and, so, less 
labour demanding.  
Figures 18 and 19 illustrate the relative superiority of FF over DF at both scale 
variables. During the period illustrated, FF presented an average size between 7 and 12 
times larger than DF at employment levels. Regarding sales turnover, FF operated at a 
scale between 9 and 26 times larger than domestic-owned enterprises. The differences 
were always statistically significant at 1% level, after performing t-tests for both variables 
and every year. Curiously, the gaps between the two groups presented slight reductions 
during and/or after recessive periods in Portuguese economy. Concerning their average 
age, FF were often older than DF, presenting an average of 34 years, in opposition to DF‟s 
average age of 21 years. 
 
                                                          
19
 Confirm Table 4 in Section 2.5.2. 
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Table 7. Evolution of average employment and turnover 
   
1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Average Employment (number of employees)          
FF 223 171 186 184 124 
DF 30 25 18 15 14 
Average Turnover (€1.000)           
FF 7.338 10.526 18.838 24.200 22.295 
DF 1.476 1.015 823 985 1.228 
 
 
Figure 18. Ratio FF‟s employment to DF‟s 
employment  
Figure 19. Ratio FF‟s turnover to DF‟s turnover  
  
 
 
3.4.4. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
20
 
 
Labour productivity, as the ratio of firms‟ total sales to respective total 
employment (turnover per employee), is commonly used as a measure of operational 
performance
21
. Despite some disadvantages pointed in the literature
22
, labour productivity 
measures present some other advantages, as these are less data sensitive measures, 
imposing very few theoretical restrictions and do not relying on measures of, for instance, 
capital stock, which are likely to be affected by measurement errors (Criscuolo, 2005). 
Additionally, Blömstrom and Sjöholm (1999) argue that labour productivity is a complete 
measure of operational performance, being a function of capital-labour ratio, skill level of 
the labour force, capacity utilization, economies of scale, ownership and various industry 
                                                          
20
 This is a measure of employees‟ productivity and may be applied in comparative analyses between firms 
within the same industry. However, low values may represent a labour-intensive industry and high values 
may be associated to capital-intensive industries. 
21
 See Table 1 in Section 2.2. 
22
 For instance, Criscuolo (2005) points out that labour productivity only measures the efficiency of one of 
the inputs to production and thus we cannot distinguish whether an increase in productivity is due to an 
improvement in efficiency or an increase in capital stock.  
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specific factors.  In our case, QP database does not provide any financial variable allowing 
other measurement of firms‟ performance, since the data were originally designed to 
collect information on labour market.  
As previously stated in Section 2.2, a largely debated issue on IB literature relates 
to the significance of performance gaps often arising from comparisons between DF and 
FF. Unconditional on firms‟ characteristics, the data on Portuguese case suggests that an 
increasing gap exists between such groups, concerning operational performance levels, as 
illustrated by figures 20 and 21. 
 
 
Figure 20. Evolution of operational performance Figure 21. Ratio FF‟s operational performance to 
DF‟s operational performance  
 
 
 
Operational performance was always higher for FF, except in 1994. In addition, 
the average difference between foreign and domestic operational performance was always 
statistically significant at 1% level, except in 1989 and 1994, when t-tests revealed no 
significant difference. The gap between both groups seems to be increasingly larger since 
the middle 1990s, with FF presenting average operational performance levels about 4 times 
larger than those of DF. However, these results must be accurately analyzed, since 
performance gaps may be a mere statistical artifact as a significant branch of the literature 
has already confirmed (e.g., Barbosa and Louri (2005) for Portugal and Karlsson et al. 
(2009) for China).  
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3.4.5. HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
The quality of the workforce, in terms of skills and qualifications of employees, is 
another dimension where foreign and domestic firms more often differ. Human capital 
levels may be viewed as an increasingly competitive factor at the firm-level, exerting as 
well an important role upon firms‟ evolution and growth (e.g., Teixeira, 2002). Despite 
several measures can be used to proxy the human capital of firms (e.g., average wages, 
average school years of the workforce, among other measures), in this study we proxy the 
firm‟s human capital by the share of college graduates in firm‟s total employment. Similar 
measures of firm‟s human capital levels were chosen by Mata and Portugal (1999, 2002, 
2004), also using QP database. Figure 22 depicts the evolution of these shares for foreign 
and domestic firms. The ratio between both shares is illustrated in figure 23.  
 
Figure 22. Proportion of workers with a college 
degree 
Figure 23. Ratio FF‟s human capital to DF‟s human 
capital 
  
 
From the above results, we observe a positive trend in human capital in both 
groups of firms, as well as a significant distance between DF‟s and FF‟s levels. The 
average share of college graduates in the firms‟ workforce was 5.9% in FF over the whole 
period, in opposition to the share of 2.7% in DF. The ratio of FF‟s to DF‟s human capital 
shows that foreign firms presented, on average, a proportion of highly qualified workers 
about 2.2 times greater than Portuguese firms, and t-tests revealed that the disparity found 
at human capital levels was statistically significant at 1% level. These conclusions 
corroborate those ones of Almeida (2003), whose study, applied to PMI for the period of 
1991-1998, found that FF had a proportion of low educated workers 7 percentage points 
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lower than DF. Moreover, those differences remained even after controlling for region and 
sector composition, as well as size and age of firms. Accordingly, these differences must 
be properly accounted for, in order to isolate the pure ownership effect upon firm 
performance, growth and survival.  
 
 
3.4.6. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION  
 
Finally, a last comparative dimension between FF and DF is their location 
patterns throughout the country, namely their geographical focus in urban centers. 
Geographic location of firms may matter for their performance evolution, growth patterns 
and survival prospects. More rural locations are often less developed and may lack 
diversity of resources, though can enable the firms to exploit a niche with limited 
competition. Conversely, urban locations often contain a wealth of varied resources, but 
firms at these locations may also have to face greater competition and higher costs related 
to diseconomies of agglomeration (Stearns et al. 1995; Fotopoulos and Louri 2000; 
Littunen 2000).  
We follow Guimarães et al. (2000) by classifying the districts of Porto and Lisbon 
in the coastal side of Portugal as urban centers, where in fact the greatest part of foreign 
investments has been concentrated. Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the distribution of foreign 
and domestic firms over urban centers and the remaining districts in the country.  
The results confirm the strong, though decreasing, focus of foreign firms in urban 
locations, where better infrastructures, services and networks can be more easily found. 
Actually, in the late 1980s, more than 2/3 of FF chose the Portuguese urban centers to 
operate (44% in Lisbon and 23% in Porto). In contrast, the more recent data show that less 
than 50% of FF is located in such areas, so that they have been reallocating themselves to 
the other districts, which have also became more developed and richer in services and 
resources over the years. In opposition, DF were mostly and increasingly concentrated in 
less urban regions, also preferring Porto over Lisbon to operate (in 1987, 27% of DF were 
located in Porto and only 17% in Lisbon; in 2007, the shares were respectively 24% and 
13%). Despite the disadvantages in terms of scarcer resources, DF may have also profited 
from lower competition in these districts, mainly from their foreign counterparts.     
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Figure 24. Location of FF in urban centers Figure 25. Location of DF in urban centers 
  
 
 
3.5. EVOLUTION TRENDS OF SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS IN PMI 
 
3.5.1. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL AND LARGE FF IN PMI 
 
After an analysis of evolution trends of FF in PMI, this section deepens the 
previous appraisal of data by separating foreign-owned firms into foreign SMEs and 
foreign LEs, establishing also a comparison between them and DF of both size 
categories
23
.  
Regarding the relative importance of small and large FF in PMI, next figures 
illustrate their shares in total number of firms, employment and turnover
24
. By observing 
the evolution of FF‟s shares, we conclude that despite foreign SMEs have been accounting 
for a higher weight in total number of firms (on average, foreign SMEs corresponded to 
1.15% of total firms, while foreign LEs were just 0.3% of enterprises in PMI), larger 
subsidiaries have been prominent in securing employment and turnover.  
In fact, despite their irrelevant influence in number, foreign large-sized firms were 
responsible for 8.1% of total employment and 15.4% of total sales in manufacturing 
industry over the period 1988-2007. The corresponding shares of foreign SMEs were 3.5% 
and 4.5% for the same period of time. Both sets of foreign affiliates have however been 
increasing their positions in Portuguese industries, though the gap between small and large 
                                                          
23
 The distinction between SMEs and LEs is based on the European definition, according to which a firm is 
considered a SME if it employs fewer than 250 persons and if its annual turnover does not exceed 50 million 
euro or its balance sheet does not exceed 43 million euro 
24
 For an aggregated view of FF‟s shares, remember Figures 12, 14 and 16, respectively. For an aggregated 
view of SMEs‟ shares (foreign and domestic), similar figures are presented in the Appendix G (page 126). 
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FF has also becoming greater. In addition, as we had already stated with more aggregated 
data, recessive periods seem to have exerted a negative impact upon foreign shares. 
Foreign SMEs appear to have suffered higher declines in their total firms‟ shares during 
economic downturns, while greater declines at employment and turnover shares were more 
visible among foreign large-sized companies. This preliminary analysis of data may thus 
suggest that small and large FF may have behaved differently during economic recessions 
suffered by Portuguese economy. In other words, firm size may have acted as a moderating 
factor of foreign ownership effect during crises.  
 
 
Figure 26. Share of FF in total 
number of firms 
Figure 27. Share of FF in total 
employment 
Figure 28. Share of FF in total 
turnover 
   
 
 
 
3.5.2. SIZE, SCALE AND AGE  
 
Table 8 summarizes the main differences at the scale of operations between FF 
and DF of different size classes. In section 3.4.3 we had already stated that FF are larger 
than DF, either concerning the number of workers employed or the level of annual sales 
turnover. Now, the disaggregation of FF and DF into SMEs and LEs leads to the 
conclusion that the main differences at size and scale are found between foreign SMEs and 
domestic SMEs. In opposition, larger FF and DF had more similar scales of operation 
throughout the period. 
Figures 29 and 30 illustrate the movement of the FF/DF ratio both at employment 
and turnover, for the groups of SMEs and LEs. On average, foreign SMEs were about 4 
times larger than domestic SMEs regarding employment levels, and 8 times larger at 
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turnover. Conversely, the average FF/DF ratios among larger enterprises were, 
respectively, about 1.3 and 1.4, suggesting that foreign ownership was not so significant 
for LEs, at least concerning the differences at operational scale.    
 
Table 8. Evolution of average employment and turnover by size class 
   
1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Average Employment (number of employees)          
SMEs 
FF 83 69 67 66 52 
DF 20 18 15 13 12 
LEs 
FF 695 623 678 612 531 
DF 593 539 477 451 421 
Average Turnover (€1.000)           
SMEs 
FF 2.627 2.929 4.930 6.323 6.203 
DF 299 512 569 646 707 
LEs 
FF 23.102 43.900 76.510 88.803 113.004 
DF 63.298 38.201 35.012 64.997 109.011 
 
 
Regarding the average age of firms, foreign firms were often older than their 
domestic counterparts as previously stated, though we denote again greater dissimilarities 
within the group of SMEs. Foreign SMEs were, on average, 27 years in operation, in 
opposition to 18 years for domestic SMEs. For larger firms, the average age was about 40 
years for FF and 35 years for DF.    
  
 
Figure 29. Ratio FF‟s employment to DF‟s 
employment by size class 
Figure 30. Ratio FF‟s turnover to DF‟s turnover by 
size class 
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3.5.3. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE  
 
Figures 31 and 32 depict the evolution of operational performance of FF and DF, 
according to their respective size class. Such a disaggregation between smaller and larger 
enterprises reveals that the performance gap formerly observed in Figure 20 has mainly 
occurred between foreign SMEs and domestic SMEs. More precisely, the average ratio 
FF‟s operational performance to DF‟s operational performance was about 3.38 for the 
group of SMEs and just 1.02 within larger enterprises, which seemed to have performed 
more similarly over the two decades under study. On the other hand, the performance gap 
observed between foreign and domestic SMEs has becoming greater since the mid-1990s, 
which had contributed to the superiority of foreign-owned firms that we have detected in 
Section 3.4.4. 
 
Figure 31. Operational Performance of SMEs Figure 32. Operational Performance of LEs 
  
 
 
3.5.4. HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
Human capital is over again evaluated for the samples of FF and DF, now 
separated into SMEs and LEs. Figures 33 and 34 illustrate the evolution of the proportion 
of college graduates in FF and DF of different size classes. The statistics reveal that foreign 
superiority turns out to be higher among SMEs than within the group of LEs. Foreign 
SMEs presented, on average, 6.1% of graduated employees, in opposition to the weaker 
share of 2.3% for domestic SMEs. Among LEs, the corresponding shares were 5.9% for FF 
and 4.9% for DF. 
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These results confirm the previous evidence on FF‟s advantages over DF at 
human capital levels, and furthermore reveal that such superiority can be even greater 
among the set of smaller and medium firms. In fact, foreign SMEs very often exhibited 
higher levels of human capital than larger subsidiaries, which again makes us suspect that 
possible differences may be found between foreign SMEs‟ and foreign LEs‟ behaviours 
during turbulent periods. In addition, the data also shows the debilities of smaller domestic 
firms at human capital intensity, claiming for the attention of governments and for policies 
more focused on the upgrading of domestic skills and competencies, and thus reducing the 
gap that persists even against the smaller FF.  
 
Figure 33. Proportion of workers with a college 
degree in SMEs 
Figure 34. Proportion of workers with a college 
degree in LEs 
  
 
 
3.5.5. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION 
 
Finally, regarding the location at urban centers of Porto and Lisbon previously 
discussed for the broad groups of FF and DF, we now distinguish the same patterns for 
SMEs and LEs. Overall, we still conclude that foreign firms (both smaller and larger) tend 
to be more concentrated in more urban areas. Despite in the late 1980s this preference was 
more evident among larger FF, the differences were attenuated over the time, so that in 
2007 the shares of FF located in urban centers were very similar for smaller and larger 
enterprises, as figures below confirm. 
Conversely, the differences were greater among domestic SMEs and domestic 
LEs. The results show over again that domestic firms (both small and large) are less 
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concentrated in urban centers, compared to FF of both size classes. Moreover, we  now see 
that smaller DF are even more focused in other regions than Porto and Lisbon, which may 
lack the more sophisticated resources, infrastructures and/or resources, while larger DF are 
more equally dispersed among urban and less urban areas.   
  
Figure 35. Location of foreign SMEs in urban centers Figure 36. Location of domestic SMEs in urban centers 
  
 
Figure 37. Location of foreign LEs in urban centers 
 
Figure 38. Location of domestic LEs in urban centers 
  
 
 
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The literature suggests that foreign ownership is an important source of firm 
heterogeneity affecting performance and survival dynamics (see Tables 1 and 2). However, 
the potential impact of FDI in host economies depends not only on the quality of the 
investments, but also on the way they evolve over time. For the Portuguese case, and more 
precisely for PMI, we found foreign subsidiaries to be relatively larger, more productive, 
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technologically more advanced, richer regarding human capital and more concentrated in 
urban regions, when compared to domestic firms. This is likely to alter the patterns of jobs, 
to expand specialized and highly skilled employment, to increase the competitiveness of 
industries and maybe to stabilize the economy during economic downturns. However, a 
deeper analysis controlling for these firm-level and industry-level differences found 
between foreign and domestic firms are needed, in order to evaluate if any significant 
effect can be attributed to foreign ownership per se.   
In the next chapters, we will empirically assess the determinants of firms‟ 
employment growth, sales turnover growth and hazard rates, specially attending on the 
foreignness effect, overall and during recessions. In this chapter we have identified several 
firm-level and industry-level characteristics which are likely to affect the dynamics of 
firms, as well as the foreign ownership impact on those specific firm-level variables. 
Accordingly, our subsequent empirical analysis will properly account for them.  
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CHAPTER 425 
 
ECONOMIC SLOWDOWNS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: DO FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 
FIRMS BEHAVE ANY DIFFERENT? 
 
 
 
4.1. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This chapter examines the link between foreign ownership, employment growth 
and turnover growth
26
 at the firm-level. More precisely, the comparative response of 
foreign multinationals and domestic firms in Portugal during the two economic slowdowns 
previously identified are assessed, in order to conclude whether foreign firms reacted to the 
economic recessions differently than did domestic firms and, if that was the case, whether 
they acted as (un)stabilizer agents. Accordingly, two main research questions will be 
addressed: first, does foreign ownership helps to differentiate firm performance overall and 
during periods of crisis? And second, how does firm size interfere with the foreign 
ownership effect? 
Next the methodology to be applied and the variables to be included in our 
estimations are presented, followed by some preliminary statistics and finally the empirical 
results and the respective discussion.   
 
 
4.2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
Our empirical strategy went through three main steps. First, we investigated if 
foreign ownership affected firm performance / firm growth (measured by employment 
                                                          
25
 This chapter is a modified version of the article “Do foreign and domestic firms behave any different 
during economic slowdowns?”, published in International Business Review (doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2010.06.001). 
We acknowledge the valuable comments of two anonymous referees from IBR.  
26
 Employment growth and sales turnover growth are frequently used as measures of firm growth and 
performance. Turnover and sales are frequently used interchangeably in the literature (Coad, 2009; Bamiatzi, 
Bozos and Nikolopoulos, 2010).  
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growth and sales turnover growth) during recessions. To reach this purpose, we used a 
similar equation to that used by Álvarez and Görg (2007): 
 
ln(Yit) – ln(Yit-1) = αi + Z
’
it δ + γ1 Ownit + γ2 Down + γ3 Ownit*Down + εit    (1) 
where Y is the proxy for growth of firm i in each time period, corresponding to 
employment growth in a first specification and to sales turnover growth in a second 
specification. These variables are measured by the log difference in employment (and sales 
turnover) in firm i between t and t-1. 
A dummy variable - Own - allows distinguishing between FF and DF, and Down 
is a dummy for the periods of recession. The overall effect of economic recessions is given 
by γ2, which is expected to be negative. The equation evaluates the impact of being foreign-
owned during recessions through an interaction term – Own*Down. If FF are more able to 
absorb recessions, the growth in these firms should be higher than for DF in the recession 
period, and, in that case, γ3 will be positive and significant. If γ3 is negative, then FF 
contract more than DF during the crisis. If γ3 is zero or non-significant, it indicates that 
there are no differences in the response between foreign and domestic firms.  
Z is a vector of firm‟s and industry‟s characteristics which are likely to affect the 
dependent variables, according to the literature. A detailed description of these variables is 
presented in Table 9. We do not develop specific hypotheses regarding their effects but we 
will control for them. In particular, we include age and size, as both have been found in the 
literature to explain firm growth (Evans, 1987; Dunne and Hughes, 1994). We introduce 
the square of both variables, since their impact may be non-linear (Cardoso, 2008).  
Labour productivity and firm‟s human capital characteristics may affect firms‟ 
performance, so they must also be accounted for. We recall that FF are normally found to 
be more productive and more capital intensive than DF (Álvarez and Görg, 2007, 2009). 
Firm location in urban centres may also impact upon firm growth and, as we previously 
observed, foreign MNEs are agglomerated in the principal cities, aiming to profit from 
urbanization externalities (Guimarães et al., 2000).  Industry attributes are also controlled 
for, namely minimum efficient scale, industry concentration, industry growth, export 
intensity and foreign presence, which are the main industry-level variables commonly 
found in the literature to influence firm performance over time (e.g., Barbosa and Louri, 
2005; Álvarez and Görg, 2007; Cardoso, 2008). 
75 
 
Considering the likely moderating effect of firm size upon foreign ownership, we 
run equation (1) using, separately, the whole sample and the samples of SMEs and large 
enterprises. Our exploration of the size effect led us to estimate a second equation where 
all the variables are the same as in equation (1), with the exception of the interaction 
variables.  
  
ln(Yit) – ln(Yit-1) = αi + Z
’
it δ + γ1 Ownit + γ2 Down + γ3 Sizeit*Down + γ4 Size
2
it*Down + εit    
 
(2) 
In equation (2) we test the effect of size, instead of foreign ownership, during 
recessions (through the interaction terms Sizeit*Down and Size
2
it*Down).  Since the relation 
between size and firm growth is frequently found to be non-linear we included the variable 
Size
2
it. Finally, we estimate an equation for the sample of FF, in order to investigate further 
the role of size within the group of MNEs‟ affiliates under recessions. Z is the same vector 
of firm‟s and industry‟s characteristics, but we test if being large-sized matters for 
differentiating among FF and how it matters during recessions (through the terms Largeit 
and Largeit*Down): 
 
ln(Yit) – ln(Yit-1) = αi + Z
’
it δ + γ1 Largeit + γ2 Down + γ3 Largeit*Down + εit    (3) 
 
We applied panel data models
27
 to estimate all the above equations and, 
specifically, the suitability of within-groups and between-groups estimators. For all the 
estimations, Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of null covariance between the 
regressors and the individual effects, thus fixed effect estimators proved to be the most 
appropriate, being unbiased, consistent and asymptotical normal. In addition, our 
estimations were always applied to all firms in operation every year. Albeit many empirical 
studies often select a sample of only surviving firms, such a choice may bias the results in 
favour of foreign-owned firms if they present higher survival probabilities, leading to the 
conclusion that foreign ownership has a significant explanatory power upon firm 
performance measures (e.g., Álvarez and Görg, 2007). To avoid such a bias, we included 
in our estimations surviving and non-surviving firms during the period under analysis, 
                                                          
27
 Panel data models allow assessing firm growth measures longitudinally, rather than cross-sectionally. The 
literature points that cross-sectional measurement of firm performance is insufficient and that it should be 
measured longitudinally, due to the importance of time dimension (e.g., Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2002; Hult 
et al., 2008). 
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which constituted an unbalanced panel. Estimations using a fixed-effects specification take 
this factor into account, so it does not represent any problem (Greene, 2008). All the 
estimations were performed using STATA 10. 
 
 
Table 9. Description of Variables  
CATEGORY VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
Dependent 
Variables 
Employment Growth Ln (Employmentt) – Ln (Employmentt-1) 
Turnover Growth Ln (Turnovert) – Ln (Turnovert-1) 
 Ownership Dummy = 1 if, at least, 50% of the capital is held by foreign investors, 0 otherwise. 
Main Variables 
of Interest 
Large dummy Dummy = 1 if the firm is large-sized (i.e. if it is not a SME), 0 otherwise.  
Own*Downturn Interaction variable measuring the effect of being a FF during downturns 
Size*Downturn Interaction variable between firm size and downturn periods 
Size2*Downturn Interaction variable between the square of firm size and downturn periods 
Large*Downturn Interaction variable measuring the effect of being a large-sized firm during downturns 
Other 
variables 
F
ir
m
-L
ev
el
 
Age Number of years since the entry of the firm28 
Age squared Squared number of years since the entry of the firm 
Size Ln (number of employees) 
Size squared Squared value of Ln (number of employees) 
Firm Performance 
Operational Performance measured through the log of the ratio 
Turnover/Employment 
Human Capital Ratio Number of workers with a college degree/Total number of workers 
Urban Dummy = 1 if the firm operates in the districts of Porto or Lisbon and 0 otherwise 
In
d
u
st
ry
-L
ev
el
 
MES Median of 2-digit industry‟s employment 
HH Index 
Herfindhal Index – sum of the squared share of FF in total 2-digit industry‟s 
employment 
Industry 
Agglomeration 
Share of 2-digit industry‟s employment in total Manufacturing employment  
Foreign Share Share of FF‟s employment in total 2-digit industry‟s employment 
Export Intensity Ratio 2-digit industry Exports/2-digit industry VAB 
Industry Growth Ln (2-digit industry Employmentt) – Ln (2-digit industry Employmentt-1) 
Industry Dummies Dummy = 1 for each 2-digit industry where the firm operates, 0 otherwise 
M
ac
ro
-
L
ev
el
 
Downturn Dummy = 1 for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007 and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 No data for the foundation year were available before 1994. As a result, for the computation of variable 
Age, we proxied the firm‟s foundation year through the year of admission of the former worker for each firm. 
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4.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.3.1. PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 
 
Figures 39 and 40 compare employment and turnover growth rates between 
domestic and foreign firms. FF‟s employment grew on average 1.8%, compared to a 
growth rate of 0.2% among DF. The impact of crises in employment is evident for both 
groups: FF registered a break of almost 12 percentage points in the employment growth 
rate between 1992 and 1993, and negative rates during the first half of 2000s. Domestic 
firms showed a similar but smoother evolution. However, FF seem to have reacted first and 
more abruptly, but, conversely, appear to have recovered faster.  
In what concerns sales turnover, the average growth rates of turnover were 13% 
and 12% for foreign and domestic firms, respectively. There was a reduction in FF‟s sales 
by 18 percentage points between 1992 and 1993 and a persistent decline over the period 
2001-2006. DF‟s turnover growth has declined all over the period under analysis. 
 
Figure 39. Employment Growth  Figure 40. Turnover Growth 
 
 
 
Figures 41 to 44 depict the same performance variables, discerning firms 
according to their size
29
. The distinction between SMEs and LEs is based on European 
definition, as previously explained.  
The graphs show that, unconditionally, FF were always more volatile than DF. 
During the early 1990s recession, large DF registered larger losses of employment while 
large FF registered largest declines in turnover instead. During the second slowdown, there 
                                                          
29
 Additional statistics regarding SMEs and LEs can be found in the Appendix F (page 126). 
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were larger job losses among SMEs (both foreign and domestic), while large FF also 
registered the largest declines in turnover. 
These first statistics suggest that the cyclical downturns of Portuguese economy 
affected the growth of both sets of firms. In order to disentangle the effects of other 
covariates from the effect of foreign ownership and firm size, next we turn to an 
econometric estimation of the determinants of employment and turnover growth at firm-
level. Table 10 presents the correlation coefficients between variables and no serious 
collinearity problems were detected. 
 
 
Figure 41. Employment Growth in SMEs Figure 42. Turnover Growth in SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. Employment Growth in LEs 
 
 
 
Figure 44. Turnover Growth in LEs 
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Table 10. Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Age (1)                                   
Age squared (2) 0.09                 
Size (3) -0.07 -0.08                
Size squared (4) -0.05 -0.06 0.94               
Firm Performance (5) 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.11              
Human Capital (6) -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.19             
Ownership (7) -0.11 -0.11 0.33 0.50 0.08 0.03            
Urban (8) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.55           
Downturn (9) -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00          
Own*Downturn (10) -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.10         
Size*Downturn (11) -0.07 -0.08 0.38 0.35 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.77 0.19        
Size squared*Downturn (12) -0.05 -0.06 0.46 0.49 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.56 0.25 0.92       
MES (13) -0.04 -0.04 0.24 0.23 -0.23 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.12      
HH Index (14) -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.50 0.31 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.12     
Industry Agglomeration (15) -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.13 -0.17 -0.05 -0.78 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.56 0.23    
Exports/VAB (16) -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.08 0.48   
Industry Growth (17) -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.09 -0.17  
For. Presence in Industry (18) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.13 0.30 0.66 -0.02 
 
 
 
4.3.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 11 shows the estimations for employment growth and Table 12 for turnover 
growth. In each table, Models 1 and 2 correspond to the equations (1) and (2), respectively. 
In columns 3 and 4 we show the results of equation (1) applied separately to the samples of 
SMEs and LEs correspondingly, to further explore the ownership effect in interaction with 
size. Finally, column 5 shows the results of equation (3), testing the effects of size within 
the foreign firms‟ sample30. 
 
a) Employment Growth 
 
Table 11 shows the results for employment growth over 1988-2007. Regarding 
the effect of firm-level variables, all are statistically significant. Firm age and size have a 
significant inverted U-shaped effect upon employment growth, which means that young 
SMEs show positive trends on employment growth up to a certain threshold of age and 
size, maybe due to their nimbleness and need to reach a minimum efficient scale in order 
to compete with more mature and larger firms. Additionally, firms with higher operational 
                                                          
30
 Some additional models regarding the effect of firm size upon both dependent variables during crises were 
estimated. The results are presented in the Appendix C and D (pages 123 and 124). 
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performance and more human capital-intensive firms show slower employment growth 
rates. 
When we control for firms‟ and industries‟ characteristics, foreign ownership, 
though with a negative coefficient, is not significant to explain differences in employment 
growth between firms. Regarding industries‟ attributes, firms in industries with lower 
concentration, higher export intensity and with greater foreign presence show higher 
employment growth over the period. Hence, firms‟ employment growth is an outcome of 
other firm and industry characteristics rather than a pure ownership effect (e.g., Karlsson et 
al., 2009). 
The two recessions affecting the Portuguese economy impacted negatively on 
firms‟ employment growth (Downturn coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level), 
but not in a different fashion according to their ownership (Models 1, 3 and 4). This result 
is in line with McAleese and Counahan (1979) and Álvarez and Görg (2007).  
Accordingly, we do not find evidence of a (un)stabilizer role played by FF during 
recessions upon job losses.  
Looking at the results of Model 2, the crises‟ impact upon employment growth 
seems stronger for larger firms. Large enterprises may be the first to lay-off workers in 
order to reduce operational costs to thrive the crisis. Sato (2000) and Tan and See (2004) 
also found evidence on SMEs‟ resistance during volatile macroeconomic conditions. 
Nevertheless, the effect of size is less visible among FF, as large FF‟s employment growth 
rates did not evolve significantly different from that of smaller FF during the two 
recessions (Model 5). Wang et al.‟s (2005) study of firms‟ success during the Asian crisis 
also revealed that firm size was not significant to differentiate between foreign firms.  
 
 
b) Turnover Growth 
 
Table 12 reports the results for turnover growth. Regarding firm-level variables, 
as for employment growth, we find significant non-linear effects of firm‟s age and size. 
Larger firms tend to have better sales‟ performance although excessively large firms are 
affected by their inert and rigid nature. Turnover growth seems to lower during firms‟ 
infancy, growing faster only after firms attain a minimum age. Firms‟ operational 
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performance impacts positively upon firms‟ turnover growth and, as for employment 
dynamics, firms with higher human capital intensity tend to have slower rates of growth at 
sales. 
In what regards turnover growth during all the period, foreign ownership per se 
matters. Foreign firms show 10-15% lower sales growth than their domestic partners.  
The location in urban centres emerges as a positive factor for sales expansion, 
probably due to the proximity to a larger market. At industry-level, belonging to industries 
with higher MES, with greater concentration and lower foreign shares – thus, industries 
with higher entry barriers and greater potential for market gains – potentiate firms‟ 
turnover growth. Firms in more export-oriented industries tend to have slower turnover 
growth, probably due to higher competition in international markets. 
Both recessions affected significantly the firms‟ turnover growth rate, but the 
effects seem to differ slightly between firms accordingly to their ownership and size. The 
effect of being foreign-owned during recessions is positive (the coefficient of 
Own*Downturn is positive and significant in Models 1 and 3) as FF reveal about 5% 
higher sales growth rates during recessions compared with DF. Our result is in line with 
that found by Fukao (2001). Notwithstanding, the foreign ownership effect seems more 
significant among SMEs, but not so much for explaining differences between LEs during 
recessions.  
As for employment growth, size is significant to differentiate firms during 
downturns. We found a U-shaped relationship between size and turnover growth under 
economic recessions. Until firms reach a certain threshold of size, their turnover growth 
may be strongly hit by economic slowdowns, becoming more resistant to sales‟ contraction 
as they grow big. However, as for employment growth, firm size is more significant within 
the group of DF and does not significantly differentiate firms within the sample of FF.  
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Table 11. Employment growth estimation results 
 All Firms  All Firms SMEs LEs FF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.5863 *** 0.5793 *** 0.6386 *** -5.6111 *** -0.8486 *** 
 (0.0139)  (0.0140)  (0.0141)  (0.2006)  (0.1127)  
Age 0.0002 ** 0.0002 ** 0.0002 ** -4.19e-05  0.0002  
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  
Age squared -7.36e-08 * -9.45e-08 ** -9.02e-08 ** 1.01e-08  -7.70e-08  
 (3.83e-08)  (3.84e-08)  (3.96e-08)  (1.55e-07)  (2.86e-07)  
Size 0.4594 *** 0.4615 *** 0.4715 *** 1.6917 *** 0.6537 *** 
 (0.0020)  (0.0021)  (0.0021)  (0.0509)  (0.0211)  
Size squared -0.0358 *** -0.0359 *** -0.0405 *** -0.1176 *** -0.0431 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0043)  (0.0028)  
Firm Performance -0.1334 *** -0.1333 *** -0.1376 *** -0.0265 *** -0.1005 *** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0036)  (0.0043)  
Human Capital -0.1480 *** -0.1469 *** -0.1355 *** -0.0910  -0.0826 * 
 (0.0083)  (0.0083)  (0.0084)  (0.0615)  (0.0496)  
Ownership -0.0034  -0.0073  -0.0016  -0.0204    
 (0.0066)  (0.0062)  (0.0073)  (0.0157)    
Urban 0.0050  0.0049  0.0034  -0.1233 *** -0.0224  
 (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0079)  (0.0323)  (0.0343)  
Large         -0.0123  
         (0.0224)  
Downturn -0.0043 *** -0.0069 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0300 *** -0.0260 *** 
 (0.0008)  (0.0021)  (0.0008)  (0.0075)  (0.0087)  
Own*Downturn -0.0099    -0.0107  0.0036    
 (0.0062)    (0.0070)  (0.0145)    
Size*Downturn   -0.0055 ***       
   (0.0017)        
Size 
squared*Downturn   0.0001        
   (0.0003)        
Large 
dummy*Downturn         0.0067  
         (0.0177)  
MES -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0006  -0.0007  0.0151 *** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0037)  (0.0050)  
HH Index -1.4719 *** -1.4975 *** -1.5668 *** 3.0606 ** -5.3278 *** 
 (0.2105)  (0.2105)  (0.2139)  (1.3811)  (1.6135)  
Industry 
Agglomeration 0.1761 *** 0.1743 *** 0.1858 *** 0.0444  0.1196  
 (0.0320)  (0.0320)  (0.0322)  (0.2755)  (0.3173)  
Export Intensity 0.0166 *** 0.0163 *** 0.0176 *** -0.0203  -0.0117  
 (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0124)  (0.0124)  
Industry Growth -0.0023  -0.0023  -0.0022  -0.0022  -0.0123  
 (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0188)  (0.0198)  
Foreign Share 0.0532 ** 0.0525 ** 0.0530 ** 0.2376  -0.0814  
 (0.0228)  (0.0228)  (0.0230)  (0.1746)  (0.19269  
Industry Dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
N 660457  660457  652229  8228  10045  
R
2
 0.2758   0.2759   0.2776   0.2655   0.3116   
 
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 12. Turnover growth estimation results 
 All Firms  All Firms SMEs LEs FF 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -7.0903 *** -7.0995 *** -7.0076 *** -13.3358 *** -9.5496 *** 
 (0.0296)  (0.0296)  (0.0296)  (0.6966)  (0.2940)  
Age -0.0086 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0090 *** -0.0025 ** -0.0042 *** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0011)  (0.0015)  
Age squared 4.25e-06 *** 4.25e-06 *** 4.45e-06 *** 1.19e-06 ** 2.07e-06 *** 
 (7.93e-08)  (7.94e-08)  (8.10e-08)  (5.43e-07)  (7.32e-07)  
Size 0.5016 *** 0.5082 *** 0.5340 *** 0.9649 *** 0.7208 *** 
 (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0044)  (0.1770)  (0.0553)  
Size squared -0.0426 *** -0.0438 *** -0.0542 *** -0.0431 *** -0.0442 *** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0150)  (0.0072)  
Firm Performance 0.5872 *** 0.5873 *** 0.5809 *** 0.8059 *** 0.6569 *** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0127)  (0.0117)  
Human Capital -0.3057 *** -0.3052 *** -0.2710 *** -1.0232 *** -0.5190 *** 
 (0.0175)  (0.0175)  (0.0175)  (0.2143)  (0.1313)  
Ownership -0.1508 *** -0.1334 *** -0.1488 *** -0.1027 *   
 (0.0137)  (0.0129)  (0.0151)  (0.0553)    
Urban 0.0435 *** 0.0432 *** 0.0419 ** -0.0265  0.0165  
 (0.0161)  (0.0161)  (0.0166)  (0.1135)  (0.0906)  
Large         -0.0602  
         (0.0575)  
Downturn -0.0653 *** -0.0476 *** -0.0649 *** -0.0158  -0.0168  
 (0.0017)  (0.0044)  (0.0016)  (0.0262)  (0.0224)  
Own*Downturn 0.0473 ***   0.0576 *** -0.0480    
 (0.0128)    (0.0144)  (0.0506)    
Size*Downturn   -0.0184 ***       
   (0.0036)        
Size 
squared*Downturn   0.0036 ***       
   (0.0007)        
Large 
dummy*Downturn         -0.0739  
         (0.0453)  
MES 0.1260 *** 0.1260 *** 0.1244 *** 0.1357 *** 0.1596 *** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0129)  (0.0130)  
HH Index 7.4800 *** 7.4678 *** 7.2043 *** 15.2551 *** -0.2351  
 (0.4352)  (0.4352)  (0.4371)  (4.8370)  (4.1338)  
Industry 
Agglomeration -0.3985 *** -0.3996 *** -0.3238 *** -2.8138 *** -1.4302 * 
 (0.0668)  (0.0668)  (0.0664)  (0.9587)  (0.8191)  
Export Intensity -0.1449 *** -0.1450 *** -0.1404 *** -0.2409 *** -0.2132 *** 
 (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0433)  (0.0320)  
Industry Growth 0.0212 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0201 *** 0.0862  -0.0454  
 (0.0034)  (0.0034)  (0.0034)  (0.0654)  (0.0506)  
Foreign Share -1.0332 *** -1.0316 *** -1.0341 *** -0.8161  -0.7287  
 (0.0475)  (0.0475)  (0.0472)  (0.6140)  (0.4987)  
Industry Dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
N 618390  618390  610397  7993  9530  
R
2
 0.2472   0.2472   0.2410   0.3737   0.2959   
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Our main empirical results on performance differences between FF and DF during 
recessions
31
 are summarized in Table 13. Our outcomes are based on an empirical setting 
where foreign MNEs search mainly for a low-cost export base and, to a less extent, to 
expand their market. In brief, when we control for firms‟ and industries‟ characteristics, 
job losses in foreign MNEs during both recessions were not significantly different from 
that of indigenous firms, but at turnover levels foreign firms seem to have reacted better, 
maybe due to their organizational, managerial and technological advantages, adding to 
their multinationality advantages.  
Beyond the foreign ownership effect, we show that firm size matters to explain 
domestic firms‟ growth, exerting significant negative effects on firms‟ employment growth 
and non-linear effects on turnover growth throughout recessions. Regarding employment 
growth, large firms are the ones registering greater job losses. SMEs‟ turnover appears to 
be more severely affected by downturns while very large firms may have knowledge 
advantages to exploit markets, registering better performance in terms of sales growth.   
Summing up, for policy, our results do not contest the option for active FDI 
attraction policies. As regards the evaluation of the potential advantages arising from 
MNEs‟ presence during economic slowdowns, the results indicate that MNEs do not exert 
a disturbing effect on host economy employment during crisis and that may even 
contribute to smooth the declines in turnover.  
 
Table 13. Summary of empirical results – employment and turnover growth 
  Performance / Growth Measure 
 Sample Employment Growth Turnover Growth 
Foreign Ownership effect during crises 
All Firms n.s. + 
SMEs n.s. + 
LEs n.s. n.s. 
Firm Size effect during crises 
All Firms - 
FF n.s. n.s. 
(-): significant negative effect; (+) significant positive effect; n.s.: no significant effect. 
                                                          
31
 As a robustness check, we repeated the previous empirical analysis for the sub-periods 1988-2000 and 1994-2006 
(comprising the recessions of 1991-93 and 2001-03, respectively). We tried to replace the Downturn dummy by the 
corresponding 1-year lag and 2-year lag dummies, in order to test whether FF acted as potential stabilizers after the crises 
rather than during the crises. The results were not significantly different from those obtained for the global period 1988-
2007, being available upon request. In addition, as the technological complexity of industries where FF operate could 
change the conclusions, we estimated Model 1 for the samples of firms operating in low-tech, medium-low tech and 
medium-high/high-tech. For employment growth, the results do not change significantly. For turnover growth, the 
potential stabilizers were FF operating in less technology-intensive industries. The results can be found in the Appendix 
A (page 121). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ECONOMIC SLOWDOWNS AND FIRM SURVIVAL: DO FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS 
BEHAVE ANY DIFFERENT? 
 
 
 
5.1. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This chapter analyses the determinants of firm exit and provides a comparison 
between the survival and hazard patterns of foreign and domestic firms over almost two 
decades, specially attending on economic slowdowns suffered by Portuguese economy. By 
examining the link between foreign multinational enterprises and firm failure in 
Portuguese Manufacturing Industry through time-to-event models, we address three main 
questions: first, do foreign MNEs‟ affiliates have higher failure rates than domestic firms? 
Second, does the foreignness effect change during economic downturns? And finally, is the 
survival of foreign firms affected by their size? Complementarily, we also assess whether 
the presence of multinationals in the industry affect the survival of other firms, as a way to 
search for potential horizontal spillovers arising from foreign presence in PMI. 
We analyze foreign and domestic firms created in the period 1988-2005, by 
following their paths during stable and unstable periods. Next section provides a detailed 
description of our methodological procedures and finally the univariate and multivariate 
analyses are presented, where empirical results are discussed.  
 
 
5.2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
5.2.1. COMPUTATION OF DURATION DATA 
 
Owing to the longitudinal dimension of QP database, an ideal characteristic to 
perform survival analyses, we were able to follow individual firms over time. Working 
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directly with raw files (from 1985 to 2007), it was possible to compute entry and exit 
measures by ourselves. This analysis started in 1986, since data on 1985 was needed to 
check the presence of firms in the database in the previous year. The time of exit was 
determined by identifying the year when firms cease to report to the survey. As with such a 
large database some coding errors in the original files are inevitable, the checking of exits 
stopped in 2005, in order to require that a firm be absent from the file at least two years to 
be considered as a closure. Consequently, temporary exits (1 year of absence) were not 
considered as closures, to be on the safe side in identifying the time of exit in the database. 
Accordingly, firms that were in the files in years t-1 and t+1, but not in t, were considered 
to be active in t. The respective missing record was amended for that year, with key 
variables being imputed as the average values registered in the adjacent years. Similar 
procedures were applied in the studies of Mata and Portugal (1999, 2002, 2004) and 
Geroski et al. (2010), also using QP database.  
Despite we have data for the period 1985-2007, the survival analysis will be 
conducted for the period 1988-2005. We could start in 1986, but we only have data on 
industry‟s exports since 1988, as previously explained in the preceding chapters. The years 
2006 and 2007 were only used as a control for the identification of exits. Accordingly, we 
focus on the 1988 cohort and on firms born thereafter
32
, following them until their last 
record in the database, which may correspond to the moment of exit or, alternatively, to the 
last year we have information about the firm. In this last case, if the firm has not 
experienced the failure event during the whole period, it is identified as a censored object – 
which is known in the literature by right-censoring, occurring for those firms whose birth 
date is known but who are still living when they are lost to follow-up or when the study 
ends (Singer and Willett, 1993; Hosmer et al., 2008). Figure 45 helps to understand these 
problems associated with time-to-event data, highlighting the cases which were and were 
not included in our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 This is known by left truncation in survival analysis literature and is common in the empirical studies on 
firm survival. In our case, this arises because we have no annual data for firms born before 1988 (e.g., for a 
firm created in 1950, we have no complete data for the period 1950-1987, so it must be excluded from our 
analysis).  
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Figure 45. Examples of complete and incomplete observations in a restricted time window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The duration of Firm a in Figure 45 is completely observed, thus cases similar to 
that were included in the analysis. Firm b is an example of a right-censored case, that is, 
we know its birth date, but we do not know its death date, because it has not experienced 
the “failure event” during the time window observed. So, it is included in the database as a 
censored element. Firm c is left-truncated, because it became at risk of failure before the 
start of observation window. As a result, given that we have no data for the period 
represented by the dashed line, we have to exclude cases like this from our analysis. The 
durations of Firm d and Firm e are both completely observed and both belongs to the 1988 
cohort. However, while Firm d experiences the failure event some years later, Firm e 
reaches the maximum duration allowed by our time window – 18 years, failing in 2005. In 
short, only cases similar to Firm c were excluded from the analysis, representing the left-
truncation problem that leads us observing only the firms born since 1988. Similar 
approaches were adopted in the studies of Mata and Portugal (1999, 2002, 2004).  
Figure 46 presents the sampling plan from the database, summarizing the 
proceedings adopted in the discrete time database. The first panel displays the longevity of 
firms, represented on a calendar time, while the second panel presents the corresponding 
measured durations. For expositional convenience, only an arbitrary spell is depicted for 
some of the cohorts of firms. The horizontal lines depicted in the first panel represent the 
1988 2005 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
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longevity of firms since the moment of entry until the moment of failure/exit, while the 
vertical lines indicate the first and last surveys in which the firm is observed. 
Thus, we can track the presence of a firm on a yearly basis, as illustrated in the 
second panel. The solid lines represent the effective duration intervals, determined with the 
aid of the dotted lines, which represent the application of the criterion to identify the 
closures (i.e., the firm must be absent from the file for at least two years to be considered 
as a closure).  
 
Figure 46. The sampling plan 
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Cases ii), iii), v) and vii) are examples of firms that exited during the period, 
although presenting different survival times. Firms i), iv) and vi) were still alive in the end 
of the period, so the star in the end of their observations‟ duration means that they were 
treated as censored in the analysis. Finally, the figure makes clear that whereas the firms 
* 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
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from the 1988 cohort can reach a maximum of 18 years of duration, the ones from the 2003 
cohort can reach, at most, 2 years. As a result, while the exit rates for the first and second 
years are estimated using data from the 18 cohorts, the subsequent rates are estimated 
using fewer cohorts. Our statistical model will pay particular attention to this fact.  
 
 
5.2.2. STATISTICAL MODEL 
 
To analyze in detail the time pattern of firms‟ exit, we rely on econometric models 
belonging to a class of models known as duration models or time-to-event analysis. 
Conventional multivariate statistical approaches such as linear regression models are ill-
suited to properly analyze data when the problematic under study is the time elapsed within 
a state (in our case, firm‟s life) before a transition occurs to a different state (exit). We saw 
that, at the end of the period under scrutiny, a number of firms are still operating, so that 
their duration is still incomplete. Due to this censoring, in our survival analysis of new 
firms, we need to employ a statistical model able to accommodate such incomplete 
durations.  Furthermore, since we are interested in depicting the evolution of the exit rates 
as time proceeds, the use of standard binary choice models is also inadequate.  
The key concept in duration analysis is the hazard rate, that is, the probability that 
an observation exits within a particular time interval, given that it survived until then. In 
our case, the data on firms‟ duration comes from an annual survey, so our measured 
durations are grouped into time intervals of one year length. For those firms that were still 
operating at the end of the period, the relevant information is that their survival time 
exceeded the lower limit of the last observed duration. Such a sampling plan, with which 
we can only assign to firms discrete durations, is properly accommodated in the framework 
of discrete time duration models (Singer and Willett, 1993). We thus proceed by dividing 
the time axis into 18 intervals, corresponding to our 18 measured durations in Figure 46, 
and defining the hazard rate h(t) for the t
th
 interval as the probability of exiting during the 
t
th
 interval, conditional upon having survived until then.   
Following the methodology applied in other studies conducted for Portugal with 
QP database (Mata and Portugal, 1999, 2002), we employ a very flexible specification for 
the hazard function, in which the exit rates are assumed to be constant within each interval 
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but different between intervals, by defining a set of dummy variables for each and every 
duration interval. This can be interpreted as a piece-wise linear approximation to a possibly 
complex parametric hazard function, which is equivalent, according to the jargon of the 
time-to-event literature, of saying that we apply a piece-wise constant hazard model. The 
hazard function in interval t is defined as:  
 
h(t) = e
t
,   
 t = 1, …., T                                                                                           (4) 
 
where the sequence of e
t 
gives the early evolution of the exit rates. Thus, e
1 
gives the 
probability of exit within the first year of firm‟s life, e2 denotes the probability of closure 
during the second year, given that the firm did not exit during the first year, and so on. In 
order to account for the effects of covariates, we extend the previous hazard function: 
 
h(t | Xt-1) = e
t 
e
(Xt-1)
,   
 t = 1, …., T                                                                       (5) 
 
where  denotes the vector of regression coefficients measuring the impact of a set of 
explanatory variables included in vector X
33
, often pointed out as the main determinants of 
firm survival and/or exit by the literature on these matters. The effect of such covariates 
upon the hazard rate is assumed to be proportional, as suggested by Cox (1972), which can 
easily be seen in the following reparameterization: 
 
log h(t | Xt-1) = t + Xt-1,  
 t = 1, …., T                                                                (6) 
 
Concerning the firm-level and industry-level variables included in vector X, we 
will not develop specific hypotheses regarding their effects, but we will control for them 
since they are likely to affect firm survival and firm exit according to the literature. In 
particular, firm size and firm age are two of the most debated factors in the empirical 
survival studies. Firm size is frequently found to exert a positive influence on firm 
survival, given that large firms have higher probabilities of being operating at a minimum 
                                                          
33
 For a detailed description of variables included in vector X, remember the Table 9 in Chapter 4. The 
variables included in the survival analysis were the same independent variables considered in the empirical 
study of the previous chapter. Additionally, we included an industry-level variable usually considered in firm 
survival studies – Entry Rate, computed as the ratio “Entrants' employment in year t / 2-digit industry total 
employment in year t”. 
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efficient scale and may also have better access to capital or labour markets (Mahmood, 
1992; Agarwal, 1997; Pérez et al., 2010). However, since the effect of firm size upon firm 
survival may be non-linear (e.g., Disney et al., 2003), we will control for a potential 
quadratic relation between firm size and hazard rates. Similarly, firm age has been 
acknowledged as a crucial factor for firm survival prospects (Geroski, 1995), despite no 
clear relationship is still established in the literature. With age, firms go through a process 
of learning about efficiency and market competitiveness, thus reducing the well known 
liability of newness, so that the risk of exit is expected to decrease with the accumulated 
experience of firms (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericsson and Pakes, 1995). However, several studies 
have found an inverted-U shaped link between age and exit rates, known as the liability of 
adolescence hypothesis (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991; Wagner, 1994; Strotmann, 2007; 
Pérez et al., 2010). Accordingly, we will also control for a non-linear effect of firm age.  
Firm performance will be also taken into consideration, as several studies have 
been showing that poor performance is strongly associated with higher failure rates 
(Altman, 1968; Köke, 2002; Heiss and Köke, 2004). Moreover, different performance 
measures have been used to show such relationship, as profit margins or labour 
productivity (Lin and Huang, 2008; Pérez et al., 2010). In our case, we focus on labour 
productivity as a measure of operational performance. Regarding human capital, despite its 
role as a specific-asset potentially acting as an ownership advantage, empirical evidence on 
its effect upon firm exit and/or survival is scarce and ambiguous (Teixeira and Vieira, 
2005). Bates (1990) and more recently Acs and Armington (2009) are valuable exceptions, 
though obtaining no definite conclusions. In our case, we will assess the impact of better 
skilled workers upon firm exit. 
Geographical location of firms may matter as well for firm survival prospects. 
Rural locations may lack diversity but can enable the firm to exploit a niche with limited 
competition. Conversely, urban locations often offer a wealth of diverse resources but also 
greater competition and higher costs related to diseconomies of agglomeration (Stearns et 
al., 1995; Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000; Littunen, 2000).  
Concerning the industry environment, we will use control variables to account for 
potential differences in the industry context. We will consider the minimum efficient scale 
as Audretsch (1995) argues that one of the reasons why so many firms fail is that their 
entry size is smaller than the minimum scale required to be efficient. We will control for 
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market concentration, which may either raise the risk of failure through greater 
competition intensity or decrease the exit rates by offering the incumbents the enough 
power to retaliate against entrants. Industry growth will also be controlled for, as average 
profits are affected by growth rates of industries, so industries growing quickly may exert 
positive impacts upon survival. Entry rates may also be associated with firm survival, as 
firms tend to enter the industries where higher profits are expected. Industry 
agglomeration, export intensity and foreign presence in the industry will be taken into 
account as well, although no definite expectation about their impacts exists according to 
the available literature but they are commonly controlled for in comparative studies of 
domestic and foreign firms. Regarding foreign presence, the effect is positive if there are 
positive spillovers from foreign firms to other firms in the industry or negative if an 
adverse competition effect exists. 
Finally, the overall state of the economy has long been indicated as an important 
force driving firms out of business (Geroski et al., 2010). Current macroeconomic 
conditions may change expectations about the future, leading firms to exit if an 
unfavourable environment is predictable. Despite some studies prove that exit is not 
responsive to the cycle (e.g. Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999), many 
others found that firm exit is countercyclical and that there is a detrimental impact of 
macroeconomic instability upon firms‟ survival and their dynamics (Audretsch and Acs, 
1994; Box, 2008; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). Accordingly, we will control for 
macroeconomic environment, specially attending on downturn periods which are expected 
to impact positively on firms‟ hazards, though eventually differently among foreign and 
domestic firms. If that is the case, we will test in what extent foreign firms have reacted 
better to crises and thus acted as a stabilizer element in Portuguese manufacturing. 
Regarding the pure ownership effect, no consensus is found in the literature about the 
direction of its effect upon firm survival/exit (remember Table 2). Despite this, we will 
also assess the effect of foreign ownership, on order to conclude if there remain any 
significant differences at exit rates than can be attributed to the foreignness in itself.   
All our models were estimated by maximum likelihood methods and the 
estimations were performed with STATA 10, an econometric package well-suited to 
perform survival analyses. Next we present and discuss our empirical results. 
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5.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.3.1. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Figure 47 depicts the ratio of firms‟ exits to total operating firms in each year. An 
increasing trend over the period is observable and on average 10% of total firms exited 
every year. During the economic slowdowns, mainly during the early 1990s downturn, 
such rates seemed to be greater than during the remaining period, which suggests that 
economic recessions impacted positively on firms‟ mortality. In other words, firm exit 
seems to be countercyclical, being greater during contractions and lower during 
expansions. By disaggregating the firms‟ mortality rates according to their ownership 
(Figure 48), we see that the proportion of annual failures was always greater among 
domestic firms. On average, 10% of domestic firms exited every year, whereas only 7% of 
foreign firms closed. However, both groups of firms seem to have been negatively affected 
by recessive periods, exhibiting higher mortality rates over downturns. 
 
Figure 47. Annual mortality rates of manufacturing 
firms 
Figure 48. Annual mortality rates of manufacturing 
firms by ownership 
  
 
After applying the procedures previously explained in section 5.2.1, we obtained 
an unbalanced panel so that, for each firm, there are as many data rows as there are time 
intervals at risk of the “event” (failure) occurring. This constitutes a discrete time database, 
also known by a person-period data set in the survival analysis literature (Singer and 
Willett, 1993). The final data set comprises 87.027 firms, belonging to 18 cohorts (from 
1988 to 2005). From this group of firms, 55.622 failures were identified. The median 
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survival time is 5 years, a result commonly obtained in the literature on firm survival and 
also in studies conducted for Portugal (e.g., Mata and Portugal, 2004).  
As a first step of our survival analysis, a brief univariate analysis was performed 
by using the life-table approach and Kaplan-Meier methods (Kalbfleish and Prentice, 
1980). The Kaplan-Meier estimator of surviving beyond time t is the product of survival 
probabilities in t and the preceding periods, as expressed below: 
 
S(t) = 
     
  
 
                                                                                                        (4) 
 
with nj representing the number of observations that have not failed and are not censored at 
the beginning of each time period and dj representing the number of failures that occur 
during each time period t (Hamilton, 2006). Precise estimations for the survivor function 
can be found in Table 14.  Hazard rates and cumulative failure rates (corresponding to 1-
S(t)) are reported as well.  
 
Table 14. Survival Rates and Hazard Rates
34
 
Time 
Interval 
Nr. firms 
at risk 
Nr. failures Net 
Lost* 
Survival Std. 
Error 
Hazard Std. Error Cumulative 
Failure 
[1-2[ 87027 16890 3350 0.8059 0.0013 0.1941 0.0015 0.1941 
[2-3[ 66787 9631 2820 0.6897 0.0016 0.1442 0.0015 0.3103 
[3-4[ 54336 7058 3145 0.6001 0.0017 0.1299 0.0015 0.3999 
[4-5[ 44133 5328 3381 0.5277 0.0018 0.1207 0.0017 0.4723 
[5-6[ 35424 3953 3466 0.4688 0.0018 0.1116 0.0018 0.5312 
[6-7[ 28005 2872 1975 0.4207 0.0018 0.1026 0.0019 0.5793 
[7-8[ 23158 2277 1544 0.3793 0.0018 0.0983 0.0021 0.6207 
[8-9[ 19337 1704 1335 0.3459 0.0018 0.0881 0.0021 0.6541 
[9-10[ 16298 1387 1290 0.3165 0.0019 0.0851 0.0023 0.6835 
[10-11[ 13621 1125 1060 0.2903 0.0019 0.0826 0.0025 0.7097 
[11-12[ 11436 929 1273 0.2668 0.0019 0.0812 0.0027 0.7332 
[12-13[ 9234 787 1491 0.2440 0.0019 0.0852 0.0030 0.7560 
[13-14[ 6956 547 896 0.2248 0.0019 0.0786 0.0034 0.7752 
[14-15[ 5513 447 854 0.2066 0.0019 0.0811 0.0038 0.7934 
[15-16[ 4212 303 950 0.1917 0.0020 0.0719 0.0041 0.8083 
[16-17[ 2959 181 855 0.1800 0.0020 0.0612 0.0045 0.8200 
[17-18[ 1923 150 914 0.1660 0.0022 0.0780 0.0064 0.8340 
[18-19[ 859 53 806 0.1557 0.0025 0.0617 0.0085 0.8443 
* “Net Lost” gives the number of censored cases and hence no longer entering the risk set. 
 
                                                          
34
 The survival rates and hazard rates of SMEs and LEs can be found in the Appendix H (page 127). 
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In summary, the statistics confirm that the survivor function has a negative slope 
and that only 15,57% of the firms remained alive after 18 years. About hazard rates, we 
conclude that the risk of failure tends to be higher during the first 5 years of firms‟ life, 
being slightly lower thereafter. More precisely, more than 50% of firms cease their 
operations during the first 5 years and almost 70% of firms die before completing a decade 
of life. Next we compare the estimated survivor functions for different categories of firms, 
stratified according to a foreign ownership dummy (Own = 1 if the firm is foreign-owned, 
0 otherwise) and a firm size dummy (Small = 1 if the firm is a Small-Medium Firm, 0 
otherwise). Firms are over again classified as small and medium-sized or large-sized 
according to the European definition of SMEs. Figures below depict the Kaplan-Meier 
survivor functions allowing to compare the different groups.  
These first results suggest that, unconditionally, foreign-owned firms survive 
longer than their domestic counterparts. DF display a median survival time about 4-5 
years, while the corresponding level for their foreign counterparts ascends to about 10 
years. In addition, the results show that only 16% of DF were alive in the 17
th
 year of life, 
whereas more than 34% of FF remained active at the same survival time. The comparisons 
between smaller and larger firms show that the median survival time of SMEs is about 5 
years (similarly to domestic firms), whereas large-sized companies present median life 
spans of 10 years (like foreign-owned firms). The Log-Rank and Wilcoxon test confirms 
that differences are statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
Figure 49. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor 
functions by foreign ownership 
Figure 50. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor 
functions by firm size 
  
Log-Rank Test 2(1) = 192.82***     Wilcoxon Test 
2
(1) = 
169.47***  
Log-Rank Test 2(1) = 14.73***        Wilcoxon Test 
2
(1) = 6.92*** 
 
 
96 
 
Figure 51. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor 
functions of foreign firms by firm size 
Figure 52. Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor 
functions of domestic firms by firm size 
  
Log-Rank Test 2(1) = 0.25            Wilcoxon Test 
2
(1) = 0.49 
 
Log-Rank Test 2(1) = 7.08***        Wilcoxon Test 
2
(1) = 1.18 
 
Figures 51 and 52 compare the unconditional survival rates between small and 
large firms within the samples of FF and DF. Within FF, the differences in survival 
chances seem not to be relevant, with the curves almost overlapping and median survival 
time being almost the same for both sets (about 10 years). Conversely, large DF seem to 
have substantially better chances of survival (even higher than survival patterns of large 
FF), exhibiting a median survival time of 13 years. In opposition, small DF are very 
sensible during their infancy, with almost 40% of these firms failing before the third year 
of life and less than 50% reaching the fifth year. The Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests 
confirm that firm size does not seem to be relevant for the survival within the foreign 
affiliates group and the results are ambiguous for the domestic group.   
 
 
5.3.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Our empirical strategy went through two main steps. First we have controlled for 
heterogeneity among firms by including in our estimations those firm-level and industry-
level variables previously described and that are expected to affect firm survival/exit 
according to the literature. Among those, the dummy variable Own allowed distinguishing 
between FF and DF. As our mail goal is to assess whether FF have higher failure rates than 
DF and moreover what happens during economic downturns, our estimations allow 
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evaluating the marginal impact of being foreign during recessions through the interaction 
term Own*Downturn.  
Second and complementarily, we test whether firm size interferes with the foreign 
ownership effect by replacing the Own dummy by two dummies, corresponding to foreign 
SMEs and foreign large-enterprises. By attending solely on FF‟s sample, we also test 
whether being large-sized matters for FF‟s survival during economic downturns. In 
addition, we test if any non-linear effect of firm size upon firms‟ hazard rates during crises 
exists
35
. Table 15 reports our results.  
Our first regression shows the unconditional impact of being foreign-owned upon 
the risk of failure. The estimate of -0.2912 indicates that FF have a hazard rate about 25% 
(the discrete rate of change in the probability of exit is the exp()-1) lower than domestic 
ones, which confirms the pattern previously observed in Figure 49. For the period 1983-
1989, Mata and Portugal (2002) had found as well that, unconditionally, FF were 51% less 
prone to exit than DF. 
We then included the other variables previously discussed. Regarding firm-level 
variables, all are statistically significant. Firm age exerts an inverted U-shaped effect upon 
exit rates, confirming that during the first years of life, the risk of failure increases, 
decreasing over the time after a certain threshold above which firms achieve some 
maturity. Alternatively, firm size impact is U-shaped, which means that the larger the 
firms, the higher the survival chances, though very large firms may see their failure risk 
increase possibly due to the inertia related to their huge dimension. Firm performance is 
positively linked to firm survival, which means that best performers tend to survive longer. 
Contrary to our expectations, human capital increases the firms‟ exit risk. Though 
surprising, such an outcome is reasonable and similar conclusions were already obtained 
by other studies for Portugal using QP database (Teixeira and Vieira, 2004a, 2004b, 2005). 
Teixeira and Vieira (2004a, 2004b), based on textile manufacturing over 1984-1992, argue 
that hiring top educated workers may increase firm failure risk, at least in the medium-long 
run, since these workers tend to apprehend firm total industry specific knowledge quicker 
than their less educated counterparts, and therefore require higher wage levels, otherwise 
exit to rival firms, which turn the firm unprofitable. Teixeira and Vieira (2005) extended 
that analysis based on data relative to 28 NUTs and 275 Portuguese municipalities between 
                                                          
35
 Some additional models regarding the effect of firm size per se upon firms‟ hazard rates during crises were 
estimated. The results are presented in the Appendix E (page 125). 
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1990-1999 and confirmed that human capital intensive regions were those that, on average, 
had higher firms‟ failure rates, which contradicts the general expectation that human 
capital corresponds to an ownership advantage that leads to higher survival chances. For 
USA, Acs and Armington (2009) also found puzzling results on the link between human 
capital and firm survival and did not discard the hypothesis that higher shares of college 
degrees lead to higher rates of formation of new firms that fail, especially during 
recessions. For Spain, Pérez et al. (2010) find that the proportion of skilled labor plays no 
role both on firm risks‟ of failure or of being acquired. In our case, higher shares of top 
skilled labour were always found to increase the failure risk, and for FF the negative effect 
is found to be even higher (Model 9).  
The effect of being foreign-owned changes dramatically after controlling for 
firms‟ specificities. The result remains valid in the remaining estimations, after controlling 
for macroeconomic conditions, region and industry. According to our results, even when 
accounting for firm and industry specificities, foreignness does matter in what concerns 
probability of exit. FF are now found to have about 13% higher hazards than DF, a result 
which is in line with a significant part of the literature presented in Table 2.  
The results from the estimation of model 5 show that downturn periods seem to 
have impacted negatively upon firms‟ hazards, but not in a different fashion according to 
their ownership. With respect to the effect of industry variables, higher entry rates and 
higher export intensity increase the risk of failure. Higher MES instead reduce the risk of 
exit. The sign of foreign presence coefficient is negative and significant indicating that 
there are positive spillover effects from operating in an industry with strong presence of 
foreign MNEs.  
In what concerns the influence of location, being at urban centers is found to 
increase the risk of failure. In fact, despite the wealth of diverse resources often found in 
urban areas, the intensity of competition or diseconomies or agglomeration lowers firm 
survival. 
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Table 15. Hazard Rates Estimation Results
36
  
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -1.6786 *** -1.2525 *** -1.3000 *** -1.3000 *** -1.1332 *** 
 (0.0151)  (0.0517)  (0.0519)  (0.0519)  (0.0747)  
Age   0.0117 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0117 *** 
   (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Age squared   -5.82e-06 *** -5.91e-06 *** -5.91e-06 *** -5.83e-06 *** 
   (2.04e-07)  (2.02e-07)  (2.02e-07)  (2.07e-07)  
Size   -0.5523 *** -0.5524 *** -0.5524 *** -0.5479 *** 
   (0.0113)  (0.0113)  (0.0113)  (0.0113)  
Size squared   0.0485 *** 0.0483 *** 0.0483 *** 0.0486 *** 
   (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  
Firm Performance   -0.0074  -0.0079 *** -0.0079 * -0.0180 *** 
   (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0048)  (0.0049)  
Human Capital   0.2851 *** 0.2696 *** 0.2696 *** 0.2546 *** 
   (0.0452)  (0.0452)  (0.0452)  (0.0455)  
Ownership -0.2912 *** 0.1164 ** 0.1216 ** 0.1288 * 0.1276 * 
 (0.0471)  (0.0543)  (0.0543)  (0.0675)  (0.0675)  
Urban   0.1540 *** 0.1531 *** 0.1531 *** 0.1572 *** 
   (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.0100)  
Downturn     0.1477 *** 0.1479 *** 0.1317 *** 
     (0.0099)  (0.0100)  (0.0103)  
Own*Downturn       -0.0192  0.0021  
       (0.1082)  (0.1083)  
MES         -0.0375 *** 
         (0.0066)  
HH Index         4.8113  
         (3.5584)  
Industry Agglomeration         -0.5695  
         (0.4100)  
Exports/VAB         0.0869 *** 
         (0.0213)  
Industry Growth         0.0032  
         (0.0205)  
For. Presence in Industry         -0.5900 * 
         (0.3305)  
Entry Rate         4.0428 *** 
         (0.3727)  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 417786  363462  363462  363462  362462  
2 6391.99  12402.20  12619.98  12620.01  12870.46  
Log Likelihood -160702.84   -128571.29   -128462.40   -128462.38   -128337.03   
 
*, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
                                                          
36 Additionally, we estimated model 5 separately for manufacturing industries according to different levels of 
technological complexity. Only for Medium-High/High Technology industries FF were found to survive longer during 
crises, presenting 16% lower exits than DF. The results are presented in the Appendix B (page 122). As a robustness 
check, we also ran the same global regression but replacing the Downturn dummy by a similar dummy variable with 1-
year and 2-year lags, separately. No difference was found between FF‟s and DF‟s hazard rates during and immediately 
after the economic slowdowns. The results are available upon request.  
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Table 15. Hazard Rates Estimation Results (continued) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 937 Model 10 
Constant -1.1293 *** -1.1384 *** -1.1272 *** -0.1344  -1.1152  
 (0.0748)  (0.0747)  (0.0750)  (0.7721)  (0.0750)  
Age 0.0117 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0118 *** 0.0373 *** 0.0117 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0136)  (0.0004)  
Age squared -5.83e-06 *** -5.83e-06 *** -5.84e-06 *** -0.0004 * -5.82e-06 *** 
 (2.06e-07)  (2.06e-07)  (2.06e-07)  (0.0002)  (2.08e-
07) 
 
Size -0.5494 *** -0.5545 *** -0.5534 *** -0.4836 *** -0.5572 *** 
 (0.0113)  (0.0115)  (0.0115)  (0.1203)  (0.0143)  
Size squared 0.0490 *** 0.0512 *** 0.0504 *** 0.0222  0.0469 *** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0211)  (0.0038)  
Firm Performance -0.0183 *** -0.0173 *** -0.0184 *** -0.0384  -0.0181 *** 
 (0.0049)  (0.0049)  (0.0049)  (0.0383)  (0.0049)  
Human Capital 0.2524 *** 0.2633 *** 0.2534 *** 0.5516 ** 0.2548 *** 
 (0.0455)  (0.0452)  (0.0455)  (0.2496)  (0.0456)  
Ownership         0.1300 ** 
         (0.0544)  
FF_small 0.1640 **   0.1592 **     
 (0.0688)    (0.0688)      
FF_large   -0.4072  -0.3813      
   (0.2835)  (0.2837)      
Urban 0.1571 *** 0.1576 *** 0.1571 *** 0.4714 *** 0.1572 *** 
 (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.0100)  (0.1166)  (0.0100)  
Large       0.0884    
       (0.3726)    
Downturn 0.1317 *** 0.1316 *** 0.1317 *** 0.0558  0.0866 *** 
 (0.0103)  (0.0103)  (0.0103)  (0.1172)  (0.0189)  
FF_small*Downturn 0.0061    0.0063      
 (0.1115)    (0.1115)      
FF_large*Downturn   -0.0170  -0.0165      
   (0.4495)  (0.4495)      
Size*Downturn         0.0271  
         (0.0223)  
Size squared*Downturn         0.0033  
         (0.0058)  
Large dummy*Downturn       -0.0396    
       (0.4667)    
MES -0.0375 *** -0.0373 *** -0.0375 *** -0.1016  -0.03806 *** 
 (0.0066)  (0.0066)  (0.0066)  (0.0789)  (0.0066)  
HH Index 4.8222  4.7307  4.8038  1.4860  4.9128  
 (3.5585)  (3.5589)  (3.5589)  (33.4999)  (3.5578)  
Industry Agglomeration -0.5696  -0.5761  -0.5722  -5.1041  -0.5385  
 (0.4100)  (0.4100)  (0.4100)  (4.8781)  (0.4102)  
Exports/VAB 0.0869 *** 0.0869 *** 0.0870 *** -0.1216  0.0878 *** 
 (0.0213)  (0.0213)  (0.0213)  (0.2210)  (0.0213)  
Industry Growth 0.0032  0.0033  0.0032  0.2233  0.0031  
 (0.0205)  (0.0205)  (0.0205)  (0.2595)  (0.0205)  
For. Presence in Industry -0.5902 * -0.5810 * -0.5870 * -3.8211  -0.6049 * 
 (0.3305)  (0.3306)  (0.3305)  (2.9904)  (0.3305)  
Entry Rate 4.0437 *** 4.0434 *** 4.0448 *** 7.6194 ** 4.0539 *** 
 (0.3727)  (0.3727)  (0.3727)  (3.7721)  (0.3726)  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 362462  362462  362462  4469  362462  
2 12873.75  12868.87  12877.05  241.39  12888.61  
Log Likelihood -128335.38   -128337.82   -128333.74   -1155.37   -128327.96  
 
*, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 Model 9 was estimated only for the sample of foreign-owned firms. 
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As explained earlier we are also concerned with the possibility that firm size 
affected exit and moderated the foreignness effect (Models 6 to 10). The results show that 
the probability of exit is higher among smaller FF.  Not only the dummy variable FF_small 
is significant, as also size appears negatively related to probability of exit within the group 
of FF (Model 9). However, the effect of size does not alter the foreignness impact during 
economic slowdowns. In models 6 to 10 the different interactions variables between 
downturn and size are not significant. Actually, recessions may act as a mere catalyst to 
firm death, exerting a detrimental impact upon firms‟ longevity (Box, 2008; Bhattacharjee 
et al., 2009).   
 
 
5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Our results demonstrate that after controlling for firm and industry specificities, 
foreignness increases the firm exit. FF were found to be more prone to exit than DF with 
similar observable characteristics. However, the differences were only significant for 
foreign SMEs, while no difference is found between survival trends of DF and large 
foreign MNEs. Conversely, during crises, the differences between groups are attenuated 
and the foreignness effect turns out to be insignificant, which supports the generally 
accepted idea that recessions act as a vehicle to firm death, with DF being relatively more 
affected when compared to a normal situation (their hazard rates increase significantly, 
reducing the difference to FF). Table 16 presents a synopsis of all our empirical 
assessments of DF‟s and FF‟s behaviour during the economic slowdowns experienced by 
Portuguese economy.  
 
Table 16. Summary of all empirical results  
 Sample 
Employment 
Growth 
Turnover 
Growth 
Hazard 
Rates 
Foreign Ownership effect during crises 
All Firms n.s. + n.s. 
SMEs n.s. + n.s. 
LEs n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Firm Size effect during crises 
All Firms -  n.s. 
FF n.s. n.s. n.s. 
(-): significant negative effect; (+) significant positive effect; n.s.: no significant effect. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
This dissertation has addressed an important, timely and still scarcely explored 
issue – the comparative dynamics and behaviour of foreign-owned and domestic-owned 
firms during crisis environments, in order to assess whether foreign affiliates behave any 
different, being able to overcome the adversities and thus act as stabilizer agents in host 
economies. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth empirical 
study of this issue using a long time span of micro data for Portugal, a country with great 
challenges for convergence and with an active policy towards inward foreign direct 
investment. Accordingly, our approach contributes to the existing literature on foreign 
MNEs‟ role during crises by providing as well novel empirical evidence on the Portuguese 
experience under a crisis context.   
Available firm-level empirical studies have hitherto provided mixed and indefinite 
results. Moreover, the extant evidence has typically been based on the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98, dealing with firms‟ performance, behaviour and dynamics either during 
or after crisis. Throughout this study, we have focused on the changes of firm performance 
and survival prospects during crisis events, given the importance of immediate actions by 
firms in taking advantage of potential opportunities or reacting to threats.  
From our literature review and subsequent analysis of firm-level data, we have 
concluded that, unconditionally, foreign MNEs‟ affiliates are larger, relatively more 
productive, technologically more advanced, richer regarding human capital and also seem 
to have higher longevity. However, after controlling for several firms‟ and industries‟ 
characteristics, we have concluded that being foreign-owned implies lower sales turnover 
growth rates and higher hazard rates, despite no significant effect occurs upon firm‟s 
employment growth. Accordingly, to answer our first research question “Does foreign 
ownership helps to differentiate the performance and survival of firms?”, our reply is 
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affirmative for firms‟ turnover growth and firms‟ survival, but negative regarding firms‟ 
employment growth.  
By attending on the economic recessions suffered by Portuguese economy during 
the early 1990s and early 2000s, we have searched for a potentially different behaviour 
among foreign and domestic firms at these three variables. Our results demonstrated that 
both crises‟ events have impacted negatively on firms‟ employment growth, turnover 
growth and survival, thus leading to great increases in job losses, output contractions and 
business failure, at least in Portuguese manufacturing. However, the foreignness effect 
during these crises was mixed. When we controlled for firms‟ and industries‟ specificities, 
job losses in foreign firms were not significantly different from those in indigeneous firms. 
On the other hand, at turnover levels, foreign firms seem to have reacted better, maybe due 
to their organizational, managerial and technological advantages, adding to the advantages 
of multinationality, which probably have allowed them to cut operations and to smooth the 
decline in demand by screening and exploiting markets in a global way. Regarding survival 
and exit trends, the results show that during economic slowdowns the differences between 
firms were attenuated, so that the foreignness effect turns out to be insignificant, which 
supports the generally accepted idea that recessions act as a catalyst to firm death, with 
domestic firms being relatively more affected when compared to a normal setting. In 
summary, about the potential MNEs‟ stabilizer role that we have addressed in our second 
research question, we conclude that foreign firms acted as neutral elements at employment 
growth and exit risks, though potential stabilizer agents regarding firms‟ sales.  
Finally, beyond the foreignness effect, we have assessed the importance of firm 
size to explain firm performance and survival during crises. We conclude that, throughout 
recessions, firm size exerts significant negative impacts on employment growth trends, 
significant non-linear effects on turnover growth, but no significant effect upon firm exit. 
Regarding the possible moderating effect of firm size on the foreignness‟ impact during 
slowdowns, our outcomes suggest that the effect of size upon foreign firms‟ behaviour is 
irrelevant in what concerns employment growth and exit rates, albeit significant for 
changes at turnover growth, since foreign SMEs have reacted better than foreign LEs. 
Table 17 summarizes our final answers to the previously defined research questions.  
Our results have implications both for managers and policy-makers, being much 
more than a topic of academic interest. For managers, namely those of foreign firms, our 
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outcomes suggest that they should not rely on the observable advantages (size, human 
capital and productivity) as their failure risk is high, both under stable and unstable 
economic conditions. For policy, on the one hand, our results do not contest the option for 
active FDI attraction policies. 
 
Table 17. Summary of responses to the research questions 
 Final response to the research questions by firm-level measure 
Research Questions Firms’ Employment Growth Firms’ Turnover Growth Firm Survival 
Does foreign ownership 
helps to differentiate the 
performance and survival 
of firms? 
No – foreign ownership has a 
neutral impact on employment 
growth 
Yes – foreign ownership 
has a significant negative 
impact on sales turnover 
growth. 
Yes – foreign ownership 
has a significant positive 
impact on hazard rates 
(thus a negative impact on 
firm survival). 
Does the foreignness 
effect changes during 
crises? i. e. Can foreign 
firms act, in some extent, 
as stabilizers during 
economic slowdowns? 
 
No – during economic 
slowdowns, job losses in 
foreign firms were not 
significantly different from 
those in domestic firms. 
Foreign firms acted as neutral 
elements. 
Yes – during economic 
slowdowns, foreign firms 
were able to increase their 
sales turnover growth 
rates. Foreign firms acted 
as potential stabilizer 
elements. 
No – during economic 
slowdowns, exit rates in 
foreign firms were not 
significantly different from 
those in domestic firms. 
Foreign firms acted as 
neutral elements. 
How firm size interferes 
with the ‘foreign 
ownership effect’ during 
economic slowdowns?   
 
Firm size has a negative 
impact on employment growth 
during economic slowdowns, 
but it does not moderate the 
foreign ownership effect. 
Firm size interferes with 
the foreign ownership 
effect during economic 
slowdowns – only foreign 
SMEs have reacted better 
than DF; large FF did not 
behave differently than 
DF. 
Firm size seems to have a 
neutral effect on firm exit 
during economic 
slowdowns and it does not 
interfere with the foreign 
ownership effect. 
   
On the other hand, the conclusions are not supportive of a discriminatory policy in 
favour of foreign firms. As regards the evaluation of the potential advantages arising from 
MNEs‟ presence during recessions, the results indicate that MNEs do not exert a disturbing 
effect on host economy employment and that may even contribute to smooth the declines 
in sales turnover. As regards their survival dynamics, the outcomes show that there is no 
need to fear that foreign firms destabilize the host economy more than usual by 
immediately closing down operations during slowdowns. Accordingly, what seems crucial 
is the role of host governments in restoring foreign investors‟ confidence about the future 
and showing that the crisis may also be an opportunity to reorganize themselves and 
become more efficient, rather than just a threat. However, there are no strong reasons to 
expect positive gains from FDI in what concerns their potential recovery-enhancer role. 
There are certainly other arguments that justify the FDI attraction policies by an economy 
such as the Portuguese one (e.g., knowledge transfers or structural change), but they should 
not be mainly based on the expectations about MNEs‟ greater abilities to thrive a crisis. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Empirical Results – Employment and Turnover Growth by Technological Complexity of PMI 
 
 
Firm’s EMPLOYMENT GROWTH Firm’s TURNOVER GROWTH 
 
Low-Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Medium-Low 
Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Medium-
High/High Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Low-Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Medium-Low 
Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Medium-
High/High Tech 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Constant 0.4689 *** 0.6009 *** 0.7205 *** -7.2558 *** -8.1595 *** -4.6054 *** 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.0441) 
 
(0.0391) 
 
(0.0763) 
 
(0.0951) 
 
(0.0776) 
 Age 0.0002 ** 0.0002 
 
-0.0005 *** -0.0087 *** -0.0058 *** -0.0013 *** 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0004) 
 Age squared -1.03e-07 ** -1.18e-07 
 
2.53e-07 *** 4.30e-06 *** 2.84e-06 *** 6.39e-07 *** 
 
(4.68e-08) 
 
(1.08e-07) 
 
(9.66e-08) 
 
(9.77e-08) 
 
(2.28e-07) 
 
(1.90e-07) 
 Size 0.4695 *** 0.4462 *** 0.4451 *** 0.5303 *** 0.4720 *** 0.4722 *** 
 
(0.0025) 
 
(0.0055) 
 
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0053) 
 
(0.0119) 
 
(0.0081) 
 Size squared -0.0366 *** -0.0330 *** -0.0342 *** -0.0475 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0376 *** 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0008) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0023) 
 
(0.0017) 
 Firm 
Performance -0.1288 *** -0.1313 *** -0.1522 *** 0.5929 *** 0.5936 *** 0.6272 *** 
 
(0.0008) 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0019) 
 
(0.0041) 
 
(0.0031) 
 Human Capital -0.1356 *** -0.1927 *** -0.1498 *** -0.3178 *** -0.2296 *** -0.2301 *** 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0201) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0242) 
 
(0.0432) 
 
(0.0319) 
 Ownership -0.0138 
 
-0.0145 
 
0.0260 ** -0.1733 *** -0.1619 *** -0.0970 *** 
 
(0.0095) 
 
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0129) 
 
(0.0201) 
 
(0.0274) 
 
(0.0257) 
 Urban 0.0009 
 
0.0478 ** -0.0182 
 
0.0068 
 
0.0475 
 
0.0791 *** 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0217) 
 
(0.0408) 
 
(0.0304) 
 Downturn -0.0042 *** -0.0025 
 
0.0053 *** -0.0522 *** -0.1208 *** -0.0602 *** 
 
(0.0010) 
 
(0.0023) 
 
(0.0020) 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0040) 
 Own*Downturn -0.0129 
 
0.0056 
 
-0.0074 
 
0.0826 *** 0.0661 ** -0.0114 
 
 
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0195) 
 
(0.0264) 
 
(0.0221) 
 MES 0.0050 *** -0.0153 *** -0.0138 *** 0.0996 *** 0.2219 *** 0.0210 *** 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0027) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0047) 
 
(0.0052) 
 HH Index -5.4324 *** -0.2434 
 
25.7911 *** 41.6005 *** -3.7666 *** 73.1326 *** 
 
(0.5876) 
 
(0.3368) 
 
(1.8257) 
 
(1.2291) 
 
(0.7148) 
 
(3.6088) 
 Industry 
Agglomeration 0.0939 ** 0.8592 ** 0.8278 *** 1.3588 *** -9.7048 *** -9.6546 *** 
 
(0.0391) 
 
(0.4239) 
 
(0.1383) 
 
(0.0825) 
 
(0.9022) 
 
(0.2733) 
 Exports/VAB 0.0423 *** -0.0067 
 
0.0246 *** -0.1543 *** 0.0588 *** -0.0685 *** 
 
(0.0028) 
 
(0.0058) 
 
(0.0030) 
 
(0.0058) 
 
(0.0123) 
 
(0.0059) 
 Industry Growth -0.0001 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0253 *** 0.0108 
 
0.1389 *** 
 
(0.0017) 
 
(0.0073) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0258) 
 For. Presence in 
Industry 0.0322 
 
0.0728 
 
-0.2739 *** -1.3086 *** -1.6213 *** -1.7549 *** 
 
(0.0453) 
 
(0.0474) 
 
(0.0497) 
 
(0.0952) 
 
(0.1009) 
 
(0.0981) 
 Industry 
dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 428692 
 
80053 
 
151712 
 
399757 
 
75800 
 
142833 
 R2 0.2806   0.2722   0.2743   0.2484   0.2633   0.2691   
 
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
B. Empirical Results – Firms’ Hazard Rates by Technological Complexity of PMI 
 
 
Low-Tech 
Manufacturing  
Industries 
Medium-Low Tech 
Manufacturing 
 Industries 
Medium-High/High Tech 
Manufacturing 
 Industries 
Constant -1.0936 *** -0.2818 
 
-6.4570 *** 
 
(0.0959) 
 
(0.5897) 
 
(0.6055) 
 Age 0.0121 *** 0.0171 *** 0.0113 *** 
 
(0.0007) 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0006) 
 Age squared -6.03e-06 *** -8.47e-06 *** -5.57e-06 *** 
 
(3.51e-07) 
 
(8.90e-07) 
 
(3.15e-07) 
 Size -0.5156 *** -0.7110 *** -0.5701 *** 
 
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0231) 
 Size squared 0.0423 *** 0.0770 *** 0.0506 *** 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0085) 
 
(0.0061) 
 Firm Performance -0.0232 *** -0.0676 *** 0.0245 ** 
 
(0.0057) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0120) 
 Human Capital 0.1849 *** 0.4480 *** 0.3047 *** 
 
(0.0604) 
 
(0.1339) 
 
(0.0822) 
 Ownership 0.0349 
 
0.1821 
 
0.2908 ** 
 
(0.0977) 
 
(0.1561) 
 
(0.1190) 
 Urban 0.1650 *** 0.0010 
 
0.2063 *** 
 
(0.0121) 
 
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0212) 
 Downturn 0.1032 *** 0.2198 *** 0.0736 *** 
 
(0.0126) 
 
(0.0321) 
 
(0.0276) 
 Own*Downturn 0.1618 
 
-0.2663 
 
-0.1777 *** 
 
(0.1519) 
 
(0.2596) 
 
(0.1940) 
 MES -0.0428 *** -0.0521 
 
0.1870 *** 
 
(0.0083) 
 
(0.0323) 
 
(0.0412) 
 HH Index 17.2676 ** 4.3666 
 
-76.0279 *** 
 
(8.4980) 
 
(6.2929) 
 
(22.9364) 
 Industry Agglomeration -0.1389 
 
-0.0082 
 
18.0945 *** 
 
(0.4841) 
 
(7.5542) 
 
(2.7608) 
 Exports/VAB 0.2309 *** -0.1656 * -0.3502 *** 
 
(0.0351) 
 
(0.1001) 
 
(0.0924) 
 Industry Growth 0.0517 ** 0.0009 
 
-0.1344 
 
 
(0.0215) 
 
(0.1217) 
 
(0.1775) 
 For. Presence in Industry -1.3974 ** 1.8668 *** 1.7676 * 
 
(0.5676) 
 
(0.6770) 
 
(0.9367) 
 Entry Rate 3.3725 *** 1.0476 
 
4.4959 *** 
 
(0.4560) 
 
(1.2826) 
 
(1.2069) 
 
Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Time dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 239821 
 
38422 
 
84219 
 2 8447.20 
 
1389.35 
 
2998.10 
 Log Likelihood -88385.42   -11817.18   -27950.56   
 
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
C.  Empirical Results – The effect of firm size on firms’ employment growth 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -0.8427 *** -0.8650 *** 0.5771 *** 0.5785 *** 0.5864 *** 0.5794 *** 
 (0.0104)  (0.0106)  (0.0128)  (0.0128)  (0.0139)  (0.0139)  
Age     0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0002 ** 0.0002 ** 
     (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Age2     -3.29e-07 *** -3.34e-07 *** -7.29e-08 * -9.45e-08 ** 
     (3.32e-08)  (3.32e-08)  (3.83e-08)  (3.84e-08)  
Size 0.5326 *** 0.5456 *** 0.4603 *** 0.4604 *** 0.4594 *** 0.4614 *** 
 (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  
Size2 -0.0419 *** -0.0424 *** -0.0359 *** -0.0359 *** -0.0358 *** -0.0358 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Firm Performance     -0.1310 *** -0.1308 *** -0.1334 *** -0.1333 *** 
     (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  
Human Capital     -0.1379 *** -0.1360 *** -0.1483 *** -0.1469 *** 
     (0.0082)  (0.0082)  (0.0083)  (0.0083)  
Ownership   -0.0445 *** -0.0041  -0.0043  -0.0070  -0.0073  
   (0.0063)  (0.0062)  (0.0062)  (0.0062)  (0.0062)  
Urban     0.0030  0.0029  0.0050  0.0049  
     (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0076)  
Downturn       -0.0045 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0067 *** 
       (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0015)  
Size*Downturn           -0.0052 *** 
           (0.0006)  
MES         -0.0002  -0.0001  
         (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
HH Index         -1.4665 *** -1.4978 *** 
         (0.2105)  (0.2105)  
Industry 
Agglomeration         0.1768 *** 0.1743 *** 
         (0.0320)  (0.0320)  
Export Intensity         0.0166 *** 0.0163 *** 
         (0.0014)  (0.0014)  
Industry Growth         -0.0023  -0.0023  
         (0.0016)  (0.0016)  
Foreign Share         0.0530 ** 0.0525 ** 
         (0.0228)  (0.0228)  
Industry Dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
N 719217  693780  660461  660461  660457  660457  
R2 0.2031   0.2139   0.2752   0.2752   0.2758   0.2759   
 
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
D.  Empirical Results – The effect of firm size on firms’ turnover growth 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -0.2020 *** -0.1989 *** -5.5369 *** -5.5278 *** -7.0909 *** -7.0912 *** 
 (0.0240)  (0.0245)  (0.0281)  (0.0281)  (0.0296)  (0.0296)  
Age     -0.0228 *** -0.0227 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0086 *** 
     (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Age2     1.13e-05 *** 1.13e-05 *** 4.25e-06 *** 4.25e-06 *** 
     (7.07e-08)  (7.07e-08)  (7.93e-08)  (7.94e-08)  
Size 0.1288 *** 0.1304 *** 0.4643 *** 0.4652 *** 0.5016 *** 0.5016 *** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0046)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  (0.0041)  (0.0042)  
Size2 -0.0086 *** -0.0085 *** -0.0344 *** -0.0342 *** -0.0426 *** -0.0426 *** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
Firm Performance     0.5132 *** 0.5151 *** 0.5872 *** 0.5872 *** 
     (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  (0.0015)  
Human Capital     -0.5270 *** -0.5105 *** -0.3042 *** -0.3041 *** 
     (0.0179)  (0.0179)  (0.0175)  (0.0175)  
Ownership   -0.0837 *** -0.1733 *** -0.1757 *** -0.1337 *** -0.1337 *** 
   (0.0148)  (0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.0129)  (0.0129)  
Urban     0.0960 *** 0.0950 *** 0.0434 *** 0.0434 *** 
     (0.0166)  (0.0166)  (0.0161)  (0.0161)  
Downturn       -0.0373 *** -0.0646 *** -0.0641 *** 
       (0.0017)  (0.0016)  (0.0031)  
Size*Downturn           -0.0002  
           (0.0012)  
MES         0.1260 *** 0.1260 *** 
         (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
HH Index         7.4546 *** 7.4534 *** 
         (0.4352)  (0.4352)  
Industry 
Agglomeration         -0.4020 *** -0.4021 *** 
         (0.0668)  (0.0668)  
Export Intensity         -0.1449 *** -0.1449 *** 
         (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
Industry Growth         0.0212 *** 0.0212 *** 
         (0.0034)  (0.0034)  
Foreign Share         -1.0320 *** -1.0320 *** 
         (0.0475)  (0.0475)  
Industry Dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
N 646448  623746  618394  618394  618390  618390  
R2 0.0048   0.0050   0.2011   0.2019   0.2472   0.2472   
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
E.  Empirical Results – The effect of firm size on firms’ hazard rates 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -1.1298 *** -1.1267 *** -1.2525 *** -1.3000 *** -1.1332 *** -1.1129 *** 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0517) 
 
(0.0519) 
 
(0.0747) 
 
(0.0749) 
 
Age 
    
0.0117 *** 0.0119 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0117 *** 
     
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
(0.0004) 
 
Age squared 
    
-5.82e-06 *** -5.91e-06 *** -5.83e-06 *** -5.83e-06 *** 
     
(2.04e-07) 
 
(2.02e-07) 
 
(2.07e-07) 
 
(2.08e-07) 
 
Size -0.5768 *** -0.5812 *** -0.5523 *** -0.5524 *** -0.5479 *** -0.5619 *** 
 
(0.0097) 
 
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
Size squared 0.0590 *** 0.0591 *** 0.0485 *** 0.0483 *** 0.0486 *** 0.0483 *** 
 
(0.0026) 
 
(0.0026) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
(0.0029) 
 
Firm Performance 
    
-0.0074 
 
-0.0079 * -0.0180 *** -0.0182 *** 
     
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0048) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
(0.0049) 
 
Human Capital 
    
0.2851 *** 0.2696 *** 0.2546 *** 0.2551 *** 
     
(0.0452) 
 
(0.0452) 
 
(0.0455) 
 
(0.0456) 
 
Ownership 
  
0.1207 ** 0.1164 ** 0.1216 ** 0.1284 ** 0.1299 ** 
   
(0.0485) 
 
(0.0543) 
 
(0.0543) 
 
(0.0544) 
 
(0.0544) 
 
Urban 
    
0.1540 *** 0.1531 *** 0.1572 *** 0.1572 *** 
     
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0100) 
 
Downturn 
      
0.1477 *** 0.1318 *** 0.0807 *** 
       
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0103) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
Size*Downturn 
          
0.0388 *** 
           
(0.0092) 
 
MES 
        
-0.0375 *** -0.0380 *** 
         
(0.0066) 
 
(0.0092) 
 
HH Index 
        
4.8112 
 
4.9031 
 
         
(3.5584) 
 
(3.5581) 
 Industry 
Agglomeration 
        
-0.5696 
 
-0.5396 
 
         
(0.4100) 
 
(0.4102) 
 
Exports/VAB 
        
0.0869 *** 0.0880 *** 
         
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0213) 
 
Industry Growth 
        
0.0032 
 
0.0032 
 
         
(0.0205) 
 
(0.0205) 
 
Foreign Presence 
        
-0.5900 * -0.6063 * 
         
(0.3305) 
 
(0.3305) 
 
Entry Rate 
        
4.0428 *** 4.0568 *** 
         
(0.3727) 
 
(0.3725) 
 Time Dummies YES
 
YES
 
YES
 
YES
 
YES 
 
YES 
 Industry Dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   
N 431218 
 
417786 
 
362463 
 
363463 
 
363462 
 
362462 
 2 15053.31 
 
14884.14 
 
12402.20 
 
12619.98 
 
12870.46 
 
12888.27 
 Log Likelihood -158259  -156457  -128571  -128462  -128337  -128328  
***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
F.  Comparison of samples – Small-Medium Enterprises and Large-Enterprises 
 
 
  Mean Values Correlation Matrix 
  All Firms SMEs LEs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Age (1) 24.066 19.986 35.637             
Size (2) 1.957 1.913 6.030 -0,07           
Firm Performance (3) 9.977 9.968 10.768 0,00 0,07          
Human Capital (4) 0.019 0.019 0.048 -0,02 0,03 0,19         
Ownership (5) 0.014 0.012 0.246 -0,11 0,33 0,08 0,03        
Urban (6) 0.392 0.389 0.462 0,01 0,02 -0,03 0,05 -0,55       
MÊS (7) 6.708 6.691 8.258 -0,04 0,24 -0,23 -0,05 0,06 -0,03      
HH Índex (8) 0.001 0.003 1.7e-05 -0,01 0,04 0,05 0,04 -0,50 0,31 0,12     
Industry Agglomeration (9) 0.056 0.177 0.001 -0,02 0,13 -0,17 -0,05 -0,78 0,40 0,56 0,23    
Exports/VAB (10) 1.151 1.152 1.109 -0,01 -0,05 0,13 0,05 -0,01 -0,04 -0,12 -0,08 0,48   
Industry Growth (11) -0.003 -0.003 0.026 -0,01 0,03 -0,12 -0,02 0,01 0,05 0,13 -0,03 0,09 -0,17  
For. Presence in Industry (12) 0.107 0.106 0.117 -0,02 -0,01 0,20 0,09 0,01 -0,01 0,12 0,13 0,30 0,66 -0,02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.  Relative importance of SMEs in Manufacturing 
      (SMEs as percentage of the total)  
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H.  Survival Rates and Hazard Rates of Small-Medium Enterprises and Large Enterprises 
 
 SMEs LEs 
Time 
Interval 
Nr. firms at 
risk 
Nr. failures Survival Hazard 
Nr. firms 
at risk 
Nr. failures Survival Hazard 
[1-2[ 86912 16868 0.8059 0.1941 115 22 0.8087 0.1913 
[2-3[ 66700 9625 0.6898 0.1443 87 6 0.7529 0.0690 
[3-4[ 54259 7054 0.6000 0.1300 77 4 0.7138 0.0519 
[4-5[ 44066 5324 0.5275 0.1208 67 4 0.6712 0.0597 
[5-6[ 35370 3950 0.4686 0.1117 54 3 0.6339 0.0556 
[6-7[ 27960 2869 0.4205 0.1026 45 3 0.5916 0.0667 
[7-8[ 23119 2276 0.3791 0.0984 39 1 0.5765 0.0256 
[8-9[ 19302 1703 0.3456 0.0882 35 1 0.5600 0.0286 
[9-10[ 16267 1385 0.3161 0.0851 31 2 0.5239 0.0645 
[10-11[ 13597 1123 0.2901 0.0826 24 2 0.4802 0.0833 
[11-12[ 11416 929 0.2665 0.0814 20 0 0.4802 0.0000 
[12-13[ 9215 787 0.2437 0.0854 19 0 0.4802 0.0000 
[13-14[ 6944 547 0.2245 0.0788 12 0 0.4802 0.0000 
[14-15[ 5504 446 0.2063 0.0810 9 1 0.4269 0.1111 
[15-16[ 4205 303 0.1915 0.0721 7 0 0.4269 0.0000 
[16-17[ 2955 181 0.1797 0.0613 4 0 0.4269 0.0000 
[17-18[ 1920 150 0.1657 0.0781 3 0 0.4269 0.0000 
[18-19[ 858 53 0.1555 0.0618 1 0 0.4269 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
